MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS V NORTHWESTERN BANK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS and FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 275856
Otsego Circuit Court
LC No. 05-011204-CH
NORTHWESTERN BANK, RANDY
BURROUGHS, and LESLIE BURROUGHS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Talbot and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition to
defendant Northwestern Bank (“Northwestern”) on plaintiffs’ claims for relief under separate
theories of marshaling of assets and equitable subrogation.1 We affirm.
Defendants Randy and Leslie Burroughs obtained a residential mortgage from
Northwestern; at the same time, Northwestern placed a second lien on the Burroughs’ residential
property as security for a commercial loan, which was also secured by a mortgage on a separate
“lake lot” owned by the Burroughs. The Burroughs refinanced their residential mortgage with
plaintiff Flagstar Bank, which paid off Northwestern’s residential mortgage. At the time,
Flagstar was aware of Northwestern’s second lien, but either assumed or was assured by its title
company that Northwestern would execute a subordination agreement that would give the
Flagstar mortgage priority over Northwestern’s perfected second lien securing the commercial
loan. However, Northwestern was never asked to sign a subordination agreement.
After the Burroughs defaulted on the Northwestern commercial loan, Northwestern
foreclosed on its residential lien and discharged the mortgage on the lake lot. The Burroughs
declared bankruptcy. More than a year and a half after the redemption period for the residential
1
Although Flagstar Bank, FSB, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”),
are both party plaintiffs in this action, hereafter we refer only to plaintiff Flagstar Bank in this
opinion because plaintiff MERS is solely a nominee party.
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foreclosure expired, Flagstar brought this action alleging (1) that Northwestern had an obligation
to marshal assets by proceeding against the lake lot instead of foreclosing on the residential
property, and (2) that Flagstar was entitled to relief under a theory of equitable subrogation. In
separate orders, the trial court determined that Northwestern was entitled to summary disposition
with respect to each of Flagstar’s claims.
This Court reviews the trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition de novo.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). It appears that
summary disposition was granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464
Mich 322, 332; 628 NW2d 33 (2001). The trial court must consider any pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence filed by the parties in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists. MCR
2.116(G)(2); Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). The
motion should be granted if the evidence demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact
exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MacDonald, supra at
332.
It is undisputed that Northwestern had a valid prior lien on the Burroughs’ residential
property securing the commercial loan, which was not discharged when the Burroughs obtained
their residential mortgage from Flagstar. When a mortgage is recorded, “all subsequent owners
or encumbrances shall take subject to the perfected liens, rights, or interests.” MCL 565.25(4).
Because there was no subordination agreement, Flagstar was a junior lienor with “an imperfect
security.” Farwell v Bigelow, 112 Mich 285, 290; 70 NW 579 (1897), quoting 3 Pom Eq Jur
§ 1414.
Nevertheless, Flagstar first argues that it is entitled to relief from the consequences of the
foreclosure sale of the Burroughs’ residential property under the doctrine of marshaling of assets.
Flagstar contends that because Northwestern’s loan was secured by liens on both the residential
property and the lake lot, Northwestern was obligated to foreclose on the lake lot first, thereby
protecting Flagstar’s junior lien on the residential property. We disagree. Flagstar is not entitled
to rely on the marshaling of assets doctrine because it failed to timely invoke this theory of relief.
As this Court explained, in SCD Chemical Distributors, Inc v Maintenance Research
Lab, Inc, 191 Mich App 43, 46; 477 NW2d 434 (1991):
[T]he equitable remedy of marshaling of assets exists for the benefit of
persons who hold a subordinate secured claim in property; where a senior creditor
has a lien against two funds or parcels and the junior lienor has a lien against only
one of those properties, a court of equity may compel the former to satisfy its
claim out of the property that is encumbered by only its lien. However,
application of the doctrine is limited in that it will not be allowed if it cannot be
invoked without prejudicing or injuring the rights of the senior creditor or where
it would harm the interests of a third party.
The existence of two funds “which may be resorted to by the creditor” is “an essential precedent
condition” to marshaling assets. Id.; Webber v Webber, 109 Mich 147, 152; 66 NW2d 960
(1896). “The rules must be taken with the modifications and exceptions that in their application
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the paramount incumbrancer shall not be delayed or inconvenienced in the collection of his debt,
for it would be unreasonable that he should suffer because some one else has taken imperfect
security.” Farwell, supra. A junior creditor’s right to have a senior creditor’s assets marshaled
“does not exist as does a lien or a vested interest”; it is “merely a principle which is to be
administered when it has been invoked.” 53 Am Jur 2d, Marshaling Assets, § 10, p 14. “The
junior creditor acquires the right to have the common debtor’s assets marshaled by taking proper
steps to have the doctrine enforced.” Id. at § 10, pp 13-14. “The invocation of the doctrine of
marshaling is thus dependent upon a seasonal assertion of right by the junior lienholder. By
failing to raise the question of marshaling promptly, the right to invoke the doctrine may be
waived, or lost through laches.” Id. at §§ 10, 30, p 14, 33.
In the instant case, Northwestern foreclosed its lien by advertisement. Flagstar does not
allege that the foreclosure sale was invalid for failure to comply with any statutory requirements,
and Flagstar was “not entitled to any greater notice than that required by the statute involved.”
Cheff v Edwards, 203 Mich App 557, 560; 513 NW2d 439 (1994). Flagstar did not bring action
to demand marshaling of assets until more than one and a half years after the foreclosure
redemption period had expired. By that time, the residential property had been foreclosed, the
lien to the lake lot had been discharged, and the Burroughs had filed for bankruptcy.
Consequently, Northwestern no longer had a lien against two properties so as to permit
marshaling of assets. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Flagstar’s claim for
relief under a marshaling of assets theory.
Flagstar also asserts that the trial court improperly dismissed its claim for equitable
subrogation. We disagree.
As our Supreme Court explained, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co v Used Car
Factory, Inc, 461 Mich 210, 215; 600 NW2d 630 (1999):
Equitable subrogation is a legal fiction through which a person who pays a
debt for which another is primarily responsible is substituted or subrogated to all
the rights and remedies of the other. It is well-established that the subrogee
acquires no greater rights than those possessed by the subrogor, and that the
subrogee may not be a “mere volunteer.”
“To avoid being a volunteer, a subrogee must be acting to fulfill a legal or equitable duty.” Eller
v Metro Industrial Contracting, Inc, 261 Mich App 569, 574; 683 NW2d 242 (2004).
“Subrogation from its very nature, never could have been intended for the relief of those who
were in a condition in which they were at liberty to elect whether they would or would not be
bound.” Washington Mut Bank, FA v Shorebank Corp, 267 Mich App 111, 118; 703 NW2d 486
(2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Thus, “the doctrine of equitable subrogation
does not allow a new mortgagee to take the priority of the older mortgagee merely because the
proceeds of the new mortgage were used to pay off the indebtedness secured by the old
mortgage.” Id. at 119-120.
Here, Flagstar had no preexisting interest in the residential property, and no legal or
equitable duty to grant the Burroughs a mortgage. As a volunteer, Flagstar was not entitled to
equitable subrogation. Additionally, although Flagstar asserts that it reasonably expected that
Northwestern would agree to subordinate its lien, no evidence was presented that Northwestern
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was ever asked to sign a subordination agreement, and it is undisputed that such an agreement
does not exist. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Flagstar’s equitable
subrogation claim.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Bill Schuette
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