VIRGINIA M LANE KONING V BOHUSLAV FINTA MD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VIRGINIA M. LANE KONING, Personal
Representative of the Estate of DIRK KONING,
Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 278265
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-011536-NH
v
BOHUSLAV FINTA, M.D., and WEST
MICHIGAN HEART, P.C.,
Defendants,
and
SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS, d/b/a
SPECTRUM HEALTH-BUTTERWORTH
CAMPUS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Smolenski and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Spectrum Health Hospitals (“defendant”), appeals by leave granted from a
circuit court order denying in part its motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand.
This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff’s husband, Dirk, underwent heart surgery performed by Dr. Bohuslav Finta at
defendant hospital. Dirk developed complications that either went undetected or were detected
but not corrected in time and he later died. In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff sought to
hold defendant hospital liable for the negligence of Dr. Finta and any other agents and employees
involved in Dirk’s care.1 Plaintiff’s complaint was accompanied by an affidavit of merit from
1
Plaintiff later conceded that defendant was not vicariously liable for Dr. Finta’s negligence and
dismissed that aspect of plaintiff’s complaint. That ruling is not at issue here.
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David Martin, a physician who is board certified in cardiovascular disease and clinical cardiac
electrophysiology. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that Dr. Martin was not qualified
to provide an affidavit of merit regarding the alleged negligence of staff members. The trial
court disagreed and denied that aspect of defendant’s motion.
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Kefgen
v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). Statutory interpretation is a
question of law that is also reviewed de novo on appeal. Van Reken v Darden, Neef & Heitsch,
259 Mich App 454, 456; 674 NW2d 731 (2003).
A medical malpractice action may be commenced against a licensed health care
professional or a licensed health facility. MCL 600.5838a(1). The complaint must be
accompanied by an affidavit of merit from a qualified expert certifying that the claim has merit.
MCL 600.2912d(1). The affidavit must be “signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s
attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under” MCL
600.2169. MCL 600.2912d(1). The affiant must identify the applicable standard of care, opine
that the defendant breached that standard, specify the actions that should have been undertaken
or omitted to comply with the standard of care, and specify the manner in which the breach of
the standard of care was the proximate cause of the injury. Id. “[A]n affidavit of merit is
required in every medical malpractice action, including those initiated against nonphysicians,”
McElhaney v Harper-Hutzel Hosp, 269 Mich App 488, 494-495; 711 NW2d 795 (2006), such as
“nurses, medical technologists, physical therapists, and optometrists.” Bates v Gilbert, 479 Mich
451, 456; 736 NW2d 566 (2007).
MCL 600.2169 “contains strict requirements concerning the qualification of expert
witnesses in medical malpractice cases.” McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 28; 597 NW2d 148
(1999). In general, it requires “that the qualifications of a purported expert match the
qualifications of the defendant against whom that expert intends to testify.” Decker v Flood, 248
Mich App 75, 85; 638 NW2d 163 (2001). Section 2169 requires that an expert be licensed as a
health professional. If the party against whom he testifies is a specialist, the expert must
specialize in the same field. If the party against whom he testifies is a board-certified specialist,
the expert must be board certified in the same specialty. MCL 600.2169(1)(a). In addition, the
expert must devote the majority of his professional time to the practice or teaching of the same
health profession or specialty as practiced by the party against whom he testifies. MCL
600.2169(1)(b) and (c).
Because an institutional defendant such as a hospital “is incapable of committing any
independent actions, including negligence,” a medical malpractice action brought against a
hospital is necessarily premised on a vicarious liability theory, i.e., that the hospital is liable for
the actions of its agents, and the standard of care applicable to the hospital is the same standard
of care that is applicable to each agent alleged to have been negligent. Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp
Managers, 467 Mich 1, 12-15; 651 NW2d 356 (2002); Nippa v Botsford Gen Hosp (On
Remand), 257 Mich App 387, 391-392; 668 NW2d 628 (2003). “All procedural requirements
are applicable to the hospital in the same manner and form as if [its agent] were a named party to
the lawsuit” and thus when a plaintiff files a medical malpractice action against a hospital, she
must submit with her complaint an affidavit of merit from a health care professional who
practices in the same field as the agent alleged to have breached the applicable standard of care.
Nippa, supra at 392-393. Accord Sturgis Bank & Trust Co v Hillsdale Community Health Ctr,
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268 Mich App 484, 492; 708 NW2d 453 (2005) (§ 2169[1] requires that the affiant practice or
teach in the same health profession as the individual who committed the alleged malpractice).
