FREDERICK J KRAUSE V GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FREDERICK J. KRAUSE and CINNAMON
KRAUSE,
UNPUBLISHED
May 22, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH, AMERICAN
SEATING, and GREAT LAKES
INSTALLATION, INC.,
No. 276173
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-232085-NO
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MONAHAN CO,
Defendant,
and
AMERICAN SEATING,
Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee,
v
GREAT LAKES INSTALLATION, INC.,
Cross-Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this negligence action, plaintiffs appeal by right the trial court’s orders granting
summary disposition to defendants Grace Community Church (Grace), American Seating, and
Great Lakes Installation Inc. (Great Lakes). Cross-plaintiff American Seating and crossdefendant Great Lakes also appeal the court’s order granting summary disposition to American
Seating on its contractual claim for indemnity but awarding cross-defendant Great Lakes case
evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O). We affirm.
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I. Summary of Facts and Proceedings
This case arises out of a construction worksite accident in which plaintiff1 was injured
when he stepped on a 7/16 inch diameter anchor bolt extending 1.5 inches from the cement floor
of a step riser in the balcony of Grace’s sanctuary. Grace hired defendant Monahan Company to
act as general contractor and construction manager of a major expansion and renovation of its
church building. Grace contracted directly with American Seating to manufacture and install
additional theater-style seating (622 chairs) and to relocate similar seating already installed at the
church (575 chairs). American Seating subcontracted the seating installation and relocation
work to Great Lakes. The bolt plaintiff stepped on was one of hundreds Great Lakes installed in
advance of delivery to the church of the new seats. Plaintiff worked for D. L. Custom Homes, a
subcontractor Monahan hired to install sound baffling panels. Plaintiff knew the bolts had been
installed because he had been working inside the building while they were being installed; it is
also undisputed the lighting was good, and the bolts were visible. James D’Luge, plaintiff’s
supervisor, testified the bolts were extremely obvious, the area was well lit, and plaintiff had
alternate travel routes available. D’Luge also did not believe the bolts presented an impalement
hazard to workers wearing heavy-soled construction boots. Plaintiff testified at his deposition
that he had no idea why he did not see the bolt he stepped on.
It is undisputed that installation of the seat bolts before delivery of the seats at the
worksite was highly unusual and was done to accommodate Grace’s insistence that the project be
completed by the agreed completion date of Thanksgiving eve. The decision to preinstall the
anchor bolts was made at a meeting attended by Timothy Belvitch, Monahan’s supervisor, Tom
McLean of American Seating, Dennis Millis of Great Lakes, and Grace’s managing pastor, Keith
Crawford. McLean was concerned that if the bolts were installed early they might be damaged
by construction equipment, greatly complicating the installation process. Although Belvitch was
concerned the bolts posed a trip hazard, he signed off on the idea of early installation against his
better judgment. Great Lakes installed the bolts in the balcony on October 30 and 31, 2000, left
the job site, and planned to return when the seating arrived. Great Lakes employee Randall
Winright testified that he and another Great Lakes employee placed yellow caution tape around
the area with the installed seat bolts. Belvitch and Crawford also testified the area was marked
with yellow caution tape. Plaintiff was injured on November 9, 2000.
On September 11, 2002, plaintiffs filed their complaint against all defendants, alleging
theories of premises liability, liability under the common work area doctrine, and common-law
negligence. On January 31, 2003, American Seating filed a cross-claim against Great Lakes
based on their contract for its costs defending against plaintiffs’ claims and for indemnity
should plaintiffs be successful. American Seating moved the trial court for summary
disposition on plaintiffs’ claims against it and as to its indemnification claim against Great
Lakes. The trial court heard the parties’ arguments on December 12, 2003. The trial court
denied American Seating’s motion, finding that plaintiffs raised a factual question based on an
1
The singular plaintiff refers to injured worker Frederick J. Krause; Cinnamon Krause’s claim is
for loss of consortium.
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affidavit of construction safety expert David Brayton that American Seating had acted as a
general contractor, had retained control, and the area where plaintiff was injured was a
common work area. The court ruled the indemnification clause was void to the extent that it
required Great Lakes to indemnify American Seating for its sole negligence, but did not rule
whether the indemnity clause was otherwise enforceable.
