BILL BELHABIB V J&B OF MICH INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BILL BELHABIB,
UNPUBLISHED
June 17, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
J&B OF MICHIGAN, INC., a/k/a U.S. BLADES,
INC.,
No. 278380
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-075801-NI
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition for
defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in this premises liability action. We affirm.
While taking his son to hockey practice at defendant’s ice rink on December 15, 2004,
plaintiff slipped and fell on snow-covered ice in defendant’s parking lot, suffering serious
injuries. Plaintiff filed a common-law premises liability claim against defendant as well as a
nuisance claim under MCL 600.2940. Defendant moved for summary disposition based in part
on the open and obvious danger doctrine. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, ruling that
the snow-covered ice was an open and obvious condition and that there existed no special
aspects making the condition unreasonably dangerous.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if no factual dispute exists,
thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Rice v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 252
Mich App 25, 31; 651 NW2d 188 (2002). In deciding a motion brought under subrule (C)(10), a
court considers all the evidence, affidavits, pleadings, and admissions in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Id. at 30-31.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for
defendant on his statutory nuisance claim because the common-law open and obvious danger
doctrine cannot overcome a statutory duty. Although it is unclear whether defendant’s motion
for summary disposition was intended to encompass plaintiff’s statutory claim, the trial court
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granted summary disposition for defendant on both of plaintiff’s claims, including the statutory
claim, based on the open and obvious danger doctrine. Thus, although the trial court did not
specifically mention plaintiff’s statutory claim, it addressed the claim to some extent in its ruling.
In any event, even if the court did not adequately address this issue, appellate review is not
precluded where the lower court record provides the necessary facts. Hines v Volkswagen of
America, Inc, 265 Mich App 432, 443-444; 695 NW2d 84 (2005).
Plaintiff argues that the open and obvious danger doctrine does not apply to claims based
on a statute. He relies on several cases involving MCL 554.139, which provides:
(1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor
covenants:
(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by
the parties.
(b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease
or license, and to comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state
and of the local unit of government where the premises are located, except when
the disrepair or violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused
by the tenant[’]s wilful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct.
(2) The parties to the lease or license may modify the obligations imposed
by this section where the lease or license has a current term of at least 1 year.
(3) The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed, and the
privilege of a prospective lessee or licensee to inspect the premises before
concluding a lease or license shall not defeat his right to have the benefit of the
covenants established herein.
In O’Donnell v Garasic, 259 Mich App 569, 581; 676 NW2d 213 (2003), abrogated by
Mullen v Zerfas, 480 Mich 989; 742 NW2d 114 (2007), this Court held that
[t]he open and obvious danger doctrine is not available to deny liability to an
injured invitee or licensee on leased or licensed residential premises when such
premises present a material breach of the specific statutory duty imposed on
owners of residential properties to maintain their premises in reasonable repair
and in accordance with the health and safety laws, as provided in MCL
554.139(1)(a) and (b).
This Court further stated that
[t]he application of the open and obvious danger doctrine may . . . be avoided in a
premises liability claim involving the lease or license of residential property by
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the statutory imposition of a specific duty to maintain the premises in reasonable
repair and in compliance with state and local health and safety laws.1 [Id. at 582.]
This Court has repeatedly applied the holding in O’Donnell in cases involving MCL
554.139. See, e.g., Royce v Chatwell Club Apartments, 276 Mich App 389, 397-399; 740 NW2d
547 (2007), app for lv held in abeyance 743 NW2d 213 (2008); Allison v AEW Capital Mgt,
LLP, 274 Mich App 663, 666-667; 736 NW2d 307, lv gtd 480 Mich 894 (2007); Benton v Dart
Properties, Inc, 270 Mich App 437, 441-444; 715 NW2d 335 (2006). Plaintiff in essence urges
this Court to extend the holding in O’Donnell outside the context of MCL 554.139, specifically
to MCL 600.2940. We decline to do so.
When interpreting statutory language, courts must ascertain the legislative intent that may
reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute. Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich
304, 312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). When the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent,
the statute speaks for itself and judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Id.
Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation
that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute. Id.
MCL 600.2940 provides:
(1) All claims based on or to abate nuisance may be brought in the circuit
court. The circuit court may grant injunctions to stay and prevent nuisance.
(2) When the plaintiff prevails on a claim based on a private nuisance, he
may have judgment for damages and may have judgment that the nuisance be
abated and removed unless the judge finds that the abatement of the nuisance is
unnecessary.
