CHERYLL CONKLIN V EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIV CHAPTER AAUP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHERYLL CONKLIN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 21, 2008
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
v
No. 278212
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 04-000408-CK
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Sawyer and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff filed this action for breach of contract, alleging that she was improperly
terminated without just cause from her position as executive director of defendant, a labor union
for university professors. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
plaintiff was discharged because of economic necessity, which was sufficient to establish just
cause for her discharge. Plaintiff appeals by right. We affirm.
This Court reviews a trial court’s summary disposition decision de novo. Spiek v Dep’t
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The trial court granted summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
support for a claim. The court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and other documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MCR
2.116(G)(5). Summary disposition may be granted if, except as to the amount of damages, there
is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich App 45, 48; 536 NW2d 834 (1995).
For purposes of appeal, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff’s employment could only
be terminated for just cause. Where an individual’s employment may be terminated only for just
cause, bona fide economic reasons for the discharge can constitute just cause. McCart v J Walter
Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 114; 469 NW2d 284 (1991). Here, however, plaintiff argues
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that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether defendant’s economic necessity defense was
a pretext for her termination. We disagree.
Initially, we reject plaintiff’s argument that the trial court did not consider whether
defendant’s proffered economic necessity defense was a pretext for her discharge. In its
decision, the trial court stated that “the record is not refuted when it comes to the evidence of
economic necessity and the justification for elimination of her position.” Further, during oral
arguments, the court questioned the attorneys about plaintiff ’s claims that her discharge was
politically motivated and that her duties were assumed by the new office administrator. Thus, it
is apparent that the trial court was aware of plaintiff ’s arguments regarding pretext. In any
event, our review is de novo, so we may independently consider whether the submitted evidence
supports plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s economic necessity defense was a pretext for her
termination.
In Ewers v Stroh Brewery Co, 178 Mich App 371, 378-379; 443 NW2d 504 (1989), this
Court held that an economic necessity workforce reduction is not a per se defense to a just cause
discharge, explaining:
Defendant in this case has not cited a single case, and we have found none,
where a court has held that an economic necessity reduction in force claim is a per
se defense to a termination where there is a just-cause requirement. Defendant
would have us hold that in all cases the employer is the sole judge and final
arbiter of the legitimacy of the economic necessity defense subject to review by
no one. We decline to do so.
There is no per se rule that a reduction in force constitutes good cause for
termination. Certainly employers have the right to adjust their work forces in
response to market forces and business necessity. However, they may not use
such claims as pretexts for discharges which would otherwise be subject to a justcause attack by the employee.
After carefully reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court, we are
convinced that plaintiff has met his burden of showing that a genuine issue of
disputed fact exists concerning the legitimacy of the economic necessity reduction
in force defense presented. Therefore, the trial judge erred in granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition as to plaintiff’s wrongful discharge
claim.
We believe that, consistent with the language in Toussaint [v Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980)], a jury should
be permitted to determine whether “economic necessity” was defendant’s true
reason for discharging plaintiff. Plaintiff presented substantial proofs in
opposition to the claim that Stroh’s financial condition necessitated the discharge
of plaintiff and others. Where an employer alleges discharge for economic
necessity and the employee presents evidence that the economic necessity was
pretextual and that he was discharged for another reason, the “question of just
cause” is one of fact for the jury. Here there was substantial evidence produced
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by plaintiff to rebut defendant’s economic necessity defense sufficient to create a
jury question on the legitimacy of the defense.
In McCart, supra at 115-116, the Court distinguished Ewers on the ground that in Ewers
the plaintiff offered deposition testimony and documentary evidence to show that the defendant’s
economic reasons for discharge were a mere pretext because the defendant was experiencing
substantial economic growth and operating at a substantial profit both before and after his
discharge. Conversely, in McCart, the defendant was entitled to summary disposition because
the plaintiff did not submit any evidence to rebut the defendant’s economic necessity defense.
