IN RE KATHERINE TURNER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DAVID TURNER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
July 10, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 280788
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2005-060719-NA
DAVID PAUL TURNER,
Respondent-Appellee,
and
ROSEMARY TURNER,
Respondent.
In the Matter of MICHAEL TURNER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 280789
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2005-060720-NA
DAVID PAUL TURNER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROSEMARY TURNER,
Respondent.
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In the Matter of KATHERINE TURNER, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 280790
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2005-060721-NA
DAVID PAUL TURNER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROSEMARY TURNER,
Respondent.
Before: Owens, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent David Paul Turner appeals as of right the trial
court’s order terminating his parental rights to his minor children pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
First, respondent claims that the Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination of his parental rights. In
order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). “Once a statutory
ground for termination is established, the court must issue an order terminating parental rights
unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best
interests.” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); MCL 712A.19b(5).
We review the trial court’s determination for clear error. Trejo, supra at 356–357.
The children at issue were removed from their parents’ care as a result of the parents’
inability to provide a safe and stable home because of respondent’s imprisonment, both parents’
serious substance abuse, and the past domestic violence between the parents. The trial court
assumed jurisdiction over the children after the mother admitted to the allegations in the petition.
The DHS provided respondent with a copy of his parent/agency agreement, and the respondent
was aware of the issues that he needed to address to regain custody of his children. However,
respondent remained in prison during most of the proceedings and was therefore unable to
participate in or comply with the specific services enumerated in his agreement. When
respondent was released on parole over 17 months into the proceedings, termination proceedings
had already begun. Thus, the caseworker did not offer him reunification services following his
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release from prison. Regardless, respondent was able to make substantial efforts toward
improving his ability to provide proper care for the children by participating in numerous
services while in prison, continuing to address his substance abuse and domestic aggression
issues, and obtaining employment and housing after his release.
Unfortunately, despite his efforts, the evidence clearly showed that by the time of the
termination hearing, respondent had not yet maintained enough stability or sufficiently addressed
his issues to provide a safe and stable home for the children. We find significant the testimony
detailing the longstanding and serious nature of respondent’s domestic violence and substance
abuse issues, which led to multiple incarcerations and imprisonment, lost employment, instability
in the children’s lives, the foreclosure of their home, emotional harm to the children, and an
inability to provide proper care or custody for the children. In fact, respondent had not seen his
children in over two years due to his imprisonment. Further, the children had resided with their
grandparents and outside respondent’s care for the past five years, and during this time
respondent did not provide physical or financial support for their care. Although respondent
obtained limited stability following his release from prison, as evidenced by his continued
sobriety and his ability to obtain housing and employment, he had only been released from
prison for three months at the time of the termination hearing, which was not an adequate
amount of time to demonstrate an ability to maintain his stability or provide a safe and stable
home for the children. Also pertinent to his ability to maintain stability was his recent
reunification with the children’s mother, despite their shared past of serious domestic violence
and substance abuse, which increased the likelihood that he would not be able to maintain a safe
and stable environment for the children.
On this record, we find no clear error in the trial court’s finding that the evidence
sufficiently established grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights under subsections
(c)(i), (g), and (j). Trejo, supra at 356–357. The evidence clearly and convincingly established
that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would be able to fully address his issues
in order to give the children a safe and stable home and provide them with proper care and
custody within a reasonable time. Further, considering the children’s past emotional harm due to
the lack of stability and the domestic violence in their parents’ home and the parents’ ongoing
need to address their domestic violence and substance abuse issues issues, a reasonable
likelihood existed that the children would be subjected to emotional harm if they returned to their
parents’ home. In light of the evidence, and considering that for several years, the children had
been outside their parents’ care and in a safe and stable environment where they were doing well,
it would be unfair to delay their permanency any longer, notwithstanding respondent’s efforts to
address his issues.