The parties again appeared before the court on May 20, 2004 to argue defendants’
motions for summary disposition. Monahan asserted that on the basis of this Court’s then recent
decision of Ghaffari v Turner Constr Co, 259 Mich App 608; 676 NW2d 259 (2003) (Ghaffari
I), rev’d 473 Mich 16; 699 NW2d 687 (2005) (Ghaffari II), it was relieved of liability under the
open and obvious doctrine. Grace also argued that the premises liability claim against it should
be dismissed under the open and obvious doctrine. Great Lakes argued both the open and
obvious doctrine and that it was “horn-book law” since Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich
91; 220 NW2d 641(1974) that one independent contractor is not responsible for the worksite
safety of another independent contractor’s workers. Great Lakes also acknowledged Johnson v A
& M Custom Built Homes of West Bloomfield, PC, 261 Mich App 719; 683 NW2d 229 (2004),
but asserted it had breached no common law duty in performing its contract. American Seating
joined the other defendants in asserting the open and obvious doctrine, noting that no special
aspects were present in this case. See Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512, 517-519; 629
NW2d 384 (2001). Plaintiffs argued that the heart of their case against all four defendants was
active negligence in their joint decision to preinstall the seating anchor bolts, thus creating a
dangerous situation.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the trial court ruled the
open and obvious doctrine would require granting defendants summary disposition as to all
plaintiffs’ claims of general negligence. The trial court also ruled that plaintiffs had failed to
produce any evidence that Great Lakes had negligently installed the bolts; Great Lakes had
installed the bolts according to its contract and then put up yellow caution tape. Further, the
court ruled that evidence of Grace’s pastor being on the site daily and talking with contractors
was insufficient to establish Grace retained control of the work the contractors were performing.
With respect to Monahan, the court observed that both the contract documents and witnesses’
testimony established that Monahan was the general contractor in control of the project. The
trial court then attempted to reconcile the common work area doctrine with the open and obvious
doctrine, viewing the former doctrine as a special aspect under the latter doctrine, and on that
basis, denied Monahan’s motion for summary disposition.2 The court also continued its prior
ruling that a fact question was presented whether American Seating could be determined a
general contractor for purposes of the common work area doctrine. The court entered orders
granting summary disposition on June 7 (Grace) and 14 (Great Lakes), 2004.
Another hearing was held on various motions on August 20, 2004. Among the issues
argued was American’s renewed motion for summary disposition regarding plaintiffs’ claims.
Since the last hearing, Brayton had been deposed, acknowledging that American Seating was not
2
Monahan was later dismissed from the case after it agreed to binding arbitration with plaintiffs.
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a general contractor with overall responsibility for work performed at the construction site.
Brayton also testified that the pre-installation of the seating anchor bolts was not itself a
negligent act.3 Plaintiffs conceded that American Seating’s liability was contingent on it being a
general contractor with supervisory and coordinating authority over a common work area. See
Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 53-57; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). Despite an
affidavit by Brayton contrary to his deposition testimony, the court ruled there was no competent
evidence to support a finding that American Seating acted as general contractor for purposes of
the common work area doctrine. Consequently, the trial court entered an order on September 10,
2004 granting American Seating summary disposition as to plaintiffs’ claims.
On November 7, 2005, the trial court finally issued its opinion regarding American
Seating’s indemnity claim. The court opined that the indemnification clause was void to the
extent it required Great Lakes to indemnify American for its sole negligence, MCL 691.991. But
the provision could be reformed to exclude the void part while giving effect to the parties’
intention that the indemnification clause applies “to the fullest extent permitted by law.” The
court concluded there was no material disputed fact that plaintiffs’ complaint alleged matters
within the scope of the indemnification clause; therefore, Great Lakes was liable for American’s
costs in defending against plaintiffs’ complaint. After several additional hearings, the trial court
entered a final judgment on this case on January 25, 2007, requiring Great Lakes to pay
American Seating $36,220.27 to indemnify it for its cost in defending plaintiffs’ claims but also
awarding Great Lakes $18,417.50 as sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) because the judgment was
less than a $125,000 case evaluation award that American Seating rejected. All parties now
appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition. Maiden
v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A motion brought under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim and must be supported by affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b); Maiden, supra at
120. Both the trial court and this Court must view the substantively admissible evidence
submitted at the time of the motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
Id. at 120-121. If the moving party satisfies its initial burden of supporting its position with
evidence, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of
disputed fact exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).
“Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the
nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond
the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id.
Summary disposition is proper if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich
177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record,
3
Brayton opined that the only negligence was not positioning the yellow caution tape with
stanchions higher off the floor.
