IN RE IVY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KIERRA NICOLE IVY and
KHYLEEANNA MONE’T IVY, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2008
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 282626
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-001003-NA
TAMARA IVY,
Respondent-Appellee,
and
DANELL WALKER,
Respondent.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Whitbeck and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Department of Human Services (the Department) appeals by leave granted the
denial of its petition seeking the termination of respondent Tamara Ivy’s parental rights to the
two minor children for failure to prevent physical injury with the likelihood that they will suffer
injury in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home,1 failure to provide proper care or
custody with no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and
custody within a reasonable time,2 and because, based on the conduct or capacity of the parent,
there is a reasonable likelihood that the children will be harmed if returned to the home of the
parent.3 On appeal, the Department contends that the trial court clearly erred when it found that
the Department had not met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that at least
one statutory ground for termination for each child had been met. Because we conclude that the
trial court did not clearly err in its findings, we affirm.
1
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii).
2
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
3
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
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I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
A. The Petition
Ivy first became involved with Children’s Protective Services (CPS) in April 2006,
regarding allegations of domestic violence and criminal activity in Ivy’s home. In May 2006, the
Department petitioned for termination of Ivy’s parental rights to the minor children.
In the petition, the Department alleged that Khyleeanna’s father, Danell Walker, had
assaulted Ivy on numerous occasions and that Kierra had observed the abuse at least once. She
also admitted that she had transported Walker and his cousin from the scene of armed robberies
while the children were in the car, but maintained that she did not know about the criminal
activity. Ivy later implicated Walker in the robberies. The petition further alleged that, after Ivy
reported that members of Walker’s family had threatened her, the Department prepared a safety
plan for her. The plan provided that Ivy would stay at the home of Kierra’s father, would have
no contact with any member of Walker’s family, would undergo a psychological assessment, and
would not be alone with the children without the supervision of another adult. Ivy reported that
she would comply with plan.
The petition indicated that, on May 2, 2006, Ivy learned that her daycare license would be
revoked. After learning this, Ivy took the children and left Kierra’s father’s home. While Ivy
drove, Kierra sat in the front seat without a seat belt and Khyleeanna sat in a car seat in the back.
At some point Khyleeanna got out of her seat and crawled onto Ivy’s lap. Ivy attempted to put
Khyleeanna back into her seat, but did not stop the car. Ivy lost control of the car while turning
left and struck a pole. Khyleeanna, who was still sitting in Ivy’s lap at the time of the accident,
suffered a ruptured spleen. Ivy did not seek medical attention, but took the children and
abandoned the car.
On the next day, Ivy contacted a CPS worker from a hotel. She admitted to running into
the pole and leaving the scene of the accident, but refused to seek medical care and refused to
disclose her location. By the afternoon, Ivy realized that Khyleeanna was seriously injured and
apparently decided that she would kill herself and the children. Ivy spent the afternoon writing
farewell letters in which she explained her decision to kill the children and commit suicide.
After more calls to the CPS worker, Ivy finally disclosed her location. The CPS worker
contacted the police and officers went to the hotel and arrested Ivy. Both children were treated at
the scene and, after being transported to the hospital, Khyleeanna’s ruptured spleen was surgical
corrected. Ivy was later admitted to a psychiatric unit for treatment.
Based on the facts stated in the petition, the Department asked the trial court to terminate
Ivy’s parental rights to the children under the stated grounds.
B. The Evidence
In June 2007, after Ivy admitted to the allegations in the petition, the children were
placed under the jurisdiction of the court. The trial court set a contested dispositional hearing for
August on the issue of termination.
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The trial court heard evidence over a series of hearings from August 10, 2007 to
October 31, 2007. Although there was evidence concerning the events alleged in the petition, a
significant amount of testimony concerned Ivy’s mental health and her prognosis.
Dr. Leonard VanderJagt testified as an expert psychologist. He stated that he had
evaluated Ivy on October 20, 2006. He said that she was resistant to accepting the notion that
her conduct with the children might be less than positive and was not able to recognize the
degree to which her behavior might impact the children at any given time. VanderJagt diagnosed
Ivy with major depression with accompanying anxiety, borderline personality disorder with
histrionic elements, and posttraumatic stress disorder. He indicated that these conditions would
require all the therapeutic support that could be brought to bear. Because of the intensity, scope,
and multiplicity of problems, VanderJagt opined that Ivy’s prognosis must be considered very
poor. He indicated that he had not had contact with the children and could not give an opinion
concerning the best interests of the children.
Dr. Judith St. King testified as an expert in clinical psychology. St. King said she met
Ivy in late 2000 and saw her in a professional capacity intermittently until the latter part of 2004.
She testified that Ivy was working on self-esteem, depression, relationships, and how to be in
relationships in a healthy manner. St. King testified that her working diagnosis for Ivy was
major depression and posttraumatic stress disorder. She testified that she saw the children
around 40 times over the course of Ivy’s therapy and found the relationship to be very warm. St.
King felt Ivy was doing a good job with her children and had no concerns about her ability to
parent. She also testified that she believed that if Kierra could not see her mother it would be a
very difficult and painful adjustment for her as she had a high quality relationship with Ivy.
