JANET K HOLLINRAKE V MICHAEL HOLLINRAKE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JANET K. HOLLINRAKE,
UNPUBLISHED
September 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 274229
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 04-009472-NI
MICHAEL HOLLINRAKE,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Talbot and Servitto, JJ
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment in favor of plaintiff following a jury trial.
We affirm.
Defendant and plaintiff, husband and wife respectively, were traveling in a vehicle on the
highway when weather conditions started to change. Although conditions were dry at the start of
the trip, the parties encountered rain, sleet, and ultimately snow. Defendant was traveling in the
right lane when he decided to pass in the left lane. The left lane was covered in slush and snow.
Defendant lost control of the vehicle, hit a guardrail, and the vehicle rolled over several times.
Plaintiff suffered from severe injuries including broken ribs and broken vertebrae. She required
three surgeries and the insertion of rods and screws over a three-year period to correct her back
problems. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, holding as a matter
of law that she suffered a temporary serious impairment of a body function. The jury found that
defendant was negligent and rendered an award of $200,000 in plaintiff’s favor. Defendant
appeals as of right.
Defendant first alleges that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by ruling that plaintiff
had sustained a temporary serious impairment of an important body function without examining
plaintiff’s life before and after the accident. We disagree.
In the no-fault automobile insurance act, MCL 500.31031 et seq., tort liability for
noneconomic losses is permitted when the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment
of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135(1); Hardy v Oakland Co,
461 Mich 561, 565; 607 NW2d 718 (2000). A serious impairment of body function is defined in
the no-fault act as “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that
affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.” MCL 500.3135(7). The issue
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of whether a plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function is a question of law to
be decided by the trial court, unless there is a material factual dispute concerning the nature and
extent of the person’s injuries. MCL 500.3135(2)(a); Kriener v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 120; 683
NW2d 611 (2004).
A multi-step analysis was developed by the Michigan Supreme Court for trial courts to
utilize to determine whether a plaintiff, alleging a serious impairment of body function, meets the
statutory threshold for third-party tort recovery. Kreiner, supra at 131. First, the trial court must
“determine that there is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person’s
injuries; or if there is a factual dispute, that it is not material to the determination whether the
person has suffered a serious impairment of body function.” Id. at 131-132. If the court so
concludes, then it may decide the issue as a matter of law and continue to the next step. Id. at
132. Next, it must determine if an important body function has been impaired and, if so, whether
the impairment was objectively manifested. Id. Finally, if the impairment of an important body
function was objectively manifested, the court must decide whether the impairment affected the
plaintiff’s general ability to lead a normal life. Id. at 132-133.
For an impairment of an important body function to be objectively manifested, there must
be a medically identifiable injury or condition which has a physical basis, Jackson v Nelson, 252
Mich App 643, 653; 654 NW2d 604 (2002), and the injury must be capable of objective
verification by qualified medical personnel, either as visually apparent or as detectable by
medical testing, Netter v Bowman, 272 Mich App 289, 296; 725 NW2d 353 (2006). To
determine whether the course of a plaintiff’s normal life has been affected, a court should engage
in a multifaceted inquiry, “comparing the plaintiff’s life before and after the accident as well as
the significance of any affected aspects on the course of plaintiff’s overall life.” Kreiner, supra
at 132-133. The following nonexhaustive list of objective factors may be considered in
evaluating this question: (a) the nature and extent of the impairment; (b) the type and length of
treatment required; (c) the duration of the impairment; (d) the extent of any residual impairment;
and (e) the prognosis for eventual recovery. Id. at 133. “While an injury need not be permanent,
it must be of sufficient duration to affect the course of a plaintiff’s life.” Id. at 135.
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to address the factors set forth by the
Kreiner Court, and therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to judgment “as a matter of law when [the
judge] failed to conduct the required analysis.” Irrespective of the detail set forth by the trial
court in its opinion and order, there was sufficient evidence of a temporary serious impairment of
body function submitted by plaintiff through her medical records and deposition testimony. That
record evidence demonstrated that plaintiff endured three surgeries, brief hospitalizations, and
physical therapy for weeks after the surgeries because of the automobile accident. Plaintiff was
in need of assistance from family members for bathing and dressing. Although plaintiff led an
active lifestyle before the accident, she had to limit the duration of activities such as running and
walking after the accident.
