DEPUTY SHERIFFS ASSN OF MICH V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DEPUTY SHERIFF’S ASSOCIATION OF
MICHIGAN and LARRY ORLOWSKI,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN and SHERIFFS
COORDINATING AND TRAINING COUNCIL,
No. 276453
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000349-AW
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants State of Michigan and the Sheriffs Coordinating and Training Council appeal
as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs Deputy
Sheriff’s Association of Michigan and Larry Orlowski under MCR 2.116(C)(10).1 Because the
language of MCL 791.545 and MCL 801.4b plainly states that only uncertified counties that
remit the entire $12 booking fee are entitled to receive grants, we affirm.
This case involves the interpretation of the Local Corrections Officers Training Act,
MCL 791.531 et seq. Defendants argue that counties whose training programs have been
certified and who lawfully remit only $2 of the $12 booking fee collected from each incarcerated
person are eligible to receive training grants from defendant Sheriffs Coordinating and Training
Council. Plaintiffs argue that, under the plain language of the act, only counties that remit the
entire $12 booking fee are eligible to receive grants. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs.
A trial court’s grant of summary disposition is reviewed de novo, on the entire record, to
determine whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 Maiden v
1
Although the trial court’s order states that summary disposition was granted under both MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), the trial court stated on the record that it was granting summary
disposition only under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
2
The parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the question
presented is solely one of law.
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Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Questions of statutory interpretation are
also reviewed de novo. Heinz v Chicago Rd Investment Co, 216 Mich App 289, 295; 549 NW2d
47 (1996).
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Apsey v Mem Hosp, 477 Mich 120, 127; 730 NW2d 695 (2007). If the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning
clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp,
471 Mich 540, 549; 685 NW2d 275 (2004); American Federation of State, Co & Muni
Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 399; 662 NW2d 695 (2003). Judicial construction of an
unambiguous statute is unnecessary and, therefore, precluded. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439
Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Whenever possible, every word should be given
meaning, and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory. Apsey, supra at
127. Moreover, nothing may be read into a statute that is not within the Legislature’s intent as
derived from the language of the statute. AFSCME, supra at 400. Courts may not inquire into
the wisdom of legislative policy choices, and arguments that a statute is unwise or results in bad
policy must be addressed to the Legislature. Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408, 425; 697
NW2d 851 (2005); Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Prop & Cas Guaranty Ass’n,
456 Mich 590, 613; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
MCL 801.4b (§ 4b) provides:
(1) Beginning August 1, 2003, each person who is incarcerated in the
county jail shall pay a fee of $12.00 to the county sheriff when the person is
admitted into the jail.
(2) The county sheriff may collect a fee owed under this section by
withdrawing that amount from any inmate account maintained by the sheriff for
that inmate.
(3) Except as provided in subsections (4) and (5), the sheriff, once each
calendar quarter, shall forward all fees collected under this section to the local
corrections officers training fund created in the local corrections officers training
act.
(4) The revenue derived from fees collected under this section shall be
directed in the manner provided in subsection (5) in a county for which the
sheriffs coordinating and training council has certified that the county’s standards
and requirements for the training of local corrections officers equals or exceeds
the standards and requirements approved by the sheriffs coordinating and training
council under the local corrections officers training act.
(5) In a county that meets the criteria in subsection (4), both of the
following apply:
(a) Once each calendar quarter, the sheriff shall forward $2.00 of each fee
collected to the state treasurer for deposit in the local corrections officers training
fund created in the local corrections officers training act.
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(b) The remaining $10.00 of each fee shall be retained in that county, to
be used only for costs relating to the continuing education, certification,
recertification, and training of local corrections officers and inmate programs
including substance abuse and mental health programs in that county. However,
revenue from the fees shall not be used to supplant current spending by the county
for continuing education, certification, recertification, and training of local
corrections officers. [Emphasis added.]
Sections 4b(4) and (5) both use the word “shall” to describe how the $12 fee is to be
distributed by a certified county. The word “shall” denotes mandatory action. Costa v
Community Emergency Medical Services, Inc, 475 Mich 403, 409; 716 NW2d 236 (2006).
Therefore, the plain language of § 4b requires certified counties to remit $2, and to keep $10, of
the $12 fee.