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giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which
reasonable minds might differ.” Id.
We also review de novo questions of law, including whether a party has a duty of care
giving rise to a tort action for negligence upon its breach. Benejam v Detroit Tigers, Inc, 246
Mich App 645, 648; 635 NW2d 219 (2001). The interpretation of a contract is also a question of
law this Court reviews de novo on appeal, including whether its language is ambiguous and
requires resolution by the trier of fact. Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459,
463, 469, 480; 663 NW2d 447 (2003); Mahnick v Bell Co, 256 Mich App 154, 159; 662 NW2d
830 (2003). An unambiguous contract must be enforced according to its terms. Wilkie v AutoOwners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51-52; 664 NW2d 776 (2003).
III. Plaintiffs’ Appeal
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court misapplied the open and obvious doctrine to a
construction site accident on the basis of this Court’s decision in Ghaffari I, supra. No one
disputes that our Supreme Court subsequently held that an “irreconcilable conflict” existed
between the common work area doctrine that “imposes an affirmative duty to protect against
hazards that are open and obvious,” and the open and obvious doctrine that “asserts that no duty
exists if the hazards are open and obvious.” Ghaffari II, supra at 22-23. The two doctrines serve
different purposes in different contexts; applying the “open and obvious doctrine in the general
contractor setting would tend to thwart the goals of workplace safety advanced” by Funk, supra
and its progeny. Ghaffari II, supra at 27. Finally, the Court found “there exist unique and
distinct attributes of the construction setting that would make the rules applicable in the typical
premises liability setting inappropriate.” Id. 27-28. The Court concluded, “[t]he open and
obvious doctrine has no applicability to a claim brought under the common work area doctrine.”
Id. at 31. We note, before discussing plaintiffs’ claims under the common work area doctrine,
that plaintiffs do not assail the trial court’s analysis that plaintiffs’ premises liability theory is
barred by the open and obvious doctrine. See Lugo, supra at 517-519.
In general, at common law property owners and general contractors could not be held
liable for the negligence of independent subcontractors and their employees. Ormsby, supra at
48, 53. But in Funk, supra, our Supreme Court modified the common law by establishing the
common work area doctrine as an exception to the general rule of nonliability in cases involving
construction projects. This exception, however, does not extend to subcontractors, i.e. to cases in
which a construction worker of one subcontractor injured at a worksite seeks to recover from
another subcontractor working on the same general project. Id. at 104, n 6; Klovski v Martin
Fireproofing Corp, 363 Mich 1, 5-6; 108 NW2d 887 (1961). Rather, a construction employee’s
immediate employer is generally responsible for job safety. Johnson v A & M Custom Built
Homes of West Bloomfield, LPC, 261 Mich App 719; 683 NW2d 229 (2004); Hughes v PMG
Building, Inc, 227 Mich App 1, 12; 574 NW2d 691 (1997).
To establish liability under the common work area doctrine, a plaintiff must prove that
“(1) the defendant, either the property owner or general contractor, failed to take reasonable steps
within its supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to guard against readily observable and
avoidable dangers (3) that created a high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen (4)
in a common work area.” Ormsby, supra at 54. If a plaintiff does not satisfy any one of these
elements, his claim fails. Id. at 59. Here, to survive defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
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plaintiffs were required to produce evidence to raise a question of fact with respect to Grace, i.e.,
that it retained control over supervision of the work being performed, and with respect to
American Seating, that it was a general contractor with supervisory and coordinating authority.
Without such evidence, the common work area exception to the common-law rule of nonliability simply does not apply. Id. at 56-57; Ghaffari II, supra at 31 n 7.
With respect to American Seating, we agree with the trial court that plaintiffs’ reliance on
various Internet definitions of “general contractor” and “prime contractor” is unavailing.
American’s direct contract with Grace to produce and install seating for Grace’s expansion and
renovation project did not give American general supervisory or coordinating authority over the
project work or the worksite. Rather, Grace contracted with Monahan to perform that function
as its construction manager for the project. Although American Seating retained significant
control over Great Lakes in its subcontract regarding the actual installation of the seating, the
subcontract required Great Lakes to submit to the safety directives of the general contractor, in
this case, Monahan. Moreover, all witnesses, including plaintiffs’ safety expert, testified that
Monahan, not American Seating, was the general contractor with supervisory and coordinating
authority over the project. Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting American Seating
summary disposition under plaintiffs’ common work area theory of liability. Ormsby, supra at
58; Ghaffari II, supra at 31 n 7.
