IN RE LA'TIMOTHAYA B BOBO MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of LA’TIMOTHAYA B. BOBO,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283492
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-735257-NA
TIMOTHY BARHADUE BOBO,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JOYCE MARIE BOBO,
Respondent.
In the Matter of LA’TIMOTHAYA B. BOBO,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283493
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-735257-NA
JOYCE MARIE BOBO,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TIMOTHY BARHADUE BOBO,
Respondent.
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Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents Timothy and Joyce Bobo each appeal as of right from an order terminating
their parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), (j), and (l). We
affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. In re JK,
468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d
407 (2000). We come to this conclusion because there was ample evidence supporting the trial
court’s decision and, as a result, we cannot conclude the trial court was wrong. In re Trejo,
supra at 356. Joyce previously had her parental rights terminated to 11 other children, and
Timothy’s parental rights to one of those children were also previously terminated. These facts
indisputably establish that termination was required under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). Although that
finding was enough to move on to a best interest hearing, the trial court also found that Joyce
allowed a known sex offender to reside with herself and the child, and that person sexually
assaulted the child. The evidence satisfied the trial court’s conclusions under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). The trial court found that there was credible evidence that Joyce initially
denied that sexual abuse occurred, and then later physically abused the child for disclosing the
abuse and falsely claimed that she had reported the abuse to the police. See MCL
712A.19b(3)(j).
The evidence also indicated that Timothy failed to act when informed that the child had
been sexually abused, offered no plan for the child’s care, and instead wanted the child returned
to Joyce, despite her failure to provide proper care for the child and her prior history involving
the termination of her parental rights to 11 other children. These findings were not clearly
erroneous, and satisfied the statutory criteria for termination. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j).
Additionally, Timothy was unemployed and without suitable housing. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
Further, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of respondents’ parental rights
was not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 354. On the
contrary, and despite the bond between Joyce and the child, there was clear evidence that the
child would be placed at risk if returned to respondents. Thus, the trial court did not err in
terminating respondents’ parental rights to the child. Id. at 356-357.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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