(3) If the judgment is that the nuisance shall be abated, the court may issue
a warrant to the proper officer, requiring him to abate and remove the nuisance at
the expense of the defendant, in the manner that public nuisances are abated and
removed. The court may stay the warrant for as long as 6 months to give the
defendant an opportunity to remove the nuisance, upon the defendant giving
satisfactory security to do so.
(4) The expense of abating and removing the nuisance pursuant to such
warrant, shall be collected by the officer in the same manner as damages and costs
are collected upon execution, excepting that the materials of any buildings,
fences, or other things that may be removed as a nuisance, may be sold by the
1
In Mullen, supra at 989, our Supreme Court abrogated this Court’s decision in O’Donnell only
to the extent that this Court “indicat[ed] that MCL 554.139(1) establishes a duty on the part of
owners of leased residential property to invitees or licensees generally.” Our Supreme Court
explained that the covenants created by MCL 554.139 establish duties owed by a lessor or
licensor to a lessee or licensee of residential property. Id. at 990. Thus, the duties owed under
the statute are between the contracting parties and no duty is owed to a social guest of a tenant.
Id.
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officer, in like manner as goods are sold on execution for the payment of debts.
The officer may apply the proceeds of such sale to defray the expenses of the
removal, and shall pay over the balance thereof, if any, to the defendant upon
demand. If the proceeds of the sale are not sufficient to defray the said expenses,
he shall collect the residue thereof as before provided.
(5) Actions under this section are equitable in nature unless only money
damages are claimed.
Unlike MCL 554.139, MCL 600.2940 does not give rise to a duty. Rather, it merely
provides rules applicable to the abatement of nuisances and for a cause of action in circuit court
regarding nuisance claims. The statutory language imposes no duty on property owners or
occupiers with respect to conditions present on their premises. Thus, MCL 600.2940 is
markedly different from MCL 544.139 and cannot be similarly read. Because MCL 600.2940
does not create a statutory duty, there can be no breach of any such duty regarding which the
common-law open and obvious danger doctrine would be inapplicable. See O’Donnell, supra at
581-582. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendant
on plaintiff’s statutory claim.2
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for
defendant on his common-law premises liability claim because there existed a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether special aspects made the condition unreasonably dangerous.3
We disagree.
“In general, a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee[4] to exercise reasonable care
to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the
land.” Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). This duty does
not extend to open and obvious dangers, however, unless a “special aspect” of the condition
makes even an open and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 517. In such cases, the
premises possessor has a duty to take reasonable measures to protect invitees from the risk. Id.
“[O]nly those special aspects that give rise to a uniquely high likelihood of harm or severity of
harm if the risk is not avoided will serve to remove that condition from the open and obvious
danger doctrine.” Id. at 518-519.
2
Plaintiff’s reliance on Bishop v Northwind Investments, Inc, unpublished opinion per curiam of
the Court of Appeals, issued September 16, 2004 (Docket No. 250083), rev’d in part 473 Mich
861 (2005), is unavailing. Unpublished decisions are not binding on this Court under MCR
7.215(J)(1). Moreover, plaintiff may not simply relabel his negligence claim a nuisance claim in
an attempt to avoid the open and obvious defense. See Bishop, (GRIFFIN, J., dissenting), supra,
slip op at 6, adopted by our Supreme Court in 473 Mich 861 (2005).
3
For purposes of this appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the trial court’s determination that the
snow-covered ice was an open and obvious condition.
4
Michigan law recognizes a person on a premises for reasons directly tied to the property
owner’s commercial business interests as an invitee. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship,
462 Mich 591, 604; 614 NW2d 88 (2000).
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[W]ith regard to open and obvious dangers, the critical question is whether
there is evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
there are truly “special aspects” of the open and obvious condition that
differentiate the risk from typical open and obvious risks so as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm, i.e., whether the “special aspect” of the condition
should prevail in imposing liability upon the defendant or the openness and
obviousness of the condition should prevail in barring liability. [Lugo, supra at
517-518.]
To prevent the application of the open and obvious doctrine “to a typical and obvious condition,
the condition must be ‘effectively unavoidable’ or ‘unreasonably dangerous because of special
aspects that impose an unreasonably high risk of severe harm.’” Kennedy v Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co, 274 Mich App 710, 716; 737 NW2d 179 (2007), citing Lugo, supra at 518.