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable for various staff members who allegedly breached
the standard of care by; (1) failing to recognize that Dirk was developing pericardial effusion and
tamponade (PET), (2) failing to treat the developing PET, (3) failing “to maintain proper
anticoagulation” during the PET, (4) failing “to immediately correct the markedly elevated ACT
level,” and (5) failing “to immediately stop and reverse the heparin when the pericardial effusion
was detected.” Neither the complaint nor the affidavit of merit identifies the staff members
claimed to be at fault, e.g., staff physicians, residents, interns, radiologists, anesthesiologists,
medical technologists, nurses, etc., and thus there is no basis for concluding that a cardiologist
such as Dr. Martin is qualified to render an expert opinion regarding, or provide an affidavit of
merit against, any staff member who is not also a physician specializing in cardiology.
Plaintiff argues that she was only required to file one affidavit and, because she filed an
affidavit signed by a licensed health care professional, she met the requirements of § 2912d. We
disagree. Section 2912d(1) requires “an affidavit” signed by “a health professional,” but the
health professional must be qualified to serve as an expert under § 2169. As discussed
previously, this means that the affiant must practice or teach in the same area of medicine
practiced by the staff member alleged to have been negligent. Because Dr. Martin is a physician
specializing in cardiovascular disease and clinical cardiac electrophysiology, he is only qualified
to render an expert opinion against other physicians specializing in the same fields.
Plaintiff argues that if this Court concludes that Dr. Martin’s affidavit was insufficient,
the requirements of § 2912d(1) were nonetheless met because her counsel reasonably believed
that Dr. Martin was qualified to serve as an expert. Again, we disagree.
The fact that a court determines that an affiant is not qualified to serve as an expert
witness only means that he cannot testify as an expert at trial. His affidavit of merit could still be
sufficient for initiating the action if “the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes [the affiant]
meets the requirements for an expert witness under section 2169.” MCL 600.2912a(1). That is
because, at the affidavit-of-merit stage of the proceedings, discovery is not available and “the
plaintiff’s attorney may have limited information available to ensure a proper ‘matching’
between the plaintiff’s expert and the defendant[.]” Bates, supra at 458. Thus, “[a]n affidavit is
sufficient if counsel reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believed that the affiant was qualified under
MCL 600.2169.” Watts v Canady, 253 Mich App 468, 471-472; 655 NW2d 784 (2002).
Because the complaint must be accompanied by an affidavit from an expert who matches
the qualifications of the individual alleged to have committed malpractice, counsel must
undertake some action to determine the area of practice of the individuals alleged to have
committed malpractice and whether they are specialists or board-certified specialists. Certainly
plaintiff’s counsel would have a reasonable belief that Dr. Martin was qualified to serve as an
expert against another cardiologist such as Dr. Finta and, therefore, Dr. Martin would be
qualified to serve as an expert to the extent defendant was alleged to be vicariously liable for Dr.
Finta’s negligence. However, Dr. Martin also rendered an opinion regarding hospital staff
members other than Dr. Finta. Those staff members were not identified in the complaint or in
the affidavit, and plaintiff’s counsel essentially admitted that he had no idea who those staff
members were, given that he asked for time to conduct discovery to learn their identities. If
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counsel could not identify the hospital staff members sought to be held liable, he could not know
their areas of practice and could not have reasonably believed that Dr. Martin (or any other
proposed expert) was qualified to serve as an expert against them.
Finally, plaintiff suggests that an affidavit of merit is not required to the extent that a
hospital staff member is not a licensed health care professional. Plaintiff has not briefed the
merits of this argument or cited any relevant supporting authority and, therefore, it may be
deemed abandoned. Coble v Green, 271 Mich App 382, 391; 722 NW2d 898 (2006).
Because Dr. Martin was not qualified to serve as an expert against any individual other
than Dr. Finta and because plaintiff conceded that defendant is not vicariously liable for Dr.
Finta’s negligence, the affidavit of merit was insufficient to support a malpractice claim against
defendant under a vicarious liability theory. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s claim that defendant was liable for the malpractice
of staff members other than Dr. Finta. Defendant was entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s
complaint without prejudice. Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581, 586; 734 NW2d 201 (2007).
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion and dismissing
plaintiff’s claim against it without prejudice. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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