With respect to Grace, an owner may lose its common-law insulation from liability for
the actions of independent contractors where it “acts in a superintending capacity and has
knowledge of high degrees of risk faced by construction workers . . . .” Funk, supra at 106-107.
For the “retained control” subset of the common work area doctrine to apply, the owner must
step into the shoes of and perform the functions of the general contractor to such an extent that
the owner becomes the de facto general contractor. Ormsby, supra at 54; Ghaffari II, supra at
25. This Court in Candelaria v B C General Contractors, Inc, 236 Mich App 67, 75-76; 600
NW2d 348 (1999), reviewed extant case law regarding the “retained control” doctrine which
held that there must be a high degree of actual control and that general oversight or monitoring is
insufficient. The Candelaria Court also found instructive the Funk Court’s analysis in
determining that General Motors retained control of the project at issue in that case.
Specifically, the Funk Court opined that GM’s representatives “did more than observe whether
the contract was being properly performed. In many instances, what they said, or left unsaid,
determined how the work would be performed.” Funk, supra at 108. The Candelaria Court
concluded, “[a]t a minimum, for an owner . . . to be held directly liable in negligence, its
retention of control must have had some actual effect on the manner or environment in which the
work was performed.” Candelaria, supra at 76.
In the present case, there was evidence that Grace’s managing pastor was frequently at
the worksite, conversed with contractors, and generally monitored the progress of the project.
But this conduct is insufficient to establish that Grace retained control of the work to the point it
was a de facto general contractor. Plaintiff also argues that Grace as the owner of the property
could exclude persons from the premises. This argument must fail because it would completely
eliminate the common-law rule that a property owner is not liable for the acts of independent
contractors and would vitiate any need for the retained control doctrine. Finally, the evidence
indicated that Grace exerted pressure on Monahan and Great Lakes to expedite the work to meet
contract timetables. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, one could
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infer that Grace influenced when but not how the work would be performed. Specifically,
Grace’s pressure motivated the early installation of the seat bolts. But there is no evidence that
Grace coordinated work among subcontractors or in any way affected what safety measures
contractors or individual workers would utilize to avoid the perils of the workplace. We must
recall when analyzing common work area claims that “the danger cannot be just the unavoidable,
perilous nature of the site itself.” Latham v Barton Malow Co, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___
(Docket No. 132946, April 14, 2008), slip op at 2. Because there is no evidence that Grace
retained coordinating and supervisory control over the manner in which the work was performed,
the trial court did not err in granting Grace summary disposition under plaintiffs’ “retained
control” common work area theory of liability. Ghaffari II, supra at 31 n 7; Candelaria, supra at
76.
Last, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by finding that Great Lakes was not
negligent and granting them summary disposition. Plaintiffs contend that Great Lakes had a duty
to avoid active negligence, citing Johnson, supra at 722, and Clark v Dalman, 379 Mich 251;
150 NW2d 755 (1967). In Clark, the city of Otsego hired the defendant contractor to clean and
paint its water tower. The defendant called a contract inspector employed by the city to inspect
the work in progress; he slipped and fell on a greasy coating during the inspection. The Court
discussed the basic common-law duty of care, “which imposes on every person engaged in the
prosecution of any undertaking an obligation to use due care, or to so govern his actions as not to
unreasonably endanger the person or property of others.” Clark, supra at 261. The Court further
opined, “[t]he general duty of a contractor to act so as not to unreasonably endanger the wellbeing of employees of either subcontractors of inspectors, or anyone else lawfully on the site of
the project, is well settled.” Id. at 262.
In Johnson, this Court applied the Clark common-law duty to a situation in which an
employee of one subcontractor negligently installed toe boards on a roof thereby causing an
employee of another subcontractor to fall from it. Johnson, supra at 720. The Court recognized
the general common law rule “in construction site injury cases is that only the injured person’s
immediate employer - - and not another subcontractor - - is responsible for job safety.” Id. at
721. The Court also recognized that the exception to this rule, the common work area doctrine,
did not apply to subcontractors. Id. at 721-722. But the Court reasoned that even if the
defendant “had no direct duty to take proactive measures to make an otherwise unsafe work
place safe, and therefore no duty to install toe boards to prevent [the plaintiff] from falling,”
having chosen to do so, it must do so in a non-negligent manner. Id. at 723.
