NEWTEK SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE INC V GOLF BAN INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NEWTEK SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
September 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
o. 277747
N
LC No. 05-054003-CH
GOLF BAN, INC., JIDASC, INC., d/b/a
PEACOCK RIDGE, JAMES RAU, TIMOTHY
BARKER, and DANE TERRILL,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants-
Appellees,
ROBERT PAGE,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/CrossDefendant-Appellee,
and
THOMAS SONDAY,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant/CrossPlaintiff-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Hoekstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying its motion to confirm sale after
the sale of foreclosed property. Specifically, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s ruling that
because the liability of the individual guarantors was not included in the judgment of foreclosure,
the guarantors could not be held liable for the deficiency that existed after the foreclosure sale.
Because the individual guarantors were brought into the foreclosure action under MCL 600.3160
and because this provision allows a court to order the payment of a deficiency by any person
besides the mortgagor who secures by obligation the mortgage debt after the foreclosure sale, we
reverse.
Plaintiff loaned approximately $1.3 million to defendants Golf Ban and JIDASC, who
granted a promissory note in the same amount to plaintiff. As security for the note, Golf Ban
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granted a mortgage and a security interest to plaintiff on real and personal property. In addition,
defendants James Rau, Timothy Barker, Dane Terrill, Robert Page, and Thomas Sonday
(individual guarantors) signed personal guarantees. After Golf Ban and JIDASC defaulted on
the promissory note, plaintiff obtained a judgment of foreclosure against Golf Ban. A sale of the
foreclosed property left a deficiency. Plaintiff moved to confirm the sale, asking, in part, the trial
court to confirm that the individual guarantors were liable for the deficiency. The guarantors
argued that, pursuant to MCL 600.3150, they could not be held liable for the deficiency because
their liability had not been described in the judgment of foreclosure. The trial court agreed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that because MCL 600.3160 provides for the entry of
judgment against a third-party guarantor after a foreclosure sale, the trial court erred in holding
that MCL 600.3150 precluded the individual guarantors from being held liable for the
deficiency. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Haynes v Neshewat, 477
Mich 29, 34; 729 NW2d 488 (2007). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the intent of the Legislature. Id. at 35. If the language of the statute is unambiguous,
we must apply the statute as written. Id.
Foreclosure by judicial action is governed by the provisions in MCL 600. 3101 et seq.
Two provisions, MCL 600.3150 and MCL 600.3160, are at issue in the present case. MCL
600.3150 provides:
In the original judgment in foreclosure cases the court shall determine and
adjudge which defendants, if any, are personally liable on the land contract or for
the mortgage debt. The judgment shall provide that upon the confirmation of the
report of sale that if either the principal, interest, or costs ordered to be paid, is left
unpaid after applying the amount received upon the sale of the premises, the clerk
of the court shall issue execution for the amount of the deficiency, upon the
application of the attorney for the plaintiff, without notice to the defendant or his
attorney. The court may order and compel the delivery of the possession of the
premises to the purchaser at the sale.
MCL 600.3160 provides:
If the land contract or mortgage debt is secured by the obligation or other
evidence of debt of any other person besides the vendee or mortgagor, the
plaintiff may make that person a party to the action, and the court may order
payment of the balance of the debt remaining unsatisfied, after a sale of the
mortgaged premises, against this other person as well as against the vendee or
mortgagor, and may enforce this judgment as in other cases.
The term “may” designates discretion. Old Kent Bank v Kal Kustom Enterprises, 255
Mich App 524, 532; 660 NW2d 384 (2003). Thus, pursuant to MCL 600.3160, a plaintiff has
discretion whether to make persons besides the mortgagor who have secured by obligation the
mortgage debt parties to the foreclosure action. Here, the individual guarantors were not the
mortgagors. Accordingly, plaintiff had discretion whether to make the individual guarantors
parties to the foreclosure action, and plaintiff chose to exercise this discretion. The corollary to
the previous statement is that the individual guarantors, unlike Golf Ban, the mortgagor, were not
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necessary parties to the action. The original judgment in the foreclosure action could have been
issued without the individual guarantors being included as parties to the action.
Because the individual guarantors were brought into the foreclosure action under MCL
600.3160, we conclude that this provision, rather than MCL 600.3150, governs the answer to
whether the liability of the individual guarantors was required to be included in the judgment of
foreclosure in order for the guarantors to be held liable for the deficiency. MCL 600.3160
provides that “after a sale of the mortgaged premises” the court may order payment of the
deficiency against any other person besides the mortgagor who secured by obligation the
mortgage debt. Thus, pursuant to MCL 600.3160, discretionary authority rested with the trial
court to issue an order after the foreclosure sale requiring the individual guarantors to pay the
deficiency. Accordingly, it was not required that the liability of the individual guarantors be
included in the judgment of foreclosure in order for the guarantors to be held liable for the
deficiency. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order holding that the individual guarantors
cannot be held liable for the deficiency.
Reversed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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