Defendant contends that plaintiff failed to establish that her lifestyle before and after the
accident was impacted particularly when her limitations were self-imposed. However, review of
the medical records and the nature of the extensive injuries revealed that plaintiff made progress
and suffered setbacks. Although she reported doing well at one medical visit, she also reported
suffering from muscle spasms that required her to utilize a heating pad almost constantly. In
order to return to work, plaintiff obtained a special chair that required her to rest her neck and
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head. At one point, although plaintiff was not placed on medication, she did call her physician
for medication. Additionally, after the final surgery and rehabilitation period, the medical report
revealed that although plaintiff would not be scheduled for additional visits, she would be seen
“when necessary” because the scar tissue would require an additional year to heal. Thus,
plaintiff had a medical identifiable condition that had a physical basis that was documented by
medical personnel. Netter, supra; Jackson, supra. The fact that the doctor did not recently
delineate in a report that plaintiff should limit her physical activities does not alter the deposition
testimony and medical records clearly indicating that plaintiff’s life had been affected by the
accident.1 Accordingly, the challenge to the trial court’s ruling is without merit.
Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of insurance
benefits. We disagree. The decision to admit or exclude evidence rests within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Elezovic v Ford Motor
Co, 472 Mich 408, 419; 697 NW2d 851 (2005). A party may not obtain appellate relief based on
an alleged evidentiary error to which he contributed by plan or neglect. Lewis v Legrow, 258
Mich App 175, 210; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). Review of the record reveals that counsel for
defendant expressly stated “we don’t have a problem with the insurance coming in.”
Accordingly, the challenge to the admission of evidence regarding insurance benefits is without
merit.2
Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred by admitting evidence regarding his
payment of his deductible. Although we agree that the admission of this evidence was
erroneous, reversal is not required. The elements of a negligence claim are duty, breach of that
duty, causation, and damages. Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich App 449, 452; 616 NW2d 229 (2000).
An insurer is entitled to charge a deductible that may be waived if the operator of the vehicle is
not “substantially at fault” in the accident. MCL 500.3037(1). The term fault was not defined by
statute. Moreover, there is no indication that the insurer’s definition of the term “fault” is the
1
Moreover, we would not penalize a patient for exercising common sense by limiting activities
in light of a clearly documented injury in order to prevent a medical visit and written orders to
limit activity.
2
On appeal, it is asserted that although defendant did not object to the admission of insurance
benefits, counsel for the insurance company did object to the admission. Therefore, defendant
contends that this issue should be reviewed on appeal. However, a party must cite authority in
support of their position. Caldwell v Chapman, 240 Mich App 124, 132; 610 NW2d 264 (2000).
A party may not merely announce its position and expect this Court to discover and rationalize
the basis for the claims. Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley, 259 Mich App 1, 14; 672 NW2d 351
(2003). Defendant failed to brief the issue of an unnamed party raising an issue on appeal to
which a party assented. Moreover, we note that MRE 411 provides that evidence “that a person
was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully.” MRE 411 further provides that it does not require the
exclusion of evidence when it was offered for a proper purpose. In the present case, the trial
court noted that the evidence would merely explain to the jury why a married couple that was not
estranged would be involved in litigation. It was not admitted to demonstrate that defendant
acted negligently or wrongfully. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
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equivalent of the elements required to establish a negligence action. However, error requiring
reversal may not be predicated on an evidentiary ruling unless a substantial right was affected.
MRE 103(a); Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 76; 684 NW2d 296 (2004). Although
defendant asserts that the issue of insurance and the deductible permeated the trial, the clear
focus of the trial was defendant’s driving in light of the weather conditions and the injuries
sustained by plaintiff and the impact upon her lifestyle. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
Lastly, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to provide a sudden
emergency instruction. We disagree. An appellate court reviews claims of instructional error de
novo. Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). The jury instructions
are examined as a whole to determine if error requiring reversal occurred. Id. “The instructions
should include all the elements of the plaintiff’s claims and should not omit material issues,
defenses, or theories if the evidence supports them.” Id. We will reverse based only
instructional error only when the failure to do so is inconsistent with substance justice. Id.; see
also MCR 2.613(A). Upon request, the trial court must give a standard jury instruction if it is
applicable and accurately states the law. Lewis, supra at 211. However, the trial court’s
determination regarding the applicability and accuracy of a standard instruction is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision results
in an outcome that is not within the range of principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co,
476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
The sudden emergency doctrine provides:
One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
[Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528, 546; 21 NW2d 841 (1946),
quoting Huddy on Automobiles (8th ed), p 359.]