Great Lakes argues that plaintiffs’ reliance on Clark and Johnson are misplaced because
the subsequent decision of our Supreme Court in Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460,
466; 683 NW2d 587 (2004), has undercut those decisions. Fultz held that whether a stranger to a
contract may bring a tort action against a contracting party depends on “whether the defendant
owed a duty to the plaintiff that is separate and distinct from the defendant’s contractual
obligations. If no independent duty exists, no tort action based on a contract will lie.” Indeed, in
Ghaffari II, supra the Court remanded the case to this Court to determine if a duty were imposed
on two subcontractors under Fultz. Ghaffari II, supra at 31. On remand, this Court reasoned
that a subcontractor could have a duty separate and distinct from its contract, specifically, the
“common-law duty to act in a manner that does not cause unreasonable danger to the person or
property of others.” Ghaffari v Turner Constr Co (On Remand, 268 Mich App 460, 466; 708
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NW2d 448 (2005) (Ghaffari III), citing Johnson, supra at 722, and Fultz, supra at 468-469. This
Court rejected the argument that Johnson and Fultz were incompatible, noting: “Both opinions
indicate that when a defendant acts in a manner that places others in greater danger, the
defendant may be held liable for the action.” Ghaffari III, supra at 466 n 5. Nevertheless, the
Court determined that a separate and distinct duty apart from the contract did not arise on the
facts of the case because the subcontractor had failed to move certain pipes after a former storage
area became a passageway. The Court held “a failure to act does not give rise to a separate legal
duty in tort.” Ghaffari III, supra at 466, citing Fultz, supra at 469.
We conclude the evidence in this case fails to raise a question of fact regarding whether
Great Lakes violated the common-law duty discussed in Johnson. Unlike in that case, there is no
evidence that Great Lakes improperly installed the anchor bolts thereby creating an unreasonable
risk to plaintiff. Great Lakes’ contract required it to install the anchor bolts for the purpose of
installing American’s seats. Great Lakes properly installed the anchor bolts, placed yellow
caution tape in the area, left the worksite at least a week before the accident occurred, and did not
return until after the accident. Even plaintiffs’ expert conceded that the risk that resulted in
plaintiff’s injury was not the installation of the anchor bolts, but rather the alleged failure to
guard the area from worker encroachment. The duty to provide a safe work place lay with
Monahan, the general contractor, if the common work area doctrine applied, Ormsby, supra at
53-61, Ghaffari II, supra at 20-21, or with plaintiff’s employer, D. L. Custom Homes, Johnson,
supra at 721. Indeed, plaintiff was responsible for his own safety, including by avoiding
obviously hazardous areas, by watching where he walked, and by wearing appropriate personal
protection equipment such as hard-soled boots. Generally, a duty of care will not arise on the
part of one party to protect another unless a special relationship exists between them, and the
party on whom the duty is placed is in a position of control enabling the duty to be fulfilled. See
Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495, 499; 418 NW2d 381 (1988). Here, no
special relationship existed between Great Lakes and plaintiff, and Great Lakes was not in a
position of control that would enable it to protect plaintiff. So, the trial court properly granted
Great Lakes summary disposition.
IV. Great Lakes’ Appeal
The other part of this case is a cross-claim by American Seating against Great Lakes for
contractual indemnity and defense. The contract between American Seating and Great Lakes in
paragraph 12, titled “Indemnification,” provides:
a.
TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, SUBCONTRACTOR AGREES
TO INDEMNIFY, DEFEND, AND HOLD HARMLESS AMERICAN SEATING, ITS
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES, ALONG WITH ANY OTHER
ENTITY FOR WHOM INDEMINIFICATION BY AMERICAN SEATING IS REQUIRED
UNDER THE PRIME CONTRACT (“THE INDEMNITEES”), AGAINST ALL LIABILITY
AND CLAIMS FOR DEATH OF OR INJURY, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
EMPLOYEES OF SUBCONTRACTOR, OR OF ANY INDEMNITEE, OR PROPERTY
DAMAGE, INCLUDING THE LOSS OF USE OF PROPERTY, INCLUDING EXPENSES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES RELATED THERETO, ARISING OR ALLEGED TO ARISE OUT OF OR
IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT OR PERFORMANCE OF
THE WORK OR OTHER ACTIVITIES BY SUBCONTRACTOR AND ITS AGENTS AND
EMPLOYEES ON AND AROUND THE PROJECT, EVEN IF SUCH CLAIM OR LIABILITY
IS CAUSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF ANY INDEMNITEE, IT
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BEING THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE PARTIES THAT SUBCONTRACTOR INDEMNIFY
THE INDEMNITEES EVEN FROM THEIR OWN NEGLIGENCE. . . .
