DIXIE LEE ANDERSON V DOYLE ANTHONY HAYES SR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DIXIE LEE ANDERSON,
UNPUBLISHED
July 1, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 273914
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 273914
DOYLE ANTHONY HAYES, SR.,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this divorce action, plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce and
defendant cross appeals. On direct appeal, plaintiff challenges the award of spousal support, the
division of property, and the failure of the trial court to award her attorney fees. On cross appeal,
all of defendant’s issues concerns the valuation of the parties’ business asset, Pyper Products.
We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
I
The parties were married on September 30, 1989 when each was approximately 39 years
old. Each party was previously married and this marriage produced no children. At the time of
the marriage, plaintiff, an MBA, was doing consulting work out of her home. At the time of the
marriage, defendant, an executive, had been employed at General Motors but was transitioning to
Diesel Technologies. After they were married, defendant moved into plaintiff’s house on Byron
Street in the Easttown section of Grand Rapids, Michigan. Initially, the parties lived a very
modest lifestyle because plaintiff’s income from her private consulting was small and defendant
had spousal and child support obligations as a result of his previous divorce. The parties grew
more financially stable and purchased a cottage in Pentwater, Michigan in 1992.
Five years into their marriage defendant became unhappy with his job and began
interviewing, but instead decided he wanted to start his own company. To prepare for the startup of the business, reduce their liabilities and increase their chances of obtaining financing, the
parties sold their Pentwater cottage for a $4,000 profit. They then took out a $111,000 loan to
secure the necessary start-up capital. Together with plaintiff’s encouragement, defendant formed
Pyper Products Corporation (Pyper Products) on December 14, 1994 with several other corporate
entities. Pyper Products was organized as a Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) in Michigan
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based on defendant’s African-American race. To satisfy the MBE requirements all corporate
constituents granted defendant 55% of the stock in the company. Pyper Products is located in
Battle Creek and manufactures plastic automotive parts including fans and fan shrouds.
In 1995, plaintiff became employed with the World Affairs Council of Western
Michigan, and, at the time of the divorce, she was the Executive Director of the Council. In
1996, the parties sold the house on Byron Street and used the $50,000 profit on the sale as a
down payment on a new home on Robinson Road in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The parties
financed the remainder of the purchase price through a $120,000 mortgage. Later, in 1998, the
parties refinanced the primary mortgage increasing it to $150,000. The parties also opened a
home equity line of credit on the house, which at the time of the divorce, amounted to nearly
$66,000. The parties used the line of credit to make home repairs, purchase an automobile, and
finance various other expenses.
Over time, the parties began to have arguments over finances and personal
disagreements. In July 2000, defendant began having an extramarital affair. In 2003, defendant
and other parties and entities began a staffing company called Talent Trax, LLC. Defendant was
credited with a 40% interest in Talent Trax, LLC. In order to finance defendant’s capital
contribution, a second line of credit was established on the parties’ home on Robinson Road in
the amount of $10,000. In early 2003, plaintiff began to suspect that defendant was having
affairs and had a gambling problem. Plaintiff confronted defendant and he agreed to attend
Gamblers Anonymous meetings. By October 2003 plaintiff suspected defendant was not
attending his meetings and hired a private detective to follow defendant.
Plaintiff filed for divorce on March 25, 2004 after nearly fifteen years of marriage. After
lengthy divorce proceedings, the parties were divorced on October 4, 2006. After hearing
testimony in the matter, the trial court made the following findings of fact on the record:
This is a marriage of approximately fifteen years. The parties were
married in September of 1989. The past relations and conduct of the parties have
been testified to at length. Both parties work. As the record indicates, [plaintiff]
is the executive director of the World Affairs Counsel where she earns
approximately $50,000.00 per year.
And, [defendant] is the head of Pyper Products, where he earns
$150,000.00, approximately. He also earns funds from Talent Trax, and funds as
a bank director for Mercantile Bank, for an approximate yearly wage of
somewhere between $185,000.00 to $200,000.00 per year.
Both parties have the ability to work, and continue to be employed
throughout the pendency of these proceedings.
The Court in its discretion with regard to spousal support has considered
the significant asset of Pyper Products in the award that I’ve just stated that will
be made to [plaintiff.]
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Both parties are approximately 55 years of age. The Court does find that
[defendant] has the ability to pay spousal support based upon his significant
income being much more than [plaintiff’s.]
Currently, as the Court evaluates the present situation of the parties, both
parties have independent living situations. Again, both parties are employed.
And, both parties have presented budgets to the Court that are included in the file.
The needs of the parties, as I’ve indicated, are set forth on their respective
budgets. Neither parties’ needs are significantly higher than the others. The
parties each enjoy relatively fine health. The prior standard of living of the
parties and whether either is responsible for the support of the other.
The parties lived a relatively middle class lifestyle until [defendant]
moved in – into his position with Pyper Products. And, then their income
significantly increased. He’s been the primary wage earner during the marriage
of the parties.
Both have contributed to the joint estate. And, the Court does find with
regard to fault, that [defendant] is responsible for the end of this marriage, based
on multiple affairs, and based on a lack of honesty – honesty, and also with regard
to financial difficulties including gambling.
Pointing to its conclusions that both parties contributed to the marriage and that
defendant was responsible for the end of this marriage, based on marital infidelity, a lack of
honesty, and financial difficulties including gambling, the trial court granted plaintiff 55% of the
parties’ non-business marital assets and 45% of the parties’ non-business marital assets to
defendant. When distributing the non-business marital assets, the trial court utilized a
spreadsheet submitted by defendant proposing a division of assets and liabilities as a starting
point. The trial court allocated individual assets and liabilities based in its findings of fact
regarding valuation. The trial court specifically assigned values to the parties’ real property,
retirement assets, stock options and deferred compensation, bank accounts, vehicles, and debts.
