PEOPLE OF MI V LEANDREW LIDDELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 2, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272777
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-006206-01
LEANDREW LIDDELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282551
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-006206-01
LEANDREW LIDDELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
I.
Introduction
In Docket No. 272777, defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of two
counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of a
person under 13 years of age) (CSC I), and three counts of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (person under 13 years of age) (CSC II). Defendant was
sentenced, as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 20 to 60 years in prison for each count
of CSC I and 15 to 30 years in prison for each count of CSC II. This Court granted defendant’s
motion for remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on whether defendant’s trial
counsel was ineffective. People v Liddell, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
April 6, 2007 (Docket No. 272777). Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
granted defendant a new trial.
In Docket No. 282551, the prosecutor appeals by delayed leave granted from the trial
court’s order granting defendant a new trial. This Court consolidated the two appeals and stayed
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further proceedings in Docket No. 272777. People v Liddell, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered February 29, 2008 (Docket No. 282551). We affirm the trial court’s order
granting a new trial and, thus, decline to consider defendant’s issues on appeal.
II.
Facts and Proceedings
As just mentioned, this Court remanded this matter to the trial court to hold a Ginther1
hearing about the medical report and Jordan’s representation of defendant. At that hearing,
Jordan testified that Lindsay2 and defendant told Jordan that there was a medical report for Tory;
Jordan asked the prosecutor if she had a copy of a report, and she responded that she did not.
Jordan explained to defendant that in order to obtain the report, they would likely need the trial
court to inspect the report and make a determination of whether it was relevant to defendant’s
case. He explained to defendant that this would put the prosecutor on notice that they intended
to use the medical report and that, in his opinion, the prosecutor would then preemptively
introduce the report in her case-in-chief in the light most favorable to her case. He further
explained that in the absence of the report, he could argue to the jury that the prosecutor had not
“present[ed] to the jurors everything that they would need to feel confident in a verdict of
guilty.”
Lindsay told Jordan that the medical report might show that Tory’s hymen was intact.
Nevertheless, Jordan opined to defendant that “a doctor is not going to come forward and say a
victim of a CSC . . . is a virgin. He will just say whether or not his findings are consistent with . .
. penetration.” Jordan further explained that because defendant was accused of conduct other
than penile penetration, the medical report might not eliminate the charges related to fellatio and
digital penetration of the vagina. Further, Jordan was aware of allegations of other criminal
sexual conduct in other jurisdictions and was concerned that the testimony resulting from
introduction of the report would bring out this information, to defendant’s detriment. Again,
Jordan felt that the lack of a medical report would be far more valuable to defendant’s case
overall than casting some doubt upon one count of CSC I. Jordan testified that he did not have
any indication at that time that the medical report contained evidence that Tory denied vaginal
penetration.3
The doctor’s summary in the medical report includes:
[Tory] states that there has never been any intercourse to her vagina or to her
anus. She states that she has seen his penis, touched his penis[,] and has given
him oral sex on demand.
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
2
Maria Lindsay was defendant’s fiancée, who frequently dealt with Jordan regarding
defendant’s trial.
3
Defendant testified at the hearing that there was a conversation between he and Jordan, but he
testified that he did not agree to not obtaining the medical record. Jordan testified that defendant
agreed with the tactical decision not to obtain the report.
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***
[Tory] denies acute [sic] putting his penis in her vagina or rectum but she
performs oral sex and she touches his penis. . . . The genital examination, vaginal
examination, no discharge, no bleeding, hymen ring is pink and is complete.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for a new trial, stating:
I’ve got to tell you – I was convinced that counsel for the defense made an
error. But for that error, this man might have been acquitted. . . . [I]n this case, I
think that if [the] medical report had been introduced, and people had understood
that this little girl had an intact hymen – and if I remember correctly, her
testimony was that this man placed his penis in her vagina something like 50
times, and I know what they say – “penetration, however slight” – but look how
huge this guy is.
And so . . . I believe that if the jury heard that, they would have had a
reasonable doubt. And especially – I hate to say this . . . I have to grant a new
trial.
III.
Analysis
The prosecutor argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial
because it erred in its conclusion that defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective. We disagree.
The decision of whether to grant a new trial is in the trial court’s discretion and is,
therefore, reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 149; ___
NW2d ___ (2008); People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 271; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). Whether a
defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law.
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). A trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error, while questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. Id.
Generally, trial counsel is presumed effective and the defendant must show that: (1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, and (2) that defendant was
so prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency that there is a reasonable probability that, without the
error, the outcome would have been different. People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 129; 695
NW2d 342 (2005). Further, the defendant must demonstrate that “the attendant proceedings
were fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645
NW2d 294 (2001).
Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was predicated on the fact that
defense counsel declined to subpoena, and thus introduce at trial, the victim’s medical report.