Although the trial court found this clause unenforceable to the extent it ostensibly
required indemnification for liability resulting from the sole negligence of a party, the court
found that part of the clause severable and the remainder to be clear, unambiguous, and
enforceable. The court further ruled that plaintiff’s complaint came within the ambit of the
clause, thus requiring Great Lakes to defend American Seating from plaintiffs’ complaint and
ultimately to indemnify American from any judgment rendered against American not based on
American’s sole negligence. Great Lakes contends the trial court erred, raising several
arguments on appeal. We find none of Great Lakes arguments has merit.
Great Lakes first argues the indemnification clause is ambiguous, thus creating a jury
question as to its meaning. We would agree with Great Lakes if indeed the clause contained two
material provisions that irreconcilably conflicted with each other. Klapp, supra at 467-479, 480.
Although Great Lakes discusses hypothetical factual scenarios not before the Court, it points to
no irreconcilable conflict with respect to the language of the indemnification clause. An
indemnity contract is construed in the same manner as other contracts. Zurich Ins Co v CCR and
Co (On Rehearing), 226 Mich App 599, 603; 576 NW2d 392 (1998). Like the trial court, we
find the clause clear and unambiguous, requiring it be enforced according to the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words used in the instrument. Id. at 604-605.
Great Lakes next argues that the indemnification clause differs from the indemnification
clause contained in the parties’ prior contracts. Great Lakes argues that American Seating used
its past working relationship and bargaining power to surreptitiously insert the new clause in a
“take-it-or-leave-it” contract. According to Great Lakes, these facts create a jury question
regarding the parties’ intent. We find this argument fails for several reasons. First, Great Lakes
cites no authority to support its argument, and “where a party fails to cite any supporting legal
authority for its position, the issue is deemed abandoned.” Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App
186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999). Further, Great Lakes’ argument has no factual support because
the indemnification clause is prominently inserted in the contract in capital letters. Finally,
courts must enforce the plain and unambiguous terms of a contract, not one party’s “reasonable
expectation” of what it believed the contract might contain. Wilkie, supra at 51-52.
Next, Great Lakes contends that the entire indemnification clause is void as against
public policy under MCL 691.991 because the valid part of the clause was not supported by
consideration separate and distinct from that underlying the whole contract. Great Lakes relies
on Ford v Clark Equipment Co, 87 Mich App 270; 274 NW2d 33 (1978), a case on which the
trial court also relied in ruling that the void portion of the indemnification clause could be
stricken leaving enforceable the clear and unambiguous remainder. The Ford Court reviewed a
similar broad indemnification clause and quoted Corpus Juris Secundum: “‘A lawful promise
based on good consideration is not invalid because an unlawful promise is made for the same
consideration.’” Ford, supra at 276, quoting 17 CJS, Contracts, § 289(a), p 1220. The Ford
Court reasoned that broad indemnification clause essentially contained two promises: one
promise that was void under MCL 691.991, and another promise that was enforceable. The
Court further reasoned that both promises were supported by the same consideration, and that it
was not contrary to the parties’ intent or the statute “to sever this independent, unenforceable
promise from the rest of the indemnity clause . . . .” Ford, supra at 276.
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Great Lakes also relies on Higgins v Monroe Evening News, 404 Mich 1, 12; 272 NW2d
537 (1978) (Moody, J., plurality opinion), for the proposition that a valid contract requires
bargained-for consideration. “The essence of consideration, therefore, is legal detriment that has
been bargained for and exchanged for the promise.” Id., citing Calamari, Contracts (1st ed), §
53, p 105. Great Lakes argues it did not bargain for the indemnification clause, and the issue of
whether it was supported by valid consideration should go to the jury.
As noted above, the essence of this argument is that each separate promise in a contract
must be supported by separate consideration. Nothing in either Ford or Higgins supports this
underlying premise of Great Lakes’ argument. Thus, Great Lakes has not cited legal authority
that actually sustains its position. Prince, supra at 197. Furthermore, contracts must be read as a
whole. “[C]ontracts are to be interpreted and their legal effects determined as a whole.” Perry v
Sied, 461 Mich 680, 689 n 10; 611 NW2d 516 (2000), citing 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 549, pp 183186. With respect to consideration, courts will not generally inquire into its sufficiency.