Once allocated, in order to balance the property settlement at 55% to plaintiff and 45% to
defendant, the trial court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $24,727 in cash from a
premarital IRA.
The trial court also granted plaintiff spousal support in the amount of $2,000 per month
for a period of three years to assist her in a transition to living solely on her own funds after
concluding that defendant had “the ability to pay spousal support based upon his significant
income being much more than [plaintiff’s.]” At the time of the divorce, the trial court found that
defendant’s aggregate yearly income was approximately $185,000 to $200,000 and plaintiff’s
annual income was approximately $50,000. The trial court conditioned the spousal support on
cohabitation, death, or remarriage, and support was made effective November 1, 2005.
The trial court granted plaintiff and defendant both 50% of the parties’ business assets.
The trial court heard extensive testimony about the valuation of Pyper Products. Plaintiff’s
expert, Marc Gilbert, testified that Pyper Products should be valued at $4.5 million. Defendant’s
expert, Eric Adamy, testified that Pyper Products had no value in excess of its substantial debts.
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Plaintiff then presented rebuttal testimony through another expert, Christine Baker, who
criticized Adamy’s methodology and testified that in her opinion, $3,269,000 represented the
equity value of Pyper Products. The trial court adopted Baker’s testimony with respect to the
equity value of Pyper Products. The trial court subtracted marital debt associated with Pyper
Products and then determined that defendant’s 55% interest in the business was $1,712,259. The
trial court divided the amount equally and awarded plaintiff 50% totaling $856,000. In regard to
Talent Trax, LLC, the trial court credited Adamy’s valuation and found its worth was $35,000.
Again, the trial court subtracted the marital debt associated with the asset, determined that
defendant’s interest was 40% totaling $4,500, and granted plaintiff 50% in the amount of $2,250.
The trial court invited the parties to submit proposals regarding how the business asset
awards would be paid to plaintiff. The trial court heard testimony, but was unsatisfied with the
parties proposed payment terms. The trial court stated that plaintiff’s expert merely presented an
alternative redistribution of the entire marital estate. Defendant’s expert maintained that based
on his projections, it would take the business eleven years to pay its debts and be in a position to
pay defendant any additional sums from which he could start to pay plaintiff her 50% share.
Thus defendant sought an eleven-year deferment on paying plaintiff her share. Finding the
parties’ payment proposals unhelpful, but the valuation fair, the trial court fashioned a payment
plan. The trial court directed that defendant would pay plaintiff $4,000 per month until the
satisfaction of the debt commencing at termination of defendant’s spousal support obligation to
plaintiff. The trial court also set a 7% interest rate on the award to encourage defendant’s early
payment. The trial court mandated a review at eleven years based on Adamy’s testimony about
the future of Pyper Products but also suggested reviews at three year intervals.
Plaintiff’s appeal and defendant’s cross-appeal followed.
II
“In deciding a divorce action, the circuit court must make findings of fact and
dispositional rulings.” McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 87; 545 NW2d 357 (1996). The
appellate standard of review for matters of property distribution is twofold. First, this Court
must review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 151;
485 NW2d 893 (1992). A finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court, on all of the
evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Draggoo v
Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429; 566 NW2d 642 (1997). We give special deference to a trial
court’s findings when they are based on the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Second, if the trial
court’s findings of fact are upheld, the appellate court must decide whether the dispositive ruling
was fair and equitable in light of those facts. Sparks, supra at 151-152. “The court’s
dispositional ruling should be affirmed unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that the
division was inequitable.” Pickering v Pickering, 268 Mich App 1, 7; 706 NW2d 835 (2005).
III
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court’s alimony/spousal support award was unjust and
unreasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case. Defendant responds that the trial
court properly awarded plaintiff spousal support in the amount of $2,000 per month for three
years because plaintiff’s own testimony provided a sufficient basis for the award. We review a
trial court’s award of spousal support for an abuse of discretion. Olson v Olson, 256 Mich App
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619, 631; 671 NW2d 64 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision
falls outside of the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co,
476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). We review a trial court’s findings of fact related to
spousal support for clear error. Moore v Moore, 242 Mich App 652, 654; 619 NW2d 723
(2000). Again, “[a] finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 654-655. If there is no clear error, we
determine whether the dispositional ruling was fair and equitable in light of the facts. Id. at 655.
The main objective of spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties
in a way that will not impoverish either party. Moore, supra at 654. Support is to be based on
what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Id. The trial court should
consider: (1) the relations and conduct of the parties during the marriage; (2) the length of the
marriage; (3) the parties' ability to work; (4) the distribution of property awarded to the parties;
(5) the parties' ages; (6) the abilities of the parties to pay support; (7) the present situation of the
parties; (8) the parties' needs; (9) the parties' health; (10) the prior standard of living of the
parties and whether either is responsible for the support of others; (11) contributions of the
parties to the joint estate; (12) a party's fault in causing the divorce; (13) the effect of
cohabitation on a party's financial status; and (14) general principles of equity. Olson, supra at
631. When determining spousal support, the trial court “should focus on the income-earning
potential of the assets and should not evaluate a party’s ability to provide self-support by
including in the amount available for support the value of the assets themselves.” Hanaway v
Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 296; 527 NW2d 792 (1995).
