PEOPLE OF MI V RODNEY GOSS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277142
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-013512-01
RODNEY GOSS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Smolenski and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of and sentences for three counts
of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and one count of second-degree fleeing and eluding,
MCL 750.479a(4). We affirm.
Defendant was charged as a result of a vehicular accident that occurred after he refused to
stop when a police vehicle signaled him to do so, and instead accelerated through a red light.
Defendant’s vehicle struck another vehicle, killing the three occupants of the vehicle.
Defendant waived his right to a preliminary examination, and was bound over to the trial
court. Defendant moved to remand the matter to the district court for a preliminary examination,
asserting that at the time he waived the examination he was under the influence of morphine he
had received for the injuries he sustained in the accident, and was unable to make an intelligent
decision regarding the waiver.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to remand for a preliminary examination,
noting that at the time the waiver was made, defendant was represented by an experienced
attorney,1 and that the decision to waive a preliminary examination was a strategic one. The trial
court found that no substantial evidence supported defendant’s assertion that he was unable to
make an intelligent decision at the time he waived his right to a preliminary examination.
1
The attorney who filed the motion to remand and who represented defendant at trial was
defendant’s third appointed attorney.
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The statutory sentencing guidelines, as adjusted for defendant’s status as a fourth habitual
offender, MCL 769.12, recommended a minimum term range of 315 to 1050 months. MCL
777.61; MCL 777.21(3)(c). The trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of 50
(600 months) to 80 years in prison for the second-degree murder convictions, and to a fourth
concurrent term of six to ten years for the second-degree fleeing and eluding conviction. In
imposing sentence, the trial court noted that it wished to impress upon the community that
fleeing from the police was extremely dangerous and could have tragic consequences.
Defendant filed an appeal, and moved to remand this matter to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing on his assertion that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and for a new
trial or resentencing. This Court denied the motion.
The right to a preliminary examination is established by statute, and is not
constitutionally based. People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 603; 460 NW2d 520 (1990). If a
defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination without the benefit of counsel, the trial
court may, in its discretion, remand the case. MCL 767.42(1).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. Counsel must have made errors so serious that he was not performing as the “counsel”
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20;
People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Counsel’s deficient performance
must also have resulted in prejudice. To demonstrate the existence of prejudice, a defendant
must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings
would have been different, id. at 600, and that the result that did occur was fundamentally unfair
or unreliable. People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). Counsel is
presumed to have afforded effective assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of proving
otherwise. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Defendant argues that the trial court deprived him of due process by denying his motion
to remand the case to the district court for a preliminary examination. Defendant also contends
that his original attorney rendered ineffective assistance by allowing him to waive the
preliminary examination. We disagree.
Defendant’s assertion that he was under the influence of morphine and other pain
medication at the time he waived his right to a preliminary examination is unsubstantiated.2 The
trial court correctly found that no evidence supported defendant’s assertion that he was unable to
make a knowing and voluntary decision to waive his right to a preliminary examination. The
trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to remand the case to
district court for a preliminary examination.
2
Defendant’s undated, unsigned, non-notarized affidavit in which he makes this assertion is
invalid, Detroit Leasing Co v Detroit, 269 Mich App 233, 236; 713 NW2d 269 (2005).
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Furthermore, defendant has not specified what issues regarding his alleged use of heroin
and cocaine at the time of the accident could have been fleshed out at a preliminary examination,
especially given that defendant admits in his affidavit that he did not inform his attorney of his
alleged use of illegal substances. Moreover, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to seconddegree murder. See, People v Langworthy, 416 Mich 630, 652; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). Given
the above, defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel rendered effective
assistance by advising him to waive the examination. Rockey, supra at 76.
Turning to defendant’s sentencing issue, we note that under the sentencing guidelines act,
if a minimum sentence is within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, we must affirm the
sentence, and may not remand for resentencing absent an error in the scoring of the guidelines or
inaccurate information relied on by the trial court in determining the sentence. MCL 769.34(10);
People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004).
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to individualized sentencing when
it stated that it was imposing sentence in order to send a message to the community. We
disagree.
The deterrence of others is a proper objective of sentencing. See People v Reddish, 181
Mich App 625, 631; 450 NW2d 16 (1989). Moreover, the trial court noted that defendant’s prior
record of five felony and six misdemeanor convictions warranted lengthy sentences. Finally,
defendant’s minimum terms were within the guidelines, and defendant does not challenge the
scoring of the guidelines or the accuracy of the information on which the trial court relied when
imposing sentence. Therefore, we must affirm defendant’s sentences. MCL 769.34(10); Kimble,
supra at 309.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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