St. King testified that she believed that the episode that gave rise to this case had been a
distinct and separate episode from other problems or issues. St. King opined that it was not
likely that Ivy would re-endanger the children in the future as long as she stayed in treatment,
was being assessed by a therapist, and stayed on medication. She felt that visitations progressing
toward custody, with support and monitoring, would be appropriate. She did not agree with
VanderJagt’s concern about Ivy’s ability to ever parent again.
Nancy James testified that she had been Ivy’s therapist for about 13 months, seeing her
weekly to biweekly. James testified that it was a complicated case, dealing with anxiety in the
beginning and some depression relating to losing her children, and that it had taken some time to
get Ivy’s trust and to see changes in her. James noted ongoing chronic depression, as well as
anxiety, panic attacks, and posttraumatic stress disorder, but stated that Ivy had made tremendous
progress. James testified that the incident that gave rise to the case was an isolated incident. She
opined that Ivy was not likely to hurt the children if they were returned to her and recommended
reunification.
Dr. John Wittekindt, a psychiatrist, also testified on Ivy’ behalf. Wittekindt testified that
he had seen Ivy through Community Mental Health since November 2006. He noted that her
depression was considerably improved and that she had complied with her medication regimen.
He stated that he had no qualms about her ability to operate as a mother and as a custodial parent.
Marta Henson testified that she had been Kierra’s therapist since May 15, 2006, and had
seen her about 50 times. She stated that Kierra missed her sister and worried about her sister’s
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well being. She also missed her mother and expressed interest in seeing her. Henson said that
Kierra hoped to have visits with her mother soon and had a very close relationship with her.
Hensen testified that she learned that Kierra had been seeing Ivy since July 2006. Kierra had not
felt comfortable revealing this to Hensen, because she knew Henson would have to tell and was
afraid she would not be able to see her mother again. At Hensen’s request, parenting time for
Ivy was arranged at Hensen’s office.
Hensen testified that it would be very difficult and harmful for Kierra if Ivy’s rights were
terminated and Kierra were unable to see her again. However, Hensen stated that she believed
that Kierra would continue to see her mother whether or not her rights were terminated. Hensen
concluded that it would not healthy for Kierra to be sneaking around. On cross-examination,
Hensen agreed that it could be harmful to Kierra if Ivy’s rights were not terminated, because it
would reaffirm her thoughts that Ivy did not do anything wrong.
Julie Reynolds testified that she was Ivy’s friend and had known her for 17 years. She
had seen her weekly or daily, and at times had lived with her. Reynolds testified that Ivy was a
really good mother and always did what she could to provide for the children. Reynolds testified
that the children were normal happy children, well behaved, and appropriately dressed.
Reynolds had no concerns about how Ivy was raising the children before they were removed
from her care. Reynolds testified that Ivy had improved in the last year and a half, seemed
stable, and was working. She stated that at the time of the incident that gave rise to this case, Ivy
was going through a lot in her life and her whole world seemed to be falling apart. Reynolds
testified that she saw the events of May 2006 coming in the way Ivy was acting, but before that
she had never seen any indication that Ivy would be capable of trying to kill her children.
In closing arguments, the Department argued that the grounds for termination had been
met and that termination would be in the children’s best interests. The guardian ad litem for the
children also indicated that she felt termination would be in the best interests of Khyleeanna, but
stated that she would leave the termination of Ivy’s parental rights to Kierra to the court’s
discretion.
Ivy’s counsel argued that the statutory criteria for termination were not met and further
that termination would be contrary to the best interests of Kierra. But Ivy’s counsel conceded
that there was no similar evidence concerning the best interests of Khyleeanna.
C. The Court’s Opinion And Order
In a written opinion, the trial court noted that there were divergent views regarding
whether the children would be safe with Ivy and whether the incident leading to court
jurisdiction was an isolated incident. The court stated that it was “not sure whether the children
will or will not be safe” with Ivy. However, it found that termination would not be in the best
interests of Kierra:
I am sure it would not be in Kierra Ivy’s best interest to have her mother’s rights
terminated because of Kierra’s age. She seems to have clearly bonded with her
mother and though court ordered termination would legally end Ms. Ivy’s
relationship with Kierra, the truth may be that Kierra will not disassociate from
her mother and will continue to see her mother. The practical problem thus arises
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as to whether or not we are serving Kierra’s best interest in termination. The
Court thinks not, and THEREFORE, DECLINES TO TERMINATE THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS of Tamara Ivy to the minor child, Kierra Nicole Ivy.
The trial court then turned to whether there was clear and convincing evidence that the children
would be harmed if returned to Ivy’s care:
The question of “what if” occurs. What if mother puts herself into another bad
situation which drives her to the brink and creates the incident that nearly ended
with the termination of her children’s lives. What if mother does not continue on
with therapy and medication, will her mental instability return and would she put
the children in jeopardy because of it.