Next, respondent claims that termination of his parental rights was premature because the
DHS failed to provide him with services during and after his release from prison to assist him in
reunifying with his children. At the outset of this case, the DHS planned to reunify the family,
and thus the DHS was required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused
the children’s removal. MCL 712A.18f; In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192
(2005). Because respondent was imprisoned, the sole effort by the DHS towards rectifying
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respondent’s issues was formulating and providing him with a parent/agency agreement.1
However, it was evident from our review of the record that the DHS’s alleged failure or inability
to provide services to respondent did not impede his ability to receive services to address his
issues. To the contrary, during his imprisonment, respondent availed himself of numerous
services available to him through the Department of Corrections to address his parenting,
substance abuse, and domestic violence issues. Further, upon his release from prison, respondent
secured services on his own to continue to work on those issues. In fact, respondent testified that
he successfully addressed the issues identified in his parent/agency agreement through his
participation in those services. Because respondent admittedly was able to find services in
prison or on his own to address his issues, without the assistance of the DHS, he failed to show
that he was adversely affected by the DHS’s alleged lack of contact with him or referrals for
services. See Fried, supra at 543. Therefore, we cannot say that respondent’s failure to make
sufficient progress towards addressing his issues to provide a safe and stable home for the
children was attributed to the DHS’s alleged failure to assist him with services.2 Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that petitioner made reasonable
efforts toward reunification.
Respondent next claims that termination of his parental rights was clearly not in the
children’s best interests. “Once a statutory ground for termination is established, the court must
issue an order terminating parental rights unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole record,
that termination is not in the child’s best interests.” Trejo, supra at 354; MCL 712A.19b(5). We
review the trial court’s determination regarding the child’s best interests for clear error. Trejo,
supra at 356–357.
Although respondent made commendable efforts and progress towards improving his
situation, and he loved, shared a bond with, and desired to parent the children, the focus of a best
interests inquiry should be on the children. Trejo, supra at 356. The children here had resided
with their grandparents for approximately five years in, by all accounts, a stable and safe
environment, and respondent had not seen his children in over two years. The record indicated
that the children suffered emotional harm and anxiety and exhibited behavioral issues arising
from their parents’ past instability and domestic violence. These issues had been addressed in
therapy, and the children had demonstrated improvement and seemed happier in their placement
with their grandparents. Additionally, the caseworker indicated that the children did not talk
about respondent or ask for him during the proceedings. In light of these facts, we find no clear
error in the court’s best interests determination. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 356–357.
Respondent’s recent efforts and progress towards addressing his issues did not “clearly
overwhelm” the children’s need for permanency in a safe environment. See Trejo, supra at 364.
1
However, the DHS made significant efforts to reunify the family during the lengthy
proceedings by providing numerous services to the children’s mother, including substance abuse
treatment, parenting classes, counseling, and visit facilitation, and by providing counseling to the
children.
2
The lower court record reveals that respondent never requested services from the caseworker
during the proceedings and only contacted her on three occasions.
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Finally, respondent claims that he was denied due process because the court started the
termination proceedings in his absence. On March 7, 2007, the first day of the scheduled
termination hearing, neither respondent, who was still incarcerated, nor his appointed counsel
was present. The court was unwilling to continue the hearing for both parents; instead it
proceeded with regard to the mother only and continued the hearing with regard to respondent.
A continued termination hearing concerning respondent was held August 9 and 10, 2007, and
respondent was present and represented by counsel.
“‘A procedural due process analysis requires a court to consider (1) whether a liberty or
property interest exists which the state has interfered with, and (2) whether the procedures
attendant upon the deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.’” In re CR, 250 Mich App 185,
204, 646 NW2d 506 (2002), quoting In re AMB, 248 Mich App 144, 209; 640 NW2d 262 (2001)
(citations omitted). Respondent failed to raise his due process claim before the trial court, and
thus we review this unpreserved claim of constitutional error for plain error affecting substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763–764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); Kern v BlethenColuni, 240 Mich App 333, 336; 612 NW2d 838 (2000).
We find no plain error or prejudice to respondent in the trial court’s action and therefore
no violation of his right to due process. The court continued the termination hearing with regard
to respondent and did not take any testimony or evidence regarding respondent when he was not
present, limiting the testimony to the mother’s case. Respondent was given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard during the continued termination proceedings, where both he and his
appointed counsel were present and available to both defend the allegations against him and
discredit the caseworker’s testimony by presenting respondent’s testimony, admitting additional
evidence, and cross-examining the caseworker. Under these circumstances, respondent failed to
show that he was prejudiced by his absence from the mother’s termination proceeding. Carines,
supra at 763–764; Kern, supra at 336.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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