In this case, both parties submitted a statement of their respective expenses and income
for the court’s consideration, and the trial court specifically addressed the Olson, supra factors
relevant to an award of spousal support. The trial court considered the parties’ ages, health,
employment, past relations, and contributions to the marriage. The trial court recognized that the
parties previously enjoyed a “middle class” standard of living. The trial court found that
defendant was at fault for the divorce because of issues related to honesty, gambling, and
infidelity. While noting that it had awarded plaintiff 50% of the parties’ equity in Pyper
Products in the amount of $856,000, it also awarded plaintiff spousal support in the amount of
$2,000 per month for three years stating as follows:
Based on review of the factors, the Court does not find that this is a strong
spousal support case.
The Court will allocate spousal support to [plaintiff] for approximately
three years at $2,000.00 per month. This will, hopefully, assist in her transition to
rely on her own funds, and based upon the amounts to be paid based on her
interest in Pyper Products.
Despite plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, the trial court considered the disparity
between plaintiff’s and defendant’s annual salaries and further acknowledged defendant’s ability
to pay spousal support when it determined that plaintiff was entitled to rehabilitative spousal
support. While plaintiff places significant emphasis on one or two of the factors to be considered
in awarding spousal support, and plainly, the court found defendant responsible for the
breakdown of the marriage, fault is only one of the relevant factors in determining spousal
support. “A judge’s role is to achieve equity, not to ‘punish’ one of the parties.” Sands v Sands,
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442 Mich 30, 36-37; 497 NW2d 493 (1993). In light of the evidence and how it relates to the
factors as a whole, we conclude that the trial court’s award of spousal support was just and
equitable because it balanced the needs and equities of the parties.
In the context of this issue plaintiff also asserts that potential tax consequences may
decrease the amount of her monthly spousal support award. This issue was not raised in the trial
court and plaintiff presented no evidence in the trial court regarding a potential tax effect. Thus,
on appeal, plaintiff has attempted to improperly expand the record to establish her assertion. As
such, we may not consider this evidence and decline to review this issue. This Court’s review is
limited to the record established by the trial court, and a party may not expand the record on
appeal. Reeves v Kmart Corp, 229 Mich App 466, 481 n 7; 582 NW2d 841 (1998).
IV
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s property settlement lacked congruence and
imposed an economic hardship on plaintiff. A judgment of divorce must include a determination
of the property rights of the divorcing parties. MCR 3.211(B)(3); Olson, supra at 627. The trial
court’s goal in distributing the marital estate is to reach an equitable distribution of the property
in light of all the circumstances. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich App 420, 423; 664 NW2d 231 (2003).
To reach an equitable distribution, a trial court should consider nine factors:
(1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the marital estate,
(3) age of the parties, (4) health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6)
necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8)
past relations and conduct of the parties, and (9) general principles of equity.
[Sparks, supra at 159-160.]
Plaintiff advances six separate arguments in support of her assertion that the trial court’s property
settlement lacked congruence and imposed an economic hardship on plaintiff. We address each
argument in kind.
A.
Plaintiff first assigns fault to the trial court’s award of the marital home and associated
mortgages to her. Plaintiff states that the trial court award effectively left her, a 57-year-old
woman, with two mortgages to be refinanced, taxes, insurance, and maintenance amounting to a
“huge economic headache” in a depressed real estate market. Defendant responds that the trial
court awarded plaintiff the parties’ “single most valuable non-business asset, the marital home”
and states that plaintiff’s complaints about refinancing are “absurd.” Regarding the taxes,
insurance, and maintenance costs associated with the marital home award, defendant contends
that those claims must be automatically rejected because plaintiff did not present any evidence
regarding those issues during the trial.
“In dividing marital assets, the goal is to reach an equitable division in light of all the
circumstances.” McNamara v Horner, 249 Mich App 177, 188; 642 NW2d 385 (2002). The
division of property is not governed by a rigid set of rules and the determination of relevant
factors will vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. Sands, supra at 34. Here, the
record reveals that the trial court clearly considered the Sparks factors when it distributed the
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marital estate and awarded plaintiff a disproportionate 55%. In fact, the record reveals that the
trial court engaged in a painstaking exercise to reach an equitable distribution of the parties’
marital assets and liabilities including the parties’ marital home to which plaintiff now assigns
error for the first time on appeal.
Plaintiff relies only on her own unsubstantiated assertions regarding the “economic
travesty” that the trial court’s award of the marital home and associated mortgages has caused
her post-judgment of divorce. To establish error, plaintiff points only to the two mortgages on
the house, taxes, insurance, and required maintenance costs and asks this Court to “empathize
with [her] fear.” Plaintiff also states that she could sell the property but “[a] sale would also be
subject to paying repair costs and a real estate commission, and in the present market, it is
doubtful that there is any value at all in this asset.” Again, plaintiff has improperly attempted to
expand the record on appeal to establish her assertions. As such, we may not consider this
evidence and decline to review this issue. This Court’s review is limited to the record
established by the trial court, and a party may not expand the record on appeal. Reeves, supra at
481 n 7.
We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. The record shows that the trial court valued
the house at $260,000 and was subject to a primary mortgage in the amount of $136,887 and a
second mortgage in the amount of $66,000. Thus, the trial court credited plaintiff with equity in
the home in the amount of $57,113. In her brief on appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the trial
court’s valuation of the property. In fact, plaintiff does not even assert that the trial court’s
findings of fact regarding valuation of the marital home at the time of the divorce were error. In
any event, plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court’s dispositive ruling regarding the
marital home was not fair and equitable in light of the facts of the case. Sparks, supra at 151152. And for these reasons we would not disturb the trial court’s dispositional ruling regarding
the marital home. Pickering, supra at 7.