General Motors Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 466 Mich 231, 239; 644 NW2d 734 (2002). In this
case, Great Lakes promised to install certain seating and American Seating promised to pay
Great Lakes a certain sum of money. The contract contained a plethora of other promises. This
Court will not dissect each individual promise to determine whether each was separately
bargained for. Because the material provisions here at issue are not ambiguous, a jury question
is not created. The trial court properly granted American Seating summary disposition.
V. American Seating’s Appeal
This case was submitted to case evaluation before the trial court decided any of the
parties’ motions for summary disposition. The evaluators issued the following unanimous
awards: (1) $500,000 for plaintiffs against Monahan; (2) $325,000 for plaintiffs against Grace;
(3) $225,000 for plaintiffs against Great Lakes; (4) $200,000 for plaintiffs against American
Seating; and (5) $125,000 for American Seating on their cross-claim against Great Lakes.
Although plaintiffs accepted awards (2), (3), and (4), all defendants rejected the awards.
Subsequently, Monahan was dismissed after agreeing to binding arbitration with plaintiffs, and
the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of all remaining defendants. After the trial
court granted American Seating summary disposition on its contractual indemnity claim,
American moved for a determination of its cost in defending plaintiffs’ claims. Great Lakes
moved for case evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)(1), (3). The trial court held several
additional hearings on these remaining issues, ultimately entering a final judgment on this case
on January 25, 2007 that required Great Lakes to pay American Seating $36,220.27 to indemnify
it for its cost in defending plaintiffs’ claims but also awarding Great Lakes $18,417.50 as case
evaluation sanctions because the “verdict” American obtained was less favorable than the
$125,000 case evaluation award it rejected.
The primary issue on is appeal is the interpretation of MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a):
(4) In cases involving multiple parties, the following rules apply:
(a) Except as provided in subrule (O)(4)(b), in determining whether the verdict is
more favorable to a party than the case evaluation, the court shall consider only
the amount of the evaluation and verdict as to the particular pair of parties, rather
than the aggregate evaluation or verdict as to all parties. However, costs may not
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be imposed on a plaintiff who obtains an aggregate verdict more favorable to the
plaintiff than the aggregate evaluation. [Emphasis added.]
Great Lakes argues that the first sentence of subrule 4(a) is dispositive in determining
whether American’s verdict is more or less favorable than the case evaluation award because
when considering only the particular pair of parties, American’s “verdict” of $36,220.27 was far
less than the case evaluation award of $125,000. American Seating argues the “however” clause
applies because it was a plaintiff on its cross-claim against Great Lakes. American Seating
argues that under the case evaluation award it would have paid plaintiffs $200,000 but only
received a payment of $125,000 from Great Lakes for a net loss of $75,000. Thus, by
proceeding to verdict, American had to pay plaintiffs zero and obtained judgment against Great
Lakes for $36,320.27. Thus, American argues, the aggregate verdict it received was far greater
than the aggregate case evaluation award.
The interpretation and application of a court rule is a question of law subject to de novo
review. Marketos v American Employers Ins Co, 465 Mich 407, 412; 633 NW2d 371 (2001).
The same legal principles regarding statutes apply: when the language of a court rule is
unambiguous, the plain meaning expressed must be enforced without further judicial
construction or interpretation. Id. at 413, citing Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462
Mich 188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000). If applicable to the circumstances, the imposition of
case evaluation sanctions is mandatory, and a court’s decision whether to grant sanctions is a
question of law we review de novo on appeal. Cusumano v Velger, 264 Mich App 234, 235; 690
NW2d 309 (2004); Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd Partnership v Markel, 226 Mich App
127, 129; 573 NW2d 61 (1997). In general, a party who rejects a case evaluation award is
subject to sanctions if it fails to improve its position by proceeding to verdict. MCR
2.403(O)(1); Rohl v Leone, 258 Mich App 72, 75; 669 NW2d 579, 581 (2003); Elia v Hazen, 242
Mich App 374, 378; 619 NW2d 1 (2000).
We agree that as a matter of fact American Seating improved its position by proceeding
to verdict as defined in MCR 2.403(O)(2) rather than by accepting the case evaluation awards
regarding plaintiffs and Great Lakes. But we must still apply the court rules as written. Further,
we must follow the rule of law established by prior decisions of this Court. MCR 7.215(J)(1).
