IN RE KEVIUS LOVELL COOPER JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KEVIUS LOVELL COOPER, JR.,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
July 24, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 282327
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-030590-NA
EVONE LASHAWN LONG,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KEVIUS LOVELL COOPER,
Respondent.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Fort Hood and Borrello, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent Evone Lashawn Long claims an appeal as of right from the trial court’s order
terminating her parental rights to the minor child, Kevius Lovell Cooper, Jr.,1 pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
Respondent has given birth to four children. Five-month-old Edreana died in 2006 from
positional asphyxiation while in the care of her father, Edward Taylor, Sr. Three months later,
another child left in Taylor’s care, two-year-old Edward Jr., was severely burned by hot water.
The medical examiner that performed the autopsy on Edreana concluded that the infant did not
die under the circumstances described by Taylor. Similarly, the two treating physicians that
1
Although it appears from the record that the lower court terminated respondent’s parental rights
to all three of her children, the order that respondent has appealed provides only for the
termination of her parental rights to her oldest son, Kevius Jr. Therefore, this appeal is limited to
the order terminating respondent’s parental rights to that child.
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cared for Edward Jr. concluded that his burns were not the result of an accidental occurrence as
described by Taylor. After these tragic events, Taylor was charged with child abuse, and the
children were removed from respondent’s care.
There was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental
rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). MCR 3.977; In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The condition that caused the children to come into care was
respondent’s inability to provide proper care and custody of them because of her cognitive
limitations. During these proceedings, respondent was evaluated as mildly mentally retarded.
The evaluating psychologist, treating therapist, and foster care worker all concluded that
respondent did not have the capacity to safely and independently parent her children. She lacked
insight and foresight into their needs. Because respondent could not recognize the needs of her
children, they were at risk of being harmed in her care. Under these circumstances, we conclude
that the trial court did not err when it terminated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).
Furthermore, there was no evidence that, despite statutory grounds for termination,
termination of parental rights would not be in the children’s best interests. Indeed, the evidence
clearly demonstrated that the children would be at risk of serious injury if returned to
respondent’s care.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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