B.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it did not include the value of Pyper
Products in its calculation of the aggregate value of the parties’ asset/debt schedule. Defendant
responds that the trial court properly considered the value of the business asset, Pyper Products,
but did so separately from the parties’ non-business assets that were included on the asset/debt
schedule. Our review of the record reveals that plaintiff’s argument is without merit. The record
is plain that the trial court considered the parties’ business and non-business assets and liabilities
separately only as a matter of mathematical convenience because it used different distribution
factors, i.e., the trial court awarded plaintiff 55% of the non-business assets but only 50% of the
business assets including the value of Pyper Products. Indeed, the trial court awarded plaintiff
50% of the value Pyper Products in the amount of $856,000. Plaintiff has not shown error.
C.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred when it did not consider $43,462 in credit card
debt as defendant’s obligation totally and completely separate from the parties’ marital debts.
Plaintiff argues in particular that these debts should not be credited against defendant’s portion of
the marital assets because the record displays that defendant accumulated these debts through his
own financial malfeasance, gambling, and financing of extramarital affairs. In response,
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defendant argues that the debts were incurred on the parties’ credit cards during the marriage and
are subject to distribution along with the marital estate. Defendant further asserts that questions
of credibility are for the trial court and the trial court clearly did not find that these debts were
defendant’s separate debts outside of the marital estate.
In a divorce action, before attempting to divide the parties’ property, the court must first
decide which assets are marital and which are separate. Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490,
493; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). It is generally presumed that all debt accumulated during the marriage
is marital. Lesko v Lesko, 184 Mich App 395, 401; 457 NW2d 695 (1990), overruled on other
grounds Booth v Booth, 194 Mich App 284 (1992). In Lesko, supra at 401, this Court recognized
that trial courts have the power to determine whether debts are joint debts or are the individual
responsibility of one party and, if so, to assign them to the party who incurred the debt.
The record reveals that the trial court considered all of the parties’ credit card debt to be
joint debts and allocated the parties’ credit card debt between the parties as part of the nonbusiness property allocation. The trial court assigned only one credit card debt to plaintiff:
Providian Credit Card in the amount of $7,829. The trial court assigned the following three
credit card debts totaling $43,462 to defendant: MBNA debt (formerly First Air) in the amount
of $8,775; MBNA debt (formerly Sears) in the amount of $14,426; and Chase Revolving Credit
(formerly Huntington) in the amount of $20,261. The trial court also assigned the parties’
Mobil/Exxon credit card debt to defendant in the amount of $2,423.
Plaintiff assigns error to the three credit card debts incurred totaling $43,462 during the
marriage. She states in her brief on appeal that these debts were incurred solely by defendant as
the direct result of his “personal malfeasance, gambling, and systematic patterns of withdrawals
from ATM accounts and dealing with credit card debt, which financed his extramarital affairs.”
Thus, plaintiff contends that the $43,462 in credit card debt should not be considered joint debt
and the trial court clearly erred when it distributed the debt as part of the marital estate. To
support her assertions plaintiff points only to her own self-serving trial testimony outlining her
description of defendant’s activities. But plaintiff admits that the credit card debt was incurred
during the marriage on the parties’ credit cards.
Importantly, the trial court’s finding that the challenged credit card debt was joint marital
debt was based on the credibility of the witnesses at trial. We must give special deference to the
trial court’s findings when they are based on the credibility of the witnesses. Draggoo, supra at
429. Clearly the trial court was aware of defendant’s gambling, extramarital affairs, and
dishonesty issues, and even assigned fault for the breakdown of the marriage as a result of
defendant’s activities. And the trial court had the ability to assign debts to defendant if it
determined that the debts were the individual responsibility of defendant. Lesko, supra at 401.
But after reviewing all the testimony and record evidence presented regarding the debts, the trial
court specifically declined this opportunity. After reviewing the circumstances in this case, and
giving “special deference to [the] trial court’s findings when they are based on the credibility of
the witnesses” Draggoo, supra at 429, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made, and decline to disturb the trial court’s determination on this issue.
Sparks, supra at 151.
D.
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Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it allowed defendant to count monies owed
to Mercantile Bank that were used to finance expert witness fees from the divorce action as a
portion of the parties’ debt attributed to defendant. Defendant argues that the trial court
specifically authorized defendant to borrow money to pay for expert witness testimony in the
divorce. Defendant further contends that the record displays plaintiff received $10,000 in
proceeds from the loan and defendant only received $3,000. It is defendant’s position that
plaintiff’s argument is absurd considering that the record shows the result of the loan is that
defendant actually financed $10,000 of plaintiff’s own expert witness fees.
Our review of the record reveals that during a hearing on April 30, 2004 defendant
requested permission to take out a loan to cover expert witness fees that would be incurred to
value the parties’ business assets for divorce litigation purposes. The trial court explicitly
approved defendant’s request. Defendant then took out a loan in the amount of $13,804 from
Mercantile Bank in order to finance expert witness fees. During trial, defendant testified that he
provided $10,000 from the loan to plaintiff’s attorney and paid $3,000 to his own lawyer in order
to finance the expert witness fees. The trial court considered this loan as a marital debt and
assigned it in total as defendant’s responsibility. After reviewing the record, we do not find error
in the trial court’s conclusion. After reviewing the circumstances in this case, plaintiff has not
established clear error and we decline to disturb the trial court’s determination on this issue.
Sparks, supra at 151.
