IN RE CRISHON VALDEZ MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CRISHON VALDEZ, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 284081
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-740736-NA
CHRISTINE VALDEZ,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (l). We affirm. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that statutory grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). There is no dispute that respondent’s parental rights to five other
children were previously terminated, and that this was established by legally admissible
evidence. This evidence is sufficient to support the termination of respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). Respondent contends, however, that this Court, in In re AH, 245
Mich App 77, 83; 627 NW2d 33 (2001), interpreted MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (l) as requiring a
“risk of harm” showing. In In re AH, supra, this Court considered an equal protection and due
process challenge to MCL 722.638, which requires the agency to seek termination at the initial
disposition where the parent’s rights were previously terminated and the “parent is a suspected
perpetrator or is suspected of placing the child at an unreasonable risk of harm due to the
parent’s failure to take reasonable steps to intervene to eliminate that risk. . . .” MCL
722.638(1)(b)(i), (2). The Court concluded that the Legislature had “effectively codified the
doctrine of anticipatory neglect and then added the additional element of risk of harm to the
child.” In re AH, supra at 84. However, MCL 722.638 does not authorize the termination of
parental rights but rather delineates circumstances in which a petitioner is required to submit a
petition or request termination. The Legislature’s decision to require the agency to file a
petition, or in some circumstances to seek termination of parental rights, does not necessarily
indicate that the Legislature intended to import a separate “risk of harm” element into the
statutory grounds for termination specified in MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (l). These statutory
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subsections do not state an element of risk of harm. The Legislature is presumed to have
intended the meaning that it plainly expressed, and where the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted In re RFF, 242 Mich App
188, 198; 617 NW2d 745 (2000).
Termination was also appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), which contains the
additional requirements that the prior termination was for serious and chronic neglect, or
physical or sexual abuse, and that prior efforts to rehabilitate the parent were unsuccessful. Id.
On appeal, respondent correctly notes that the statutory grounds were required to be shown by
legally admissible evidence because this case is one of termination at the initial dispositional
hearing. MCR 3.977(E)(3). However, because respondent did not object to the admission of
hearsay in the trial court, our review is for plain error. Meagher v Wayne State University, 222
Mich App 700, 724; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). Furthermore, respondent has not identified the
objectionable hearsay on appeal. The record contains testimony by the foster care worker in the
previous case concerning the children to whom respondent’s rights were previously terminated,
and in many instances the basis of her knowledge was not clearly indicated on the record. This
lack of clarity would certainly have been addressed if an objection had been made, and our
review is greatly hampered by the lack of such objection. Under these circumstances, plain error
is not evident. Id. Finally, we are convinced that any error was harmless, MCR 2.613(A), as the
statutory ground was adequately supported by legally admissible evidence. Ms. Strand testified
that the allegations in the prior case were physical abuse of a child, and respondent herself
admitted that her parental rights were terminated because the children sustained injuries, which
she specified as a broken arm sustained by one child and a broken leg sustained by another. Ms.
Strand testified that she worked with respondent mother on a reunification plan, but respondent
never demonstrated appropriate parenting. Ms. Strand testified that she had worked with
respondent mother for four years, and exhausted all of the services that the agency had to offer.
This record supplies legally admissible evidence adequate to establish that respondent’s rights
were previously terminated because of chronic neglect or physical abuse, and that efforts at
rehabilitation have been unsuccessful, MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), and the trial court did not clearly err
in so finding.
Respondent also claims as error the trial court’s taking judicial notice of the social and
legal files in the previous matter. Judicial notice may be taken of facts “(1) generally known
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” MRE
201(b). A circuit court may take judicial notice of the files and records of the court in which it
sits. Snider v Dunn, 33 Mich App 619, 625; 190 NW2d 299 (1971). The trial court did not err
by taking judicial notice of the files in the previous case.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly
contrary to the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5). The child, now nearly one year
old, was placed in a voluntary safety plan in the care of respondent’s niece at approximately five
weeks of age. Respondent mother has demonstrated considerable lack of judgment in her male
partners, as the two putative fathers of the child both had criminal records, and one is currently a
parole absconder. More troubling is respondent’s failure to clearly recognize that the abuser of
her other children is a dangerous person. Respondent’s psychological evaluation indicates that
she is cognitively limited and has little if any insight into her psychological and emotional issues.
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On this record we perceive no clear error in the trial court’s determination concerning the best
interests of the child.
We affirm.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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