Plaintiff here likewise failed to submit evidence to rebut defendant’s economic necessity
defense. In Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 157, 175-176; 579 NW2d 906
(1998), the Court held that where an employer relies on a bona fide decision to reduce its work
force, the plaintiff can survive a motion for summary disposition by presenting sufficient
admissible evidence to create a reasonable factual dispute with regard to whether the employer’s
proffered reason was a mere pretext and that discrimination was a motivating factor behind the
plaintiff ’s discharge. Although Lytle involved a claim for discrimination, its rationale is equally
applicable in determining if plaintiff here presented sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute
as to whether defendant’s economic necessity defense lacked factual support or whether other
reasons not amounting to just cause were the motivating factors behind plaintiff’s discharge.
We disagree with plaintiff’s argument that defendant gave conflicting reasons for its
decision to discharge here, thereby supporting her claim that the proffered economic necessity
defense was a pretext for her discharge. Plaintiff relies on Thurman v Yellow Freight Systems,
Inc, 90 F3d 1160, 1167 (CA 6, 1996), amended 97 F3d 833 (CA 6, 1996), in which the court
held that “[a]n employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can
be evidence of pretext.” In Thurman, however, the defendant’s reasons for its employment
decision changed during the course of the case and were directly contradictory. In this case,
defendant informed plaintiff in its original December 14, 2003, letter that “the Chapter’s
alarming financial position compels the immediate termination of the Executive Director
position.” Although defendant gave additional reasons warranting plaintiff’s discharge for just
cause in a December 19, 2003, letter which did not directly involve defendant’s financial
situation, those reasons were not inconsistent with the explanation defendant provided in its
December 14 letter. On the contrary, the December 14 letter also informed plaintiff that “the
Committee has further concluded that there is cause for your immediate termination from
employment, quite apart from the Chapter’s dire financial condition.” Instead of setting forth its
additional concerns in the December 14 letter, however, defendant invited plaintiff to schedule a
meeting to provide her with “an opportunity to hear and respond to its concerns.” The December
19 letter informed plaintiff that in light of her failure to schedule a meeting, it was providing her
with a summary of the further grounds for the Committee’s previous decision to terminate her
employment for cause. Further, most of the additional grounds involved plaintiff’s conduct and
decisions that contributed to defendant’s precarious financial situation.
We also disagree with plaintiff’s argument that defendant did not intend to discharge her
immediately when it sent the December 14 letter because defendant also asked for medical
documentation to support her recent leave of absence. The December 14 letter provided, in
pertinent part:
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If you believe that you are owed unused fringe benefits, you will need to
set up a meeting with me, and to bring supporting documentation with you, so that
we can discuss any such claim.
Please note that while you have been absent from work from the moment
this administration took office, which you attribute to “depression/anxiety,” you
have presented no medical documentation of any kind, despite my telephone
request for the immediate production of such documentation, and your doctors
have not responded to our request for all medical records covered by the medical
release that you left at the office. You have been absent from work on the basis of
this claimed disability for a full week, without providing any supporting medical
records. It is your responsibility to make sure that I receive all appropriate
medical records, and you are directed to do so no later than Tuesday, December
16, 2003.
Viewed in context, it is apparent that the medical documentation was requested so defendant
could evaluate the status of plaintiff’s leave of absence before her discharge. Further, plaintiff
was informed that she would continue to receive her salary for one month, during which time she
was expected to cooperate with the executive committee to assist in a smooth transition.
Similarly, we find nothing inconsistent with defendant’s opposition to plaintiff ’s
application for unemployment benefits in which it challenged plaintiff’s receipt of benefits for
the reasons summarized in its December 19 letter. Once again, those reasons are consistent with
defendant’s position in the December 14 letter that there was cause for plaintiff’s “immediate
termination from employment, quite apart from the Chapter’s dire financial condition.”
For these reasons, plaintiff failed to show that there was evidence of conflicting or
changing reasons for plaintiff’s discharge that created a factual issue with regard to whether
economic necessity was a pretext for her discharge.
Plaintiff also argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether she was actually
discharged because of political machinations, rather than economic necessity. We disagree.