E.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s adoption of defendant’s proposed asset/debt schedule
does not reflect the actual allocation of assets or debts, and is unjust, erroneous, and totally
misleading. Plaintiff asserts that a realistic analysis of the economics of the trial court’s
distribution of the marital assets illustrates that the trial court left plaintiff with only 3.6201% of
the assets and defendant with 96.8086% of the assets. Defendant argues that the record shows
that the trial court clearly awarded plaintiff 55% of the non-business marital assets and defendant
with 45% and equally divided the parties’ business assets. Defendant characterizes plaintiff’s
argument as grossly misleading and absurd.
Our review of the record reveals that plaintiffs argument is without merit. At the outset,
plaintiff’s characterization of the property disposition as 3.6201%/96.8086% is not supported by
the record. Regarding the parties’ non-business marital assets, the trial court used defendant’s
proposed division of assets and liabilities spreadsheet only as a jumping off point. The trial court
specifically assigned values to the parties’ real property, retirement assets, stock options and
deferred compensation, bank accounts, vehicles, and debts after evaluating the evidence
presented by the parties. The trial court allocated individual assets and liabilities based on its
findings of fact regarding valuation. Once the trial court allocated all of the parties assets and
liabilities between the parties, in order to balance the property settlement in a 55% to plaintiff
and 45% to defendant apportionment, the trial court ordered defendant to make up the balance in
the form of a cash payment to plaintiff in the amount of $24,727 sourced from defendant’s
premarital IRA. The record also reveals that the trial court considered the valuation of Pyper
Products separately from the non-business assets and used a different factor when it allocated
Pyper Products between the parties. It split the non-business assets equally.
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Again, the trial court orders clearly display that the trial court awarded plaintiff 55% of
the non-business assets and 50% of the business assets. Plaintiff arrives at her conclusion that
she was left with only 3.6201% of the assets and defendant with 96.8086% of the assets only by
intermingling the trial court’s non-business and business distributions. Further, she arrives at her
conclusion by stating that the trial court credited defendant with the value of his stock in Pyper
Products while completely ignoring the $856,000 cash award apportioned to her in the division
of the business assets. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.
F.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s imposition of a specific property settlement payment
stream and interest factor renders the award a nullity. Plaintiff specifically asserts that although
the trial court’s initial ruling awarding her $856,000 representing 50% of the value of the parties’
equity in Pyper Products, later rulings setting the payment stream “totally nullify its value” and
amount to “an economic lynching.” Instead, she asserts that the trial court should have instituted
an in-kind stock transfer. Defendant responds that in-kind stock awards do not work in these
situations and asserts that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it compensated
plaintiff with a substantial cash award payable, with interest, over a period of years.
After reviewing the record, we agree with defendant that the trial court did not err when it
awarded plaintiff her share of the interest in Pyper Products in the form of an equivalent cash
award, as opposed to an in-kind stock award. As this Court explained in Olson v Olson, 256
Mich App 619, 624-626; 671 NW2d 64 (2003), multiple problems can arise when stock in a
closely held corporation is divided among divorcing parties. It is rare that a divorcing couple can
maintain an ongoing business relationship in a closely held corporation. See also McDougal v
McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 91 n 9; 545 NW2d 357 (1996). After reviewing the record, we believe
this case falls within this rule rather than the rare exception.1
Next, we address plaintiff’s argument that the payment schedule adopted by the trial
court nullified the value of the $856,000 cash award and amounted to “an economic lynching.”
The trial court held a special evidentiary hearing to determine payment terms for plaintiff’s share
of Pyper Products and invited the parties to present proposals and evidence regarding proper
payment terms. After hearing evidence about the financial stability of Pyper Products as well as
defendant’s personal ability to pay the cash award to plaintiff, the trial court directed defendant
to pay plaintiff $4,000 per month until the satisfaction of the debt. The payments were to
commence at termination of defendant’s spousal support obligation to plaintiff. Noting that
plaintiff deserves to be paid her share of Pyper Products sooner than later, but acknowledging the
present economic realities facing the business, the trial court attempted to balance the equities
and set a 7% interest rate on the award to encourage early payment to plaintiff. See Thomas v
Thomas (On Remand), 176 Mich App 90, 92; 439 NW2d 270 (1989). Further attempting to
protect the interests of the parties over the long term, the trial court mandated a review at eleven
1
We note that an in-kind stock transfer may upset the legal requirements of an MBE and
possibly affect its favorable treatment.
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years based on expert testimony about the financial future of Pyper Products and also suggested
that counsel seek intermittent reviews every three years.
While we commend the trial court’s efforts in attempting to fashion a remedy that
balances the equities, the payment plan adopted by the trial court is, in fact, inequitable. A
critical review of the financial evidence provided in the record reveals that the payment plan
does not account for payment of both principal and interest. Stated differently, a monthly
payment of $4,000 does not ensure that plaintiff receives a fair and equitable share of the value
of the $856,000 award in a timely manner because in essence the entire monthly payment is
composed only of interest. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s current repayment plan and
remand the issue of the payment stream to the trial court for adoption of a new payment
schedule. The trial court should, together with input from the parties, determine and adopt a new
payment plan that amortizes the value of the $856,000 cash award over a reasonable period of
time while at the same time provides for timely payment of both principal and interest.
For these reasons, we decline to reverse the trial court’s decision to the extent that the
court awarded plaintiff an equivalent cash award representing her share of the parties’ equity
interest in Pyper Products. However, we vacate the trial court’s current repayment plan and
remand the issue of the payment stream only to the trial court for adoption of a new amortization
schedule.