Section 4b(3) requires uncertified counties to remit “all fees collected.” Section 4b(4)
requires that certified counties apportion the fees collected as mandated by § 4b(5): certified
counties shall remit $2 and keep $10 of “each fee collected.” Thus, it is evident that in
subsections (3) through (5) of § 4b, all references to “fee[s] collected” refer to the entire $12
booking fee. By contrast, § 4b(4) refers to “revenue derived from fees collected” when
describing how certified counties are to allocate the $12 fee. Thus, the Legislature made a clear
distinction between fees collected, meaning the entire $12 fee, and the revenue derived from such
fees.
Section 15 of the Local Corrections Officers Training Act, MCL 791.545 (§ 15), a related
provision regulating county jails, provides:
(1) The local corrections officers training fund is created in the state
treasury. The fund shall be administered by the council, which shall expend the
fund only as provided in this section.
(2) There shall be credited to the local corrections officer training fund all
revenue received from fees and civil fines collected under section 4b of 1846 RS
171, MCL 801.4b, and funds from any other source provided by law.
(3) The council shall use the fund only to defray the costs of continuing
education, certification, recertification, decertification, and training of local
corrections officers; the personnel and administrative costs of the office, board,
and council; and other expenditures related to the requirements of this act. Only
counties that forward to the fund 100% of fees collected under section 4b of 1846
RS 171, MCL 801.4b, are eligible to receive grants from the fund. A county that
receives funds from the council under this section shall use those funds only for
costs relating to the continuing education, certification, recertification, and
training of local corrections officers in that county and shall not use those funds to
supplant current spending by the county for those purposes, including state grants
and training funds. [Emphasis added.]
Section 15(2) mandates that “all revenue received from fees . . . collected under section
4b” be credited to the training fund. Section 15(3) states that only counties that remit “100% of
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fees collected under section 4b” are eligible to receive grants. As indicated previously, in
subsections (3) through (5) of § 4b, references to “fees collected” refer to the entire $12 fee,
while in § 4b(4), the reference to “revenue derived from fees collected” describes how certified
counties are to allocate the $12 fee. Because § 4b and § 15 were enacted together and made
conditional on each other, see 2003 PA 124, 125, the words used in both statutes should be given
the same meaning. See McNeil v Charlevoix Co, 275 Mich App 686, 701; 741 NW2d 27 (2007)
(“It is well-settled that statutes that relate to the same subject or share a common purpose are in
pari materia and must be read together as one law”). Thus, we conclude that consistent with §
4b, the reference to “fees collected” in § 15(3) means the entire $12 fee, and the reference to “all
revenue received” in § 15(2) means the portion of the fee that is remitted to the fund by the
various counties. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that, as used in § 15(3), “fees
collected” refers to the entire $12 fee. By permanently enjoining defendants from distributing
grants to counties that have not remitted the entire $12 fee, the trial court enforced § 15(3) as
written.
Plaintiffs argued below that certified counties that choose to remit the entire $12 fee
rather than only $2 are eligible for grants. However, there is no language in either statute giving
certified counties a choice whether to remit the entire $12 fee or apportion it under § 4b(5).
Rather, the plain language of § 4b(4) states that certified counties “shall” comply with § 4b(5),
which provides that certified counties “shall” keep $10 of the $12 fee collected and “shall”
forward only $2. Because these provisions are mandatory, Costa, supra, certified counties do
not have a choice to become eligible for grants by remitting the entire $12 fee.
The parties apparently agree that all the counties with local jails have been certified by
defendants.3 Thus, there are no counties that, under § 4b(3), are required to remit the entire $12
fee, and, consequently, there are no counties eligible for grants under § 15(3). The trial court
speculated, as do we, that this was an unintended result. The Legislature most likely expected
that there would be uncertified counties that would be required to remit the entire fee and which
would need grants in order to meet the newly-created certification standards. Nonetheless,
because the language of § 4b and § 15 is clear and unambiguous, the language must be enforced
as written. Shinholster, supra. Thus, until either section is amended or counties are decertified
and begin remitting the entire $12 fee, the money collected by defendants cannot be distributed
as grants. Whether the plain language of these statutes results in bad policy or brings about an
unintended or unfair outcome are arguments for the Legislature to address, not the courts.
Elezovic, supra; Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
3
While plaintiffs asserted at the motion hearing that the certification procedure used by
defendants was improper, that issue was not raised in the motions below, nor is it raised in the
briefs on appeal.
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