PEOPLE OF MI V JOSEPH NACKAYA GARVIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 5, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278185
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-013274-01
JOSEPH NACKAYA GARVIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murray and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a bench trial, of second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3), and domestic violence, second offense, MCL 750.81(3). He was sentenced to a
prison term of three to 15 years for the home invasion conviction and one year in jail for the
domestic violence conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal is being decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Facts
Defendant and Renee Chappell are the parents of Rushante Chappell, age four. Rushante
lived with her mother, who is defendant’s former girlfriend.
Renee Chappell testified that defendant appeared at her home at approximately 4:00 a.m.
on November 3, 2006. He appeared drunk, was beating on the door, and threatened to “tear
some stuff up” if Chappell did not let him in, so she opened the door. Defendant slept for two or
three hours and then left with Rushante.
When defendant called to say he was bringing Rushante home, Chappell and her friend,
Andrea Gooley, were just getting ready to go out. They sat in Gooley’s car and waited for
defendant to arrive. When defendant drove up, he had Rushante and another child with him.
Chappell went to defendant’s car to get Rushante. As Chappell was leaning inside defendant’s
car to unfasten Rushante’s seat belt, defendant said something to Chappell about wanting Gooley
to leave. She dismissed it and defendant slapped her in the face. Chappell, who was afraid of
defendant, left defendant’s car and got into her own car and started the engine, which
automatically locked the doors. Defendant followed Chappell to her car, trying to open the doors
while again threatening to tear something up and pointing at the house. Chappell drove away.
-1-
While Chappell was gone, defendant left and then came right back and asked Gooley if
she would take Rushante. She agreed. Defendant then got into Gooley’s car to talk. While they
were talking, Chappell called Gooley to inquire about defendant. Gooley gave the phone to
defendant and he and Chappell argued. Defendant left the car, taking the phone with him, and
walked to the back of Chappell’s house. Gooley got out of her car, heard glass breaking, and
then heard the sound of things breaking and being thrown around inside the house.
When Chappell returned home, she found that the back window was broken. It appeared
that defendant had thrown an outdoor planter through it, because Chappell found dirt strewn
throughout the den. The den and bedroom had been “trashed,” the television had been knocked
to the floor, broken CDs and DVDs were strewn about the floor, and the refrigerator had been
overturned. The damages ran close to $2,000. Chappell and Gooley stated that the house had
been neat when they left. Chappell had not given defendant permission to enter.
Defendant testified that he went to Chappell’s house around 4:00 a.m. because Chappell
had invited him over after work. He denied that he had been drinking or was drunk. When he
arrived, the door was unlocked and he walked in. He saw a television and some CDs on the
floor. After he slept for a few hours, Chappell agreed to let him take Rushante for the weekend,
so he took the child with him when he left.
Defendant denied returning to Chappell’s home that day. Rather, after leaving that
morning, he picked up his other daughter and eventually took the children to his mother’s house.
Chappell showed up with Gooley and another man. According to defendant, Chappell argued
with him over money and “[s]he hauled off and grabbed me and scratched my neck up.” When
defendant pushed Chappell away, the man left the car and confronted him. They argued and the
man returned to the car. As they drove off, Chappell “was hooting and hollering” that she was
going to have defendant jailed.
Defendant claimed that Chappell later called and told him he would be going to jail.
Defendant later received a call from a police sergeant, who told him that a charge of parental
kidnapping had been made against him and he should come in right away. Defendant refused,
but then “got scared” and took Rushante to Chappell’s sister and went back to his mother’s
house. The sergeant called again and defendant went to the police station and explained what
was going on. Another officer was dispatched to get Rushante. While defendant was waiting, he
could hear Chappell speaking in a back room. After the dispute over Rushante had been cleared
up, the sergeant asked defendant about being at Chappell’s house. He told the sergeant he had
been there for a few hours that morning and described what he saw.
II. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant first argues on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial because defense counsel
was ineffective. Because defendant failed to raise this claim below in a motion for a new trial or
an evidentiary hearing, review is limited to the existing record. People v Snider, 239 Mich App
393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Eloby (After Remand), 215 Mich App 472, 476; 547 NW2d 48
(1996). Relief is not available unless defendant shows that counsel’s representation was
-2-
unreasonable and counsel’s error affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Watkins,
247 Mich App 14, 30; 634 NW2d 370 (2001). Defendant must also overcome a “strong
presumption that counsel’s assistance constituted sound trial strategy.” People v Stanaway, 446
Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Defendant takes issue with the fact that once counsel was appointed for him, a different
attorney appeared at each stage of the proceedings, including the preliminary examination,
arraignment, final conference, trial, and sentencing. However, this alone does not warrant relief
absent a showing that any one attorney, due to his or her unfamiliarity with the case or lack of
preparedness, committed an error that prejudiced defendant. See, e.g., People v McGhee, 268
Mich App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005); People v Caballero, 184 Mich App 636, 640; 459
NW2d 80 (1990).
Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective for agreeing or advising him to
waive the preliminary examination before receipt of discovery materials. Assuming without
deciding that counsel failed to make an informed decision, defendant cannot show that he was
prejudiced. He claims that had counsel obtained discovery materials, she might have
recommended to proceed with a preliminary examination. At the examination, counsel would
have had the benefit of discovery materials with which to cross-examine Chappell, and might
have elicited damaging testimony that could be used for impeachment purposes at trial.
However, there is simply nothing in the record to suggest that had Chappell testified at a
preliminary examination, she would have testified any differently than she did at trial. Nor is
there anything to suggest what damaging testimony she might have offered on crossexamination. Because there is no basis in the record for concluding that a preliminary
examination would have produced valuable impeachment evidence that could have affected the
outcome of the trial, defendant has failed to establish a right to relief. Watkins, supra; People v
Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 508; 597 NW2d 864 (1999).
Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not proceeding with a jury
trial. We disagree. Issues of professional judgment and trial strategy are entrusted to counsel,
People v O’Brien, 89 Mich App 704, 708; 282 NW2d 190 (1979), but a defendant has the
ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding his case, including whether
to waive a jury, Jones v Barnes, 463 US 745, 751; 103 S Ct 3308; 77 L Ed 2d 987 (1983). The
record shows that defendant voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial, and there is no claim that
counsel gave inadequate or improper advice to defendant regarding that decision. Therefore,
defendant has failed to establish that counsel committed any error.
Defendant finally contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call his mother
and one or more other witnesses at trial. “Decisions regarding what evidence to present and
whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. This Court will
not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess
counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77;
601 NW2d 887 (1999) (citations omitted). “Ineffective assistance of counsel may be established
by the failure to call witnesses only if the failure deprives defendant of a substantial defense.”
People v Julian, 171 Mich App 153, 159; 429 NW2d 615 (1988). “A substantial defense is one
that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App
524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).
-3-
The record shows that the attorney who represented defendant at arraignment advised the
court that he anticipated calling two or three witnesses for the defense at trial. Trial counsel
called defendant, who testified that certain events took place at his mother’s house. However,
there is nothing in the record to show what testimony his mother or the other unidentified
witness(es) might have offered, or how it might have benefited the defense. Therefore,
defendant’s claim must fail. People v Pratt, 254 Mich App 425, 430; 656 NW2d 866 (2002), lv
den 469 Mich 861 (2003); Avant, supra.
III. Sentence
In his second issue on appeal, defendant argues that his three-year minimum sentence for
the home invasion conviction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree. The
minimum sentence is within the range of 19 to 38 months established by the legislative
guidelines. A sentence within the guidelines range is presumptively proportionate, People v
Broden, 428 Mich 343, 354-355; 408 NW2d 789 (1987); People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54;
523 NW2d 830 (1994), and defendant has not overcome the presumption of proportionality in
this case. A proportionate sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment. People v Drohan, 264
Mich App 77, 92; 689 NW2d 750 (2004); People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 456; 569 NW2d
641 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.