To apply the sudden emergency doctrine, the circumstances surrounding the accident must be
“unusual” or “unexpected.” Vander Laan v Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 231-232; 188 NW2d 564
(1971). An event is “unusual” when it varies from the everyday traffic routine confronting a
motorist; an event associated with a phenomenon of nature, such as a blizzard. Id. at 232. An
event is “unsuspected” when “the potential peril had not been in clear view for any significant
length of time, and was totally unexpected.” Id.
In Moore v Spangler, 401 Mich 360, 383; 258 NW2d 34 (1977), the Supreme Court held
that it was erroneous to instruct the jury regarding the sudden emergency doctrine where the
factual circumstances surrounding the accident did not create an “unusual” situation. In that
case, the police officer that arrived at the accident site testified that the sky was cloudy, the
traffic was light, the pavement was wet, but the temperature was above freezing. Id. Although
the defendant had testified that the pavement was icy, the Supreme Court held that an icy
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condition was not unusual for a January day in Michigan. Id.3 In Hughes v Polk, 40 Mich App
634, 641-642; 199 NW2d 224 (1972), this Court held that it was error to instruct regarding the
sudden emergency doctrine where the icy condition of the road was not “unusual” for a
December day when there had been a heavy snowfall the prior evening. Moreover, the
conditions were not unexpected where the evidence established that the defendant had a clear
view of the plaintiff’s car for 300 feet, the defendant was aware of the snow on the ground, and
consequently, the defendant should have expected icy conditions.
In the present case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying the sudden emergency instruction. At trial, meteorologist Jeff Andresen testified that, in
the area of the accident, precipitation began at 9:00 a.m., changed to snowfall at approximately
10:45 a.m., and continued at various intensities for the next couple of hours. The snow was
constant for the hour preceding the accident at approximately 12:30 p.m. The ground was not
frozen at the time of the accident, and “a lot” of the snowfall melted because of the ground
temperature. A snowfall on October 6, 2001, was considered early for the season. Similarly, at
trial, defendant testified that they were driving to Mackinaw City to catch the 1:30 p.m. boat.
After passing Reed City, it started to rain, began to sleet, and the sleet turned to snow. Near the
city of Gaylord, it began to snow harder, and the right lane was wet with a mild dusting of snow.
Because the left lane of traffic was not heavily traveled, the lane was snow and slush covered.
Defendant admitted that the road condition of the left lane did not happen suddenly. Despite the
condition of the roadway, he attempted to pass by entering the left lane. He lost control of the
vehicle and hit the guardrail. Defendant did not know if snow, ice, or slush caused him to slide
across the roadway.
The testimony of these two individuals did not establish an unusual or unexpected event.
Although a snowfall on October 6, 2001, may have been early for the season, its onset was a
gradual event. Defendant did not testify that a sudden blizzard occurred. Rather, defendant was
aware of the change in weather conditions from dry to wet and snowy. Further, he was able to
view the condition of the slush and snow covered roadway. The meteorologist confirmed that
the weather change was at a graduated level occurring over a period of time. Consequently, the
3
Although the Supreme Court concluded that sudden emergency instruction was erroneous,
there was no evidence of prejudice from the instruction. Id. at 383-384.
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for the sudden emergency
instruction.4
Affirmed.5
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
4
An issue is not preserved for appellate review unless it is raised in the statement of questions
involved. MCR 7.212(C)(5); Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d 781
(1995). Furthermore, an issue is not preserved for appellate review unless it is raised, addressed,
and decided by the trial court. Miller v Inglis, 223 Mich App 159, 168; 567 NW2d 253 (1997).
Within the discussion section of the issue challenging the denial of the sudden emergency
instruction, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in addressing the assured clear distance
statute because it did not apply. However, review of the lower court record reveals that this issue
was raised for the first time on appeal. A party may not harbor error as an appellate parachute by
consenting to action at trial and objecting on appeal. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679; 692
NW2d 708 (2005).
5
In light of our resolution of the issues raised in the appeal, we need not address the cross
appeal.
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