V
Plaintiff finally argues that the trial court’s failure to award her reasonable attorney fees
was not fair and equitable in light of the facts of the case. In support of her argument, plaintiff
relies only on her testimony that her attorney fees totaled approximately $86,000 and that she
does not have the funds “or any economic prospects” to pay the attorney fees and needs an award
from the court. Plaintiff asks this court to grant her a “60% attorney fee award of $51,600.00.”
Defendant argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it refused to award
plaintiff attorney fees. We review a trial court’s decision whether to award attorney fees for an
abuse of discretion. Borowsky v Borowsky, 273 Mich App 666, 687; 733 NW2d 71 (2007). A
trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome that is not within the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes. Id. at 672.
Under the “American rule,” attorney fees will not be awarded unless expressly allowed
by statute, court rule, common-law exception, or contract. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 164;
673 NW2d 825 (2005). In divorce actions, attorney fees are not recoverable as of right. Id.
However, attorney fees are authorized under MCL 552.13 and MCR 3.206(C), and may be
awarded “when a party needs financial assistance to prosecute or defend the suit.” Id. MCL
552.13 provides: “In every action brought, either for divorce or for a separation, the court may
require either party to pay . . . any sums necessary to enable the adverse party to carry on or
defend the action, during its pendency.” And, MCR 3.206(C) provides:
(1) A party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to pay all
or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific
proceeding, including a post-judgment proceeding.
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(2) A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts sufficient to
show that
(a) the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, and that the other party is
able to pay . . . .
The party requesting the fees has the burden of showing need and that the fees were reasonable
and in fact incurred. Borowsky, supra at 687; Reed, supra at 165. Attorney fees should only be
awarded if necessary to allow a party to defend or prosecute an action. Stackhouse v Stackhouse,
193 Mich App 437, 445; 484 NW2d 723 (1992).
The record shows that defendant took out a loan in the amount of $13,804 from
Mercantile Bank in order to finance expert witness fees. Testimony established that he provided
$10,000 from the loan to plaintiff’s attorney and paid $3,000 to his own lawyer in order to
finance the expert witness fees. In support of her request for attorney fees plaintiff testified that
she had incurred $86,000 in attorney fees and $27,000 in expert witness fees. Plaintiff provided
no evidence other than highlighting the disparity in the parties’ annual incomes. And, plaintiff
offered no testimony or other evidence that defendant was able to pay. The trial court made no
specific findings regarding either parties’ ability to pay and simply declined plaintiff’s request
stating she “will be held responsible for her own attorney fees.” After reviewing the record, we
conclude that plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that she was “unable to bear
the expense of the action, and that the other party is able to pay.” MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a).
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion because the trial court selected an outcome within the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Borowsky, supra at 672.
VI
On cross-appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s valuation of the parties’ interest in
Pyper Products. Defendant asserts that the automotive supply company had no value in excess
of significant debt it carried. The trial court’s valuation of assets is reviewed for clear error.
Beason v Beason, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990); Draggoo, supra at 429. “[W]here
a trial court’s valuation of a marital asset is within the range established by the proofs, no clear
error is present.” Jansen v Jansen, 205 Mich App 169, 171; 517 NW2d 275 (1994).
Regarding the valuation of Pyper Products, the trial court found as follows:
The Court will first address the issue of the valuation of the businesses,
Pyper Products and Talent Trax.
The Court heard the testimony of Mr. Adamy, Mr. Gilbert, and on rebuttal
Ms. Christine Baker.
The Court further has reviewed the submitted reports of these business
evaluation experts.
The Court finds that the appropriate valuation of the business is pursuant
to Ms. Baker’s testimony, based on her – I’m not going to go into the rationale,
but the Court does adopt her position with regard to the valuation of the business.
-12-
Therefore, it is the Court’s order that Pyper Products shall be valued at
$3,269,000.00.
[Defendant] has a 55 percent interest in this business, which would be
$1,797,950.00.
There is debt associated with the business of $85,700.00, which shall be
deducted for a total equity of $1,712,250.00.
[Plaintiff’s] interest is, therefore, $856,000.
With regard to the value of Talent Trax, the Court adopts Mr. Adamy’s
valuation of this business at $35,000.00, pursuant to his report of December 31,
’04.
[Defendant] has a 40 percent interest in this business, which would be the
amount of $14,000.00, less the outstanding debt of approximately $9,547.00, for a
total equity of $4,500.00.
[Plaintiff] would be entitled to half that amount.
With regard to the business valuation, and specifically with regard to the
award to [plaintiff], the Court is specifically finding that [plaintiff] has a 50
percent interest, not 55 percent or 60 percent as the briefs had evaluated.
Defendant sets forth three separate arguments supporting his valuation claims.
A.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to make any findings of fact or
conclusions of law in support of its valuation of Pyper Products in violation of MCR 2.517.
Plaintiff responds that the trial court fulfilled its fact-finding role when it properly based the
valuation of Pyper Products on the expert testimony and analysis provided by Baker. MCR
2.517(A), states in pertinent part as follows:
(1) In actions tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and direct
entry of the appropriate judgment.
(2) Brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on the contested matters
are sufficient, without overelaboration of detail or particularization of facts.
(3) The court may state the findings and conclusions on the record or include
them in a written opinion.
Further, a court is not required to comment on every matter in evidence or every argument made
by the parties. Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich App 320, 328; 497 NW2d 602 (1993).