As plaintiff observes, the evidence showed that union members organized specifically for
the purpose of taking control of defendant’s executive committee after the former president was
unable to implement the fiscal controls needed to address defendant’s financial problems. Still,
that evidence did not undermine the evidence of the economic necessity of plaintiff’s discharge
as executive director. The evidence showed that defendant was unable to address the financial
concerns earlier because of plaintiff’s influence over other members of the executive committee.
The formation of a new executive committee enabled the committee to address those concerns.
But unlike in Ewers, supra, the evidence here showed that there was no genuine issue of material
fact that defendant’s dire financial situation was real and substantial and was created in large part
because of plaintiff’s management decisions. Thus, even though a changing political climate
placed the executive committee in a position where it could address defendant’s financial
condition, plaintiff failed to show that defendant’s claim that it was terminating the executive
director position out of economic necessity was a pretext for plaintiff’s discharge.
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Plaintiff also argues that the evidence showed that defendant did not actually eliminate
her position, but only changed the title and hired someone else to perform the same work. Were
this the case, it would refute defendant’s claim that her position was terminated because of
economic necessity. We disagree.
In Lytle, supra at 177-178 n 27, the Court followed Barnes v GenCorp, Inc, 896 F2d
1457, 1465 (CA 6, 1990), to define a true workforce reduction:
It is important to clarify what constitutes a true work force reduction case.
A work force reduction situation occurs when business considerations cause an
employer to eliminate one or more positions within the company. An employee is
not eliminated as part of a work force reduction when he or she is replaced after
his or her discharge. However, a person is not replaced when another employee is
assigned to perform the plaintiff ’s duties in addition to other duties, or when the
work is redistributed among other existing employees already performing related
work. A person is replaced only when another employee is hired or reassigned to
perform the plaintiff ’s duties.
In Barnes, supra at 1465 n 10, the court explained that “[o]f course an employer could not avoid
liability by changing the job title or by making minor changes to a job indicative of an attempt to
avoid liability.”
At the time plaintiff was employed, she served as defendant’s executive director and was
assisted by two full-time employees. Defendant’s reorganization was not limited to eliminating
plaintiff’s executive director position. Defendant also eliminated the two full-time positions and
turned to student employees to assist in its operations. As plaintiff observes, defendant later
created a new position for an office administrator, but that position was not the equivalent of
plaintiff’s former executive director position. Unlike plaintiff’s former position, the new
position did not require a college degree or experience in management or employee relations.
Many of the duties that plaintiff formerly performed were instead assumed by members of
defendant’s executive committee, particularly its treasurer. In sum, the evidence showed that
defendant restructured its organization so that it no longer operates with an executive director.
Now, it relies on an office administrator, supplemented by student assistants, to handle the dayto-day operations that were formerly handled by its staff of three full-time employees. In
addition, defendant’s officers had assumed a greater role in defendant’s overall management.
Thus, plaintiff failed to establish support for her claim that defendant did not truly eliminate the
executive director position.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant was able to quickly recover from its financial crisis,
thereby indicating that her termination was not economically necessary. Although defendant had
a surplus by 2004, it still owed the national chapter back dues. The evidence, however, showed
that defendant’s recovery was due to its reorganization, which allowed it to significantly reduce
its employment costs through the elimination of two full-time positions and use of student
assistants. According to defendant’s treasurer, reducing defendant’s labor costs, which were
excessive compared to its income, was critical to defendant’s economic survival. The fact that
defendant’s reorganization enabled it to quickly recover from its critical financial situation does
not indicate that economic necessity was a pretext for plaintiff’s termination.
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Plaintiff also argues that she should have been offered the new position of office
administrator. However, the evidence showed that the office administrator position was not
created until well after plaintiff’s position was eliminated. Further, defendant had no obligation
to give this position to plaintiff, particularly in light of the evidence showing that plaintiff
contributed to the financial crisis and resisted implementing changes to correct the problem.
In sum, defendant’s evidence established that plaintiff’s termination was economically
necessary, and plaintiff failed to rebut that evidence with evidence showing that the asserted
economic necessity was pretextual and that she was actually discharged for another reason.
Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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