The report contained evidence that the victim’s hymen was intact and that the victim denied
vaginal penetration. Defendant was charged with both digital and penile penetration of the
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victim’s vagina, and penile penetration of the victim’s mouth.4 Defense counsel argued that this
was a question of trial strategy and that his only knowledge of the report was that it indicated that
the victim’s hymen was intact; he had no knowledge that the victim had denied penetration.5
Decisions regarding what evidence to present are presumed to be matters of trial strategy.
People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). Defendant does not deny that
defense counsel’s decision was a strategic one. Defendant argues, however, that the strategy
decision was not a sound one. However, even if an attorney’s trial strategy is ultimately
unsuccessful, there is a strong presumption that the strategy was sound. Rodgers, supra at 715.
An appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of defense counsel, or use the benefit
of hindsight on questions of trial strategy. People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 411; 740 NW2d
557 (2007). However, the failure to fully investigate potentially exculpatory evidence may fall
beneath an objective reasonable standard of performance. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600,
626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005); Mack, supra at 129.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse it’s discretion in granting a new trial based on
the ineffective assistance of counsel. In making this conclusion, we are quite cognizant of the
standards used to review trial counsel’s difficult job of making strategic decisions both before
and during trial. Our decision is not contrary to that standard. Instead, and as explained below,
our decision is consistent with the abuse of discretion standard of review, and recognizes that a
principled decision on this close issue could have gone either way. People v Babcock, 469 Mich
247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
In People v Grant, 470 Mich 477; 684 NW2d 686 (2004), our Supreme Court addressed a
similar situation. In that case the Court held that trial counsel’s failure to conduct a complete
investigation that would have revealed eyewitness testimony to corroborate its defense and
impeach the oldest victim’s testimony, “was not a strategic decision, erroneous only in
hindsight,” but rather was “a fundamental abdication of duty that prejudiced defendant, depriving
him of a fair trial.” Id. at 497-498.
Grant involved multiple counts of CSC, with the prosecution asserting that defendant
injured the victim through sexual misconduct, while defendant alleged that the injuries were
caused by a bicycle accident. In it’s case the prosecution relied heavily on (1) the victim’s
vaginal injury and (2) corresponding testimony from the victim that her injury was a result of the
defendant’s sexual penetration. Id. at 479-481. Despite the fact that (1) the victim had
knowingly made prior inconsistent statements (telling her first doctor that her vaginal injury was
the result of a bike accident, and her second doctor that she made up the story of the bike
accident out of fear of defendant and that her injury was a result of sexual penetration), (2) the
victim testified at trial consistent with what she told the second doctor, and (3) defendant gave
defense counsel a list of approximately a dozen witnesses that could help substantiate
defendant’s alleged innocence because they were “present on the day of the incident,” defense
4
Defendant was acquitted of the digital penetration charge.
5
The details of the report were elucidated in the trial court at the evidentiary hearing on remand
from this Court.
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counsel failed “to adequately interview” the witnesses. Id. at 481-482. Finding that had defense
counsel interviewed the witnesses, he could have presented their testimony that would have
significantly undercut the victim’s credibility, id. at 495, the Court reversed the defendant’s
convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because defense counsel’s objectively
unreasonable failure to adequately investigate the material facts undermined “confidence in the
trial’s outcome” Id. at 480, 493, 497-498.
Like the Grant Court, and as already recognized, we are very cognizant of the deference
given to strategic decisions of trial counsel. We are also cognizant of the fact that defense
counsel discussed the options with defendant. Nonetheless, counter balancing that is the simple
fact that trial counsel failed to even review an important document, thus precluding the making
of an informed decision and preventing the jury from hearing potentially exculpatory evidence.
Defense counsel was aware that the records contained evidence that the victim’s hymen was
intact. At trial, the victim, a nine-year-old girl, testified that she was penetrated vaginally as
many as 20 times. Clearly this evidence could have been beneficial to defendant’s case, whether
for impeachment purposes or to make further trial decisions, such as calling the doctor as a
witness. And, knowing what was actually contained in the document would have allowed for a
more informed decision as to whether to introduce the document.
There is no doubt that defense counsel demonstrated at the Ginther hearing that his
decision was thought out, was based upon several considerations surrounding this evidence, and
that defense counsel’s decision was strategic. Rodgers, supra at 715. However, defense
counsel’s decision not to ascertain the full details of the medical report prevented him from
discovering the victim’s denial of vaginal penetration in the report, and as noted above,
precluded him from making further decisions regarding evidence to support defendant’s position.
It was within the trial court’s discretion to resolve such close questions. Brown, supra at
15. The trial court had the ability to view the evidence and testimony first-hand and judged that
trial counsel erred in not pursuing this evidence and that the introduction of this evidence would
have likely raised a reasonable doubt with the jury. The victim’s veracity concerns all the
charges, and could have impacted the jury.6 Obviously the trial court felt that other witnesses for
the prosecution were not too objective. Because a principled decision below could have gone
either way, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Babcock, supra at 269.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
6
We recognize that the medical report also contains damaging evidence as to the allegation of
oral penetration. However, medical record contains significant evidence as to vaginal
penetration, which was one of the counts defendant was convicted of, and raises serious
credibility issues.
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