These are very difficult questions. Questions that people trained in
psychology seem to be wrestling with . . . . The test is clear and convincing
evidence. But weighing the various statements made by the experts in this case,
the court is not convinced that that threshold has been met. I am not, however,
convinced either that the mother is capable of parenting and believe that the court
should be given more time to observe how she does and what steps she is going to
take in the next 3 to 6 months in bringing a stability to her life that would lead the
court to believe that the children are safe. Clearly, therapy is needed and must
continue to occur for the mother.
For these reasons, the trial court elected not to terminate Ivy’s parental rights to either child.
Instead, the trial court ordered the current placement continued with visitation.
After the trial court issued its order, the Department sought leave to appeal, which this
Court granted.
II. Statutory Grounds For Termination
A. Standard Of Review
We review the trial court’s findings of fact and its decision for clear error.4
B. Legal Standards
In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing evidence.5 Once a
4
MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
5
In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 21-22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
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ground for termination is established, the court must order termination of parental rights unless
there is clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests.6
C. Applying The Standards
There is no question on this record that Ivy failed to prevent injury to one of the minor
children when she had the opportunity to do so,7 and that she failed to provide proper care and
custody for both children.8 Hence, the dispositive inquiry is whether the trial court clearly erred
when it found that the record did not supply clear and convincing evidence that there was a
reasonable likelihood that the children would be subject to harm if returned to Ivy’s care,9 or by
finding that the record did not clearly and convincingly establish that there was no reasonable
likelihood that Ivy would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a
reasonable time considering their ages.10
The dispositional hearing, which took place some 18 months after the removal of the
children, included testimony from Ivy’s therapist and treating psychiatrist, who both felt that she
was not a threat to her children. They represented that she had made tremendous progress in
therapy, complied well with her medication regimen, and had significantly improved her coping
mechanisms since the events that gave rise to this case.
Ivy’s therapist characterized the events giving rise to these proceedings as an isolated
incident, occurring when Ivy was under extraordinary stress from various sources. In light of
Ivy’s improved coping mechanisms, she felt that even a recurrence of similar stress would not
evoke a similar response. Likewise, Ivy’s treating psychiatrist noted that Ivy’s depression had
considerably improved over the last six to eight months, although she still suffered from anxiety
and panic attacks as well as depression.
Countervailing testimony from the clinical psychologist who evaluated Ivy indicated that
she is a psychologically complex person with serious and chronic problems that threaten her
emotional and behavioral stability, and if confronted with a situation perceived as threatening,
she could become agitated, angry, and disorganized. He further noted cause for very serious
concern in Ivy’s score on the Child Abuse Potential Inventory. VanderJagt opined that Ivy is
largely unable to address and respond to the demands of everyday life. He concluded that she
suffers from severe chronic depression, chronic anger, probable posttraumatic stress disorder,
and personality disorder, and stated that the intensity, scope, and multiplicity of problems
indicated a very poor prognosis. He testified that his view as of the date of the evaluation was
that Ivy had long-term underlying problems. However, he also testified that the trial court
6
MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
7
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii).
8
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
9
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (j).
10
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
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should look to treating professionals to understand where a person is in terms of ongoing
behavior, and Ivy’s ability to cope should be commented on by those currently treating her.
Clearly, the record would permit a factfinder to conclude by clear and convincing
evidence that a statutory ground for termination had been established. Ivy’s past conduct,
including a plan to kill herself and the children, together with VanderJagt’s evaluation and
prognosis are adequate to support a conclusion that there was a reasonable likelihood that the
children would be subject to harm in Ivy’s care,11 or that there was no reasonable likelihood that
Ivy would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable time
considering their ages.12 However, the record also contains substantial evidence that would
allow the trial court to reach the opposite conclusion—in particular the favorable testimony of
Ivy’s treating psychiatrist and therapist.
We agree with the Department and the guardian ad litem that the recommendations for
reunification made by James and Wittekindt were compromised by the fact that they had not
seen the children. Further, it appeared that Ivy had not been entirely forthcoming with James.
Nonetheless, we are not convinced that the testimony of these witnesses suffers from such
defects that it must be entirely discounted. Further, we agree with the Department and the
guardian ad litem that St. King’s testimony has little or no probative value. St. King saw Ivy
before the incidents in question, and yet was still willing—in August 2006—to recommend that
Ivy be allowed contact with the children and further to opine that this would be in the best
interests of the children. Nevertheless, the trial court’s judgments of credibility are entitled to
substantial deference by this Court.13 And we are not prepared to second-guess the judgment of
the trial court in this difficult case.
The trial court cautiously concluded that it did not know whether Ivy could be a safe
parent and indicated that more time would be necessary before a determination could be made.
For that reason, it ordered the children continued as temporary court wards and directed that
“further disposition take place and a further program be kept in place to monitor how the mother
is doing.” Given the divergent views of the witnesses, we cannot characterize the trial court’s
findings as clearly erroneous. Further, because there was no clear error in the trial court’s
finding that a statutory ground for termination had not been established by clear and convincing
evidence, we need not address the question of the children’s best interests.14
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Elizabeth Gleicher
11
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (j).
12
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
13
In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); See also MCR 2.613(C).
14
MCR 712A.19b(5).
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