-13-
The trial court heard extensive testimony about the valuation of Pyper Products during
trial. Plaintiff’s expert, Marc Gilbert, testified that Pyper Products should be valued at $4.5
million. Defendant’s expert, Eric Adamy, testified that Pyper Products had no value in excess of
its substantial debts. Plaintiff then presented rebuttal testimony through another expert, Christine
Baker, who criticized Adamy’s methodology and testified that in her opinion, $3,269,000
represented the correct equity value of Pyper Products. The record reveals that the trial court
reviewed the competing expert testimony provided by the three expert witnesses, Adamy,
Gilbert, and Baker, as well as the parties’ exhibits. The trial court made the requisite findings
and conclusions when decided among the competing business valuation methodologies placed on
the record and ultimately adopting Baker’s opinion of the equity value of Pyper Products. We
conclude that the trial court’s findings comport with the court rule’s acknowledgment that factual
findings can be “brief, definite, and pertinent . . . without overelaboration of detail or
particularization of facts.” MCR 2.517(A)(2). Although defendant may not agree with the
court’s findings, this does not make them insufficient and the trial court’s judgment does not
violate MCR 2.517.
B.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed clear error in adopting rebuttal
testimony provided by expert Baker regarding the value of the parties’ interest in Pyper Products.
Defendant specifically contends that the trial court failed to fulfill its role as gatekeeper in
violation of MRE 702 when it accepted Baker’s opinion regarding the value of Pyper Products
because Baker lacked sufficient facts and data to offer an opinion. And, defendant states that the
trial court ignored the fact that Baker did not actually value Pyper Products. Plaintiff counters
that the trial court did fulfill its role as gatekeeper and did not violate MRE 702 because Baker
was properly qualified as an expert and further, her rebuttal testimony was properly admitted to
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence and making determinations on the issues
presented at trial.
While defendant frames this issue as one only involving MRE 702, to review this issue,
we must engage in a two part analysis and determine if (1) the testimony was proper rebuttal
testimony, and, (2) the testimony was proper under MRE 702. “Admission of rebuttal testimony
rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse
is shown.” Nolte v Port Huron Area School Dist Bd of Ed, 152 Mich App 637, 644; 394 NW2d
54 (1986). The qualification of a witness as an expert and the admissibility of the expert’s
testimony are within the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion. Tobin v Providence Hosp, 244 Mich App 626, 654; 624 NW2d 548
(2001). Again, an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision falls outside of the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado, supra at 388.
“Rebuttal testimony is used to contradict, explain, or refute evidence presented by the
other party in order to weaken it or impeach it.” Winiemko v Valenti, 203 Mich App 411, 418;
513 NW2d 181 (1994). If evidence is responsive to evidence presented by the defendant, it is
rebuttal even if it overlaps with evidence admitted during the plaintiff's case in chief. People v
Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). However, “a party may not introduce
evidence competent as part of his case in chief during rebuttal unless permitted to do so by the
court.” Winiemko, supra at 419.
-14-
Defendant contends that the trial court should not have permitted Baker to testify as a
rebuttal witness. Specifically, defendant argues that Baker was not a proper witness to rebut the
testimony of his expert witness, Adamy, because Adamy performed a thorough and
comprehensive business valuation based on raw data including but not limited to interviews,
visits to the business, and witnessing its operations. Defendant contends that because Baker was
not engaged to value Pyper Products and in fact never performed her own personal business
valuation, she was not a proper witness to rebut Adamy’s testimony. Plaintiff contends that
although Baker never performed her own analysis of raw data to value the business, her
testimony was properly offered in rebuttal for the specific purpose of critical expert analysis of
the methodologies offered by defendant’s expert witness.
At trial, the trial court qualified Baker as an expert witness in the area of business
valuation based on defense counsel having no objections to her qualifications.2 But, the trial
court required plaintiff to lay a foundation to show that Baker was qualified to rebut defendant’s
expert witness testimony, and to show on what basis Baker based her conclusions. Defendant’s
first objection to Baker’s testimony and ensuing argument is as follows:
Plaintiff: Now I want to ask you in a general sense with respect to approaching a
valuation such as that involving Pyper Products, I’d like you to tell this Court
what you believe to be the appropriate methodology or the appropriate approach
to take.
***
Defendant: Well, I want to object, your Honor. I don’t think there’s sufficient
foundation for her to testify along these ways. She’s only indicated that she’s
reviewed two reports, no financial statement, no visit to the plant, no review of
testimony that’s been happening in this trial, I don’t think there’s any foundation
for her to be offering what appears to be expert witness about what is the
appropriate valuation methodology for this company.
Plaintiff: Well these reports all came into evidence, your Honor. Those have
been reviewed by the witness. I believe the witness said she’s reviewed the
financial statements as well. And I think, and I think what I’m doing and what
2
The record reflects that at the time of trial Baker was a CPA employed as a principal with the
Rehmann Group. Baker testified that she was previously a partner in a valuation specialty firm
called Economic Advisors, and before that was with Plante Moran. Baker held a specialty
credential offered by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in business
valuation and was one of 13 members the AICPA Business Valuation Committee nationwide.
She also served on the Michigan Association of Certified Public Accountant’s litigation and
business valuation task force. Baker had presented at professional seminars with respect to
valuation issues on local, state, and national levels. At the time of the trial she had completed
approximately 290 to 300 business valuations, had performed business evaluations in the divorce
context, and had previously been qualified as an expert witness in the field of valuation in
Michigan.
-15-
this witness is doing is laying a foundation for her analysis of those reports and
the methodology.
Defendant: Well the question to her first was “What is the appropriate method?”
And there’s no basis for her to give the Court that testimony when she herself
hasn’t done an evaluation of this business. I just don’t understand how she could
come close to just reviewing documents. If there’s a – there’s a sensitive area
she’s going to address, perhaps that would be a proper rebuttal testimony, but to
go through the whole thing is absurd. That’s not even rebuttal testimony. That’s
new testimony.
