PEOPLE OF MI V BRANDON EDWARD GORECKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 2, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277448
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001587-FC
BRANDON EDWARD GORECKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of first-degree murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), torture, MCL 750.85, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, larceny in a building, MCL
750.360, and larceny of more than $1,000, MCL 750.356(3)(a). Defendant was sentenced to
concurrent terms of life in prison for first-degree murder, 20 to 30 years for torture, 20 to 30
years for armed robbery, one to four years for larceny in a building, and two to five years for
larceny of more than $1,000. We affirm.
Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court improperly admitted statements
made by codefendant Raymond Carp (defendant’s brother) to Carp’s girlfriend that addressed
defendant’s role in the murder. Whether a statement was made against the declarant’s penal
interest is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 268; 547
NW2d 280 (1996). The findings of fact of the trial court are reviewed for clear error while the
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
at 269. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 265; 666 NW2d
231 (2003).
Defendant argues that the admission of the non-testifying accomplice’s (Carp) statements
violated his confrontation rights as espoused in Lilly v Virginia, 527 US 116; 119 S Ct 1887; 199
L Ed 2d 117 (1999) and Williamson v United States, 512 US 594; 114 S Ct 2431; 129 L Ed 2d
476 (1994). We conclude, however, that this case is resolved by application of precedent from
this Court and our Supreme Court.
Out-of-court statements that are offered for the truth of the matter asserted are considered
hearsay and are not admissible unless there is an applicable exception. MRE 802. The pertinent
exception here is MRE 804(b)(3), which states as follows:
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A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not
have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
In People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 165; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), our Supreme Court
concluded that admitting a non-testifying co-defendant’s statements against a defendant does not
violate a defendant’s right to confrontation if the prosecution can establish that (1) the declarant
was unavailable, and (2) the statements bear an indicia of reliability or fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. The Court set forth the following factors for deciding whether there is a
sufficient indicia of reliability to support admission:
[W]hether the statement was (1) voluntarily given, (2) made contemporaneously
with the events referenced, (3) made to family, friends, colleagues, or
confederates—that is, to someone to whom the declarant would literally speak the
truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and without
prompting or inquiry by the listener.
On the other hand, the presence of the following factors would favor a
finding of inadmissibility: whether the statement (1) was made to law
enforcement officers or at the prompting or inquiry of the listener, (2) minimizes
the role or responsibility of the declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3)
was made to avenge the declarant or to curry favor, and (4) whether the declarant
had a motive to lie or distort the truth.
In considering the above factors relative to the totality of the conversation between Carp
and his girlfriend, the trial court correctly concluded that the testimony was admissible as Carp
was undisputedly unavailable to testify, and his statements meet all of the factors in favor of
admissibility. Carp volunteered the information to his girlfriend within days of the murder. His
girlfriend is someone that Carp would be expected to be truthful with when imparting this type of
information. There is no evidence that Carp’s girlfriend prompted the statements. Indeed, she
testified that she did not ask questions but simply listened to Carp as he recalled the events of the
incident. There is no evidence that Carp had a motive to lie at this point. Furthermore, Carp’s
invocation of the “pinky swear” rule—albeit a bit juvenile—evidences that he was telling the
truth and not expecting this information to be used in a court of law or elsewhere.1 Thus, the
statements were properly admitted and did not violate defendant’s confrontation rights. Poole,
supra; People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 556; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
1
Moreover, defendant admitted at trial to the killing, and there is ample additional evidence
establishing that the killing was premeditated and deliberated.
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Defendant argues that Williamson, Dorchy v Jones, 398 F3d 783 (CA 6, 2005), and
Vincent v Seabold, 226 F3d 681 (CA 6, 2000), are controlling in this case. However, Williamson
did not address a federal constitutional question, as it remanded the matter before it based on its
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE 804(b)(3)), Williamson, supra at 600-601,
604, and thus provides no authority for defendant’s constitutional argument in the matter before
us. Our Court in Beasley squarely addressed and rejected the precise argument made by
defendant here, i.e., that Williamson and Lilly apply, rather than Poole. Beasley, supra at 554559. Furthermore, Vincent and Dorchy are distinguishable from the case at bar as Vincent
involved the exclusion of testimonial co-defendant statements that were made to police officers,
Vincent, supra at 684-686, while Dorchy involved testimonial statements that were made at the
prompting of an attorney during a direct examination at a previous trial that shifted the blame
from the declarant to the defendant in the case at bar, Dorchy, supra at 786, 789-791. Here,
defendant has not argued that Carp’s statements were testimonial. Additionally, the statements
in Vincent and Dorchy involved statements that lacked an indicia of reliability, Poole, supra at
165. Hence, they are not controlling in this case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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