With respect to the second sentence of MCR 2.403(O)(4)(a) on which American Seating relies,
this Court has held that when determining whether “a plaintiff” has obtained an aggregate verdict
more favorable than the aggregate evaluation, only the claims asserted by that party as a plaintiff,
in a complaint, cross-complaint, or countercomplaint, should be considered. HA Smith Lumber
& Hardware Co v Decina, 258 Mich App 419, 433-435; 670 NW2d 729 (2003), vac’d in part on
other grounds 471 Mich 925; 689 NW2d 227 (2004), on rem 265 Mich App 380; 695 NW2d 347
(2005), rem’d 474 Mich 1073; 711 NW2d 327 (2006), rev’d 480 Mich 987; 742 NW2d 120
(2007). Specifically, the Court held, “the plain language, context, and purpose of the rule
compels us to conclude that when our Supreme Court used the term ‘plaintiff,’ it meant plaintiff
with respect to only those claims in which that party is a plaintiff, not cases in which the party is
a plaintiff with respect to only one or some of the claims.” Id. at 435. Our Supreme Court
subsequently vacated and eventually reversed only that part of HA Smith addressing attorney fees
under the Construction Lien Act, MCL 570.1101 et seq. Consequently, our Supreme Court has
not reversed or modified the decision in HA Smith regarding MCR 2.403(O). It remains binding
precedent under MCR 7.215(J)(1).
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American Seating next argues that the trial abused its discretion in determining a proper
attorney fee to award as a sanction. The essence of American’s argument is that the trial court
determined that an award based on an hourly rate greater than that which counsel actually
charged his client was a reasonable attorney fee. We disagree.
When sanctions are awarded, the actual costs to be charged are the costs taxable in any
civil action plus a reasonable attorney fee. MCR 2.403(O)(6); Dessart v Burak, 470 Mich 37,
40; 678 NW2d 615 (2004). We review the trial court’s determination of a reasonable attorney
fee for an abuse of discretion. Zdrojewski v Murphy, 254 Mich App 50, 73; 657 NW2d 721
(2002). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is outside the range of principled
outcomes. Patrick v Shaw, 275 Mich App 201, 204; 739 NW2d 365 (2007), citing Maldonado v
Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
There is no precise formula for computing the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee.
However, among the facts to be taken into consideration in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the
professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor
involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of
the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client. See generally 3 Michigan Law &
Practice, Attorneys and Counselors, § 44, p 275 and Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Ethics. [Crawley v Schick, 48
Mich App 728, 737; 211 NW2d 217 (1973).]
In Zdrojewski, supra at 71-72, this Court opined, “[a] reasonable attorney fee must be
based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate for services necessitated by the rejection of the
evaluation.” In doing so in this case, the trial court employed the multi-factor analysis first
delineated in Crawley, supra. With respect to American Seating’s argument that the trial court
failed to give adequate weight to the actual fees charged by Great Lakes’ counsel, we note that a
reasonable attorney fee is “not equivalent to actual fees charged.” Zdrojewski, supra at 72.
Here, as in Zdrojewski, the trial court determined that $150 an hour is a reasonable hourly rate to
calculate a reasonable attorney fee. This determination was not outside the range of principled
outcomes. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Finally, American Seating argues that Great Lakes should be required to indemnify it
under its contract for the case evaluation sanctions. American Seating asserts the case evaluation
sanctions are “attorney’s fees related . . . arising or alleged to arise out of or in any way related to
the subcontract agreement” within the meaning of the indemnification clause in its contract with
Great Lakes. We reject this argument for several reasons. First, case law interpreting both
contractual indemnity and common-law indemnity, while permitting recovering of attorney fees
and expenses to defend an underlying claim that is the subject of indemnification, has not
permitted recovering fees and costs incurred in establishing the right of indemnity. See Hayes v
General Motors Corp, 106 Mich App 188, 200-202; 308 NW2d 452 (1981) (contractual
indemnity), and Warren v McClouth Steel Corp, 111 Mich App 496, 508-509; 314 NW2d 666
(1981) (common-law indemnity). More importantly, to the extent a causal link between the
parties’ contract and the case evaluation sanctions exists, it is too attenuated to permit contractual
recovery; any link was broken by the supervening cause of case evaluation under the court rules.
In other words, the case evaluation sanctions did not arise out of the parties’ contract. The
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sanctions ensued from case evaluation and the verdict American Seating obtained after rejecting
the case evaluation award. To allow indemnification of the case evaluation sanctions would
completely frustrate the purposes of the court rules. Consequently, this argument fails.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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