PEOPLE OF MI V REGINALD LEE KIRKWOOD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 10, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277139
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-012193-01
REGINALD LEE KIRKWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (victim under 13 years of age), and one count of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (victim under 13 years of
age). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 40 years for the two CSC I
convictions and 3 to 15 years for the CSC II conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm.
Defendant first claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel
failed to call the complainant’s gynecologist and psychologist as witnesses, and failed to have
the complainant examined by an independent psychologist. We disagree. Criminal defendants
have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v Washington, 466 US
668, 685-686; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). Effective assistance of counsel is
presumed, and it is defendant’s heavy burden to prove otherwise. People v Solmonson, 261
Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). “When no Ginther[1] hearing has been conducted,
our review of the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to mistakes
that are apparent on the record.” People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 125; 695 NW2d 342
(2005). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 129.
Defendant claims the gynecologist would have testified that there was no physical
evidence of the incidents occurring. The decision whether to present an expert witness is
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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presumed to be a matter of trial strategy. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688 NW2d
308 (2004). We will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, nor will we assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v
Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). The failure to call a witness constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel only when it deprives a defendant of a substantial defense.
Dixon, supra. A substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the outcome of
the trial. People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), vacated in part on
other grounds 453 Mich 902 (1996).
At trial, counsel established that the complainant recently had a gynecological
examination. Counsel then used this information to cast doubt on the complainant’s testimony,
pointing out that the prosecution failed to offer any evidence to prove that the complainant had
any scarring or damage in her vaginal area. Counsel likely determined that this tactic was
sufficient to impeach the complainant’s credibility, and that it was not worth the risk of the
gynecologist testifying that scarring was present or providing an explanation for any lack of
scarring. Coupled with defendant’s failure to provide any evidence to support his position that
had the gynecologist been called, the testimony would have been as he asserts, we find no error.
Defendant next suggests the complainant’s psychologist would have undermined her
credibility with testimony regarding the more than ten-year delay in reporting the incidents. As
before, defendant offers no proof regarding this witness’s testimony. Moreover, this does not
appear to be a case where the victim pushed memories of the assaults from her conscious to
subconscious mind. When asked why she told those treating her at the second mental facility
about the assaults, the complainant stated that she did so “[b]ecause my mom said in order to get
over it and passed it, I have to talk about it.” When asked how she knew what her mother was
talking about, the complainant explained it was “[b]ecause [she] was writing certain things down
and [her mother] would find stuff.” In fact, when defense counsel questioned the complainant
about her possibly faulty memory, she screamed, “How do you forget somebody that raped you?
Come on now.” Given the prior early reporting that was not believed by her mother, this
testimony strongly implies that the assaults remained in the complainant’s conscious mind but
were just never reported.
Moreover, had the witness testified, it is possible that this would have actually hurt the
defense. The psychologist might have cited the complainant’s recent behavior changes, suicide
attempt, and counseling sessions as the reason why she ultimately reported the incidents. Given
this risk, counsel may have decided it was more effective to cast doubt on the prosecution’s case
by referencing the ten-year delay during cross-examination and closing argument, rather than to
call the psychologist as a witness. Accordingly, we decline to substitute our judgment for that of
counsel or second-guess this issue of trial strategy. Matuszak, supra.
Finally, defendant fails to establish that there was no examination by an independent
psychologist. See People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999) (observing that a
“defendant has the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel”). Rather, he speculates that if such an examination had occurred, counsel
would have mentioned it at trial. Defendant appears to suggest that the examination results
would have impeached the complainant’s credibility by establishing that she suffered from a
repressed memory. Again, nothing in the record supports defendant’s claim. Thus, it is quite
possible that the examination results were unfavorable and that counsel elected not to mention
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them as a matter of trial strategy. Dixon, supra; Matuszak, supra. However, even if counsel did
fail to have the complainant examined and this examination would have benefited the defense,
defendant has not shown that the outcome would have been different. Mack, supra at 129. The
complainant’s testimony provided ample evidence for defendant’s conviction, and the trial court
expressly stated that it found her credible. We conclude that defendant has not overcome the
burden that he received effective assistance of counsel. Solmonson, supra.
Defendant also claims the evidence was insufficient to convict him of CSC I because the
prosecutor failed to establish the element of penetration. We disagree. “Circumstantial evidence
and the reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of the crime,” People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 869 (1993), and any
conflicts in the evidence are resolved in the prosecution’s favor, People v Fletcher, 260 Mich
App 531, 562; 679 NW2d 127 (2004). At trial, the primary evidence of penetration was
established through the testimony of the complainant. On direct-examination, she testified that
defendant’s penis went inside her vagina and that he “went up and down” on her. Although there
were certain details of the incident that the complainant could not remember, at no point did she
waiver on the issue of penetration. From this testimony it was reasonable to conclude that
penetration occurred. This was ultimately a question of witness credibility, which was properly
left to the trier of fact to determine. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864
(1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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