IN RE MALIK XAVIER WEBSTER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of MALIK XAVIER WEBSTER,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 285091
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-000001-NA
KIMBERLY WEBSTER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
FORREST NEAL,
Respondent.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Kimberly Webster appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating
her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(l) (the parent’s rights to
another child were terminated as a result of a proceeding under MCL 712A.2(b)). Because
respondent has failed to show plain error, we affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Respondent does not argue that § 19b(3)(l) was not established by clear and convincing
evidence. Rather, she posits a general due process challenge to the use of a 2001 termination
order to satisfy § 19b(3)(l). She contends that due to the passage of time, the previous
termination order was no longer a sufficient predictor of parental behavior to justify termination
of her parental rights to the instant child, especially where the conditions that led to the prior
termination were not at issue in this case. Because respondent did not raise this issue in the trial
court, it is not preserved. Rooyakker & Sitz, PLLC v Plante & Moran, PLLC, 276 Mich App
146, 162; 742 NW2d 409 (2007). Therefore, the issue is reviewed for plain error affecting
respondent’s substantial rights. Kloian v Schwartz, 272 Mich App 232, 242; 725 NW2d 671
(2006).
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The trial court may terminate parental rights at the initial dispositional hearing if a
preponderance of the evidence adduced at trial establishes grounds for the assumption of
jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b) and the court finds on the basis of clear and convincing
legally admissible evidence that one or more facts alleged in the petition are true and establish
grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3). MCR 3.977(E); In re Archer, 277 Mich App
71, 73; 744 NW2d 1 (2007). Termination is appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l) if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he parent’s rights to another child were
terminated as a result of proceedings under section 2(b) of this chapter or a similar law of
another state.”
The plain language of § 19b(3)(l) does not impose any age limit on the prior involuntary
termination or limit its use to cases in which the conditions that led to the prior termination have
recurred, and a court may not read into a statute anything “that is not within the manifest intent
of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” In re S R, 229 Mich App 310, 314; 581 NW2d
291 (1998). In other words, a court cannot “judicially legislate by adding into a statute
provisions that the Legislature did not include.” In re Wayne Co Prosecutor, 232 Mich App 482,
486; 591 NW2d 359 (1998). Petitioner presented clear and convincing legally admissible
evidence in the form of a certified copy of an order involuntarily terminating respondent’s
parental rights to another child that established a statutory basis for termination, and alone
eliminated respondent’s liberty interest in the custody and control of her child. In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 355-356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Further, while the prior termination established a
statutory basis for termination in this case, that alone did not mandate termination of
respondent’s parental rights. The trial court still had to consider whether termination of
respondent’s parental rights would be clearly contrary to the child’s best interests, MCL
712A.19b(5), which further protected respondent’s rights. In re Trejo, supra at 356. Therefore,
respondent has failed to show plain error.
Contrary to what respondent asserts, the trial court did not terminate her parental rights
under § 19b(3)(j). The record clearly shows that termination was sought and ordered under
§ 19b(3)(l) only. The prior neglect proceeding involving Malik and respondent’s continued
substance abuse were relevant to the court’s jurisdictional and best interests determinations, but
were not offered to prove a statutory ground for termination.
Finally, there is no merit to respondent’s argument that her admission to continued drug
use violated the corpus delicti rule. That rule is intended “to prevent the use of a defendant’s
confession to convict him of a crime that did not occur.” People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App
165, 180; 740 NW2d 534 (2007). Here, respondent was not charged with, tried for, or convicted
of a criminal offense. Therefore, the rule is not applicable.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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