PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIAM JAMES GATES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 5, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 271508
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 05-008663-FC
WILLIAM JAMES GATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Talbot and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (victim under 13), two counts of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (victim under 13), and one count of
assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration, MCL 750.520g(1). As a fourthoffense habitual offender, defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 22 years, 6
months to 40 years in prison for CSC I, 10 to 15 years for each count of CSC II, and 5 to 10
years for assault with intent to commit CSC. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions were based on multiple instances of abuse of two family
members. At the time of these incidents, the two victims were about five or six years old. At
trial, the jury heard testimony from these two victims, as well as other acts testimony from a
nephew of defendant’s who is now an adult, and a friend of that nephew. Both other acts
witnesses testified that defendant sexually abused them when they were children, beginning
when they were about five or six, and ending when they were about 13.
Defendant first argues that as applied to this case, MCL 768.27a violates the
constitutional guarantee against ex post facto laws.1 MCL 768.27a allows certain other acts
evidence to be admitted for any relevant purpose in criminal cases involving certain offenses
against minors. The statute became effective on January 1, 2006. Defendant was tried in 2006,
but the acts were committed several years earlier.
1
US Const, Art I, § 10; Const 1963, art 1, § 10.
-1-
This Court has rejected the ex post facto challenge to MCL 768.27a. In People v
Pattison, 276 Mich App 613, 618-619; 741 NW2d 558 (2007), this Court examined whether the
prohibition on ex post facto laws was implicated by the application of MCL 768.27a to a crime
committed after the law’s effective date. Pattison stated that the new rule “allows in evidence
that previously would have been inadmissible, because it allows what may have been categorized
as propensity evidence to be admitted.” Id. at 619. The Court concluded, however, that “the
altered standard does not lower the quantum of proof or value of the evidence needed to convict
a defendant,” and thus did not violate the ex post facto prohibition. Id. Accordingly, defendant’s
argument is without merit.
Defendant next argues that the trial court denied him due process when it admitted other
acts evidence. Defendant’s due process challenge is predicated on the general legal prohibition
against character evidence being used to prove action in conformity on a given occasion, and
argues at length that the evidence was not admissible under MRE 404(b) and interpreting case
law. However, the challenged evidence was admitted under MCL 768.27a, which allows for the
admission of other acts evidence for any purpose, including to show propensity. Courts have
recognized that the admission of other acts evidence is restricted, not because it is irrelevant, but
because it may be overly prejudicial. Pattison, supra, at 620 (observing that “our cases have
never suggested that a defendant’s . . . propensity for committing a particular type of crime is
irrelevant to a similar charge. On the contrary, it is because of the human instinct to focus
exclusively on the relevance of such evidence that the judiciary has traditionally limited its
presentation.”).
“There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent which holds that a state
violates due process by permitting propensity evidence in the form of other bad acts evidence.”
Bugh v Mitchell, 329 F3d 496, 512 (CA 6, 2003). Moreover, referring to FRE 414 (which
similar to MCL 768.27a permits the admission of “evidence of the defendant’s commission of
another offense or offenses of child molestation” in a child molestation prosecution), United
States v LeMay, 260 F3d 1018, 1026 (CA 9, 2001) made the following observation:
We conclude that there is nothing fundamentally unfair about the
allowance of propensity evidence under [FRE] 414. As long as the protections of
[FRE] 403 remain in place to ensure that potentially devastating evidence of little
probative value will not reach the jury, the right to a fair trial remains adequately
safeguarded. [See also Pattison, supra at 620-621.]
MRE 403 provides that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” MRE 403 does not serve to protect
a defendant from the disturbing characteristics of evidence that are “inherent in the underlying
crime.” People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 499-500; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). “The danger the rule
seeks to avoid is that of unfair prejudice, not prejudice that stems only from the abhorrent nature
of the crime itself.” Id. at 500. However, as noted above, the testimony of the other acts
witnesses was relevant under MRE 401 precisely because of such a line of reasoning. Thus,
contrary to defendant’s argument, the evidence was substantially probative and the prejudice
resulting was not unfair.
-2-
Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred when it refused a jury request to rehear
testimony from the victim. Before the jury was sent to deliberate, the attorneys indicated that
they would be “on call” from their offices. Later that afternoon, the jury reached a verdict.