Plaintiff: I respectfully differ with counsel’s assessment here. I think as far as
laying a foundation for this witness is critical analysis and I use those words
because those were the exact words contained in the disclosure prior to settlement
conference with respect to this witness’s testimony, critical analysis of what Mr.
Adamy, we understood he would be testifying to, and the methodologies applied
by both other experts. And I think asking this witness as far as her conclusions as
to the appropriate methodology to follow, is laying a foundation for the analysis
of those opinions.
The Court: I’m going to sustain the objection and ask for a further foundation as
to whether she is able to make this opinion, and on what basis, before it is
rendered to the trial court.
Defendant objected throughout Baker’s testimony at least eight additional times over the
course of plaintiff’s attempt to lay the foundation required by the trial court for Baker’s
testimony. The trial court addressed each objection substantively. After finding that plaintiff
had developed a sufficient foundation for the testimony, the trial court allowed Baker to provide
her opinion regarding the calculations Adamy used to arrive at his net value of equity figure and
to provide recommended modifications and corrections to Adamy’s figure. Ultimately, finding
that it was appropriate rebuttal testimony, the trial court allowed Baker to provide her own
recalculation figure of Adamy’s expert calculation in the amount of $3,269,000.
After reviewing the testimony provided in the record we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting plaintiff to rebut defendant’s calculation of the value of
Pyper Products with expert opinion evidence that modifications needed to be made to correct
errors in Adamy’s valuation figure. Baker’s rebuttal testimony was clearly used to contradict
and refute the valuation evidence presented by defendant’s expert witness. This is a proper use
of rebuttal testimony. Winiemko, supra at 418. And, contrary to defendant’s argument, Baker
need not, as a rebuttal witness, perform an entirely new valuation from raw source data in order
to accomplish the task of reviewing Adamy’s work while utilizing his work product and her own
expert experience. As evidenced in the record, the point of plaintiff’s proffering of Baker’s
testimony was to establish errors committed by Adamy in his expert valuation, and in fact
impeach its credibility. Again, this is a proper use of rebuttal testimony. Id. Thus, no error
occurred and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Baker’s rebuttal testimony
based on Baker’s thorough review of the sum and substance of Adamy’s valuation reports
including various exhibits and supporting documentation.
-16-
Defendant also argues that Baker was not qualified to give rebuttal testimony on the
valuation of Pyper Products, because she had not performed her own personal valuation of the
company. A trial court serves as a gatekeeper under MRE 702 to ensure that any expert
testimony admitted at trial is reliable. Clerc v Chippewa Co War Mem Hosp, 267 Mich App 597,
601-602; 705 NW2d 703 (2005), remanded in part, 477 Mich 1067 (2007). A witness may be
qualified as an expert “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” MRE 702. MRE
702 provides specifically that:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The gatekeeper role “mandates a searching inquiry” that a trial judge may neither abandon nor
perform inadequately. Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 780, 782; 685 NW2d 391
(2004). Where the trial court fails to properly exercise its function as a gatekeeper, the
appropriate remedy is to vacate the court’s order and remand the case to the trial court. Clerc,
supra at 603.
Arriving at a reliable and correct valuation of Pyper Products involved a complicated
financial calculation concerning the evaluation of countless economic factors. Baker testified
that as a business valuation expert, she was knowledgeable about the proper procedures,
assumptions, and methodologies to employ to arrive at a correct business valuation. Baker also
testified that she used her own expert methods to review and correct the analysis provided by
Adamy in this case. Throughout her testimony, defendant regularly objected. Defendant also
had the opportunity to challenge Baker’s testimony and the corrections she believed were
necessary to correct Adamy’s valuation. The trial court clearly found that Baker’s testimony
would assist it in both understanding and determining the facts of the case. And that she would
provide reliable testimony. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
Baker’s expert testimony at trial.
C.
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to select and apply any
method of valuation and in doing so failed to determine a value within the range established by
the proofs. Plaintiff counters that the trial court did in fact select Baker’s method of valuation of
Pyper Products and thus did select a value within the range established by the proofs. “The
general rule applicable to valuation of marital assets is that the party seeking to include the
interest in the marital estate bears the burden of proving a reasonably ascertainable value . . . .”
Wiand v Wiand, 178 Mich App 137, 149; 443 NW2d 464 (1989). “The trial court may, but is not
required to, accept either parties’ valuation evidence.” Pelton v Pelton, 167 Mich App 22, 25;
421 NW2d 560 (1988). Where marital assets are valued between divergent estimates, the trial
court has great latitude in arriving at a final figure. Id. at 26. The trial court is in the best
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
-17-
After reviewing the record, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion
when it determined the appropriate valuation of Pyper Products. The trial court heard extensive
testimony about the valuation of Pyper Products during trial. The trial court rejected plaintiff’s
expert, Gilbert’s, testimony that Pyper Products should be valued at $4.5 million. The trial court
also rejected defendant’s expert, Adamy’s, testimony that Pyper Products had no value in excess
of its substantial debts. After reviewing the competing expert methodologies provided by the
three expert witnesses, Adamy, Gilbert, and Baker, as well as the parties’ exhibits, the trial court
credited Baker’s testimony that provided a corrected valuation in the amount of $3,269,000 as
the equity value of Pyper Products. We cannot conclude that the trial court’s valuation was
clearly erroneous in light of the trial court’s assessment of credibility and the great disparity
between the multiple valuations and methodologies employed. The trial court’s ultimate
determination of the value was within the range established by the proofs, and therefore, the trial
court did not clearly err in its valuation.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
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