“‘However, typical open and obvious dangers . . . do not give rise to these special aspects.’” Id.,
citing Lugo, supra at 520.
Plaintiff contends that the icy condition located just outside the only entrance to the
building was effectively unavoidable. He relies on Robertson v Blue Water Oil Co, 268 Mich
App 588, 590; 708 NW2d 749 (2005), which involved a plaintiff slipping and falling on ice
covering the entire area surrounding the defendant’s service station. Customers described the
parking lot as “‘a disaster,’ ‘a mess,’ and ‘a sheet of ice.’” Id. The plaintiff fell while walking to
the convenience store of the service station after fueling his truck. Id. at 591. In determining
whether the condition was unavoidable, this Court stated that “the only inquiry is whether the
condition was effectively unavoidable on the premises.” Id. at 593 (emphasis in original). This
Court determined that “there was clearly no alternative, ice-free path from the gasoline pumps to
the service station” and, therefore, “[t]he ice was effectively unavoidable.” Id. at 593-594.
Further, this Court declined to absolve the defendant of liability on the basis that the plaintiff
could have gone elsewhere considering the hazardous condition of the parking lot, because the
defendant specifically invited the public, including the plaintiff, onto its premises for commercial
purposes. Id. at 595.
This case is factually distinguishable from Robertson. Unlike Robertson, defendant’s
parking lot was not “a sheet of ice” that posed a uniquely high risk of serious injury. Rather, it
was snowing at the time of plaintiff’s fall and very cold, conditions typical of a Michigan winter.
These typical winter conditions are a far cry from the “unusually severe and uniform ice storm”
that caused the hazardous condition in Robertson.
Moreover, the Lugo Court stated that a special aspect creating an unreasonable risk of
harm may exist where, for example, the floor of the sole exit of a commercial building is covered
with standing water, requiring persons to enter and exit through the water and creating an
unavoidable risk. Lugo, supra at 518. Here, even considering that the snow-covered ice was
located near the sole entrance to defendant’s facility, the danger was not unavoidable as plaintiff
contends. A photograph of the premises indicates that it was possible to enter the building
without stepping on the patch of ice where plaintiff fell.
Similarly, the condition was not “unreasonably dangerous because of special aspects that
impose[d] an unreasonably high risk of severe harm.” Kennedy, supra at 716. In a dissenting
opinion in Kenny v Kaatz Funeral Home, Inc, 264 Mich App 99, 114; 689 NW2d 737 (2004),
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rev’d 472 Mich 929 (2005), Judge Griffin addressed whether snow-covered ice presented an
unreasonable risk of harm:
Finally, plaintiff has presented no evidence of the alleged “special
aspects” of the snow-covered and icy parking lot that created “a uniquely high
likelihood of harm or severity of harm . . . .” Lugo, supra at 518-519; Joyce [v
Rubin, 249 Mich App 231; 642 NW2d 360 (2002)], supra at 242-243.
Previously, this Court held that a layer of snow on a sidewalk did not constitute a
unique danger creating a “risk of death or severe injury,” Joyce, supra at 243, and
that falling down ice-coated stairs likewise does not give rise to the type of severe
harm contemplated in Lugo. Corey [v Davenport College of Business (On
Remand), 251 Mich App 1; 649 NW2d 392 (2002)], supra at 6-7. Snow and ice
in a Michigan parking lot on December 27 are a common, not unique, occurrence.
Under the Lugo, supra at 518-519, definition of “special aspects,” ice and snow
do not present “a uniquely high likelihood of harm or severity of harm.” Joyce,
supra at 241-243[.]
Our Supreme Court adopted Judge Griffin’s reasoning in Kenny v Kaatz Funeral Home, Inc, 472
Mich 929; 697 NW2d 526 (2005), and it governs the instant case. Thus, there existed no
“‘special aspects’ of the open and obvious condition that differentiate[d] the risk from typical
open and obvious risks so as to create an unreasonable risk of harm[.]” Lugo, supra at 517-518.
Plaintiff also argues that the open and obvious doctrine cannot be reconciled with the
comparative fault statute, MCL 600.2958, and urges this Court to call upon the Supreme Court to
overrule the doctrine. Because plaintiff raises this issue for the first time in this Court, we
decline to address it. Kosch v Kosch, 233 Mich App 346, 353-354; 592 NW2d 434 (1999). In
any event, we note that our decision affirming the trial court’s ruling is based on reasoning
focusing on the objective circumstances surrounding the premises rather than on subjective
factors involving plaintiff.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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