Before taking the verdict, the trial court placed two events on the record. First, the judge stated
that the jury requested clarification regarding the charged counts. The trial judge stated that he
met with counsel, and they agreed to an answer that was provided to the jury. Secondly, the jury
sent the trial judge a note indicating that it would like to take a break and then rehear the
testimony of a victim. The trial court instructed the bailiff to give the jury a break. With regard
to the testimony, the jury was informed “that they’re going to have to rely on their collective
memory and there would be no read back of the testimony.” It is unclear from the record if
counsel was consulted regarding this instruction before it was given to the jury.2 After the trial
judge made a record regarding the handling of the notes from the jury, neither counsel objected
to the trial court’s disposition of the jury’s notes.
MCR 6.414(J) provides that when a jury makes a request to review testimony or
evidence, “the court must exercise its discretion to ensure fairness and to refuse unreasonable
requests, but it may not refuse a reasonable request.” This court rule simply expresses an
established “case-law rule” that the decision on whether to read back testimony is “confided to
the sound discretion of the trial judge.” People v Howe, 392 Mich 670, 675-676; 221 NW2d 350
(1974) (internal quotation marks removed). A blanket refusal to read back testimony is an abuse
of discretion, but a court may, within its discretion, ask jurors to try to rely on their memories, so
long as the jury is informed that its request may be renewed. People v Crowell, 186 Mich App
505, 508; 465 NW2d 10 (1990), remanded on other grounds 437 Mich 1004 (1990).
“A defendant does not have a right to have a jury rehear testimony. Rather, the decision
whether to allow the jury to rehear testimony is discretionary and rests with the trial court.”
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 218; 612 NW2d 144 (2000), citing MCR 6.414 and Howe,
supra. Although a trial judge violates MCR 6.414(J) by foreclosing the jury from the possibility
of later reviewing the requested testimony, this error is subject to waiver when defense counsel
specifically approves of the trial court’s refusal of the request and its subsequent instruction to
the jury. Carter, supra at 219-220. To preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be placed
on the record because counsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute. Id. at 214.
Because defendant failed to object in the record below, the trial court’s decision is reviewed for
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-765;
597 NW2d 130 (1999).
2
This lack of clarity in the record is compounded by the fact that the prosecutor did not file a
brief on appeal. Although the general rule is that the parties may not enlarge the record on
appeal, People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 524 n 1; 616 NW2d 710 (2000), neither party
moved to expand the record on appeal or to file affidavits indicating whether the trial court
consulted with them at the time of the jury request.
-3-
Assuming without deciding that the trial court refused to provide the jury with the
testimony and foreclosed any renewal of the request,3 defendant has failed to demonstrate plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763. Specifically, there is no
basis for reversal because defendant failed to show that he was actually innocent or that the
assumed error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings. Id. at 774.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred at sentencing, when it scored offense
variable (OV) 11 at 25 points and OV 13 at 50 points. After defendant filed this appeal,
however, this Court ordered a remand to the trial court for resentencing. This issue was
addressed in a resentencing, where the trial court agreed with defendant, reducing the scoring of
OV 11 to zero points and OV 13 to 25 points. The trial court then resentenced defendant to the
same sentences originally imposed. Though defendant received no reduction in sentence,
defendant’s argument was reviewed and decided in his favor in the trial court, and is now moot.
People v Rutherford, 208 Mich App 198, 204; 526 NW2d 620 (1994).
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
3
Despite the presumption that the trial judge possesses an understanding of the applicable law,
People v Wofford, 196 Mich App 275, 282; 492 NW2d 747 (1992), and in light of the unclear
record, we nonetheless will assume that review was foreclosed. However, in the future, we
presume that the trial judge’s response to a note from the jury will be adequately delineated in
the record. (Although the trial judge handwrote the answers to the jury on the first note, there is
no handwritten notation on the second note requesting the transcript.) We make this foreclosure
assumption despite the fact that defendant does not assert that MCR 6.414(B) was violated.
(MCR 6.414(B) provides in relevant part, “The court may not communicate with the jury or any
juror pertaining to the case without notifying the parties and permitting them to be present.”).
-4-
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