IN RE DARVON LAWAN SMITH JR MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DARVON LAWAN SMITH, JR.,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 277428
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-434790-NA
DARVON LAWAN SMITH, SR.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DASHAWN MONIQUE TAYLOR,
Respondent.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Sawyer and Murphy, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent Darvon Lawan Smith, Sr. appeals as of right the order of the trial court
terminating his parental rights to his minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g),
(h), and (j). Because the trial court was properly vested with jurisdiction to determine
respondent’s parental rights, clear and convincing evidence established a statutory basis for
termination of parental rights, and termination of parental rights was not clearly contrary to the
best interests of the child, we affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Respondent challenges for the first time on appeal the trial court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him, contending that the trial court failed to properly serve him with the original
and supplemental petitions. Respondent did not raise this issue before the trial court and it is
therefore not preserved for our review. See In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679-680; 692
NW2d 708 (2005). Were we to review this issue, we would reject respondent’s contention.
Respondent attended virtually all hearings after the initiation of the case and was represented by
counsel throughout the proceedings for over two years, yet he never challenged personal
jurisdiction. Respondent cannot now belatedly claim that defective notice operated to invalidate
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the proceedings in which he diligently participated for over two years. See In re Gillespie, 197
Mich App 440, 446-447; 496 NW2d 309 (1992).
We also reject respondent’s contention that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion), (c)(i) (conditions that led
to adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (h)
(imprisonment). MCR 3.977(J). Respondent was incarcerated throughout most of the child’s
life, was incarcerated at the time that the child was removed from the home of the child’s
mother, and remained incarcerated at the time of termination. During the small portions of the
child’s life that respondent was not incarcerated, the record indicates that he provided little
support or care for the child. We note that the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s
parental rights also indicates subsection (3)(j) as a ground for termination, so designated
apparently by mistake because the trial court’s ruling from the bench indicates subsection (3)(i)
as the intended ground. Because courts speak through their written orders, we decline to
consider subsection (3)(i) as a ground for termination in this case. Erroneous termination under
one statutory ground, however, is harmless where the trial court correctly found another statutory
basis for termination. In re Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
Based on the same clear and convincing evidence we conclude that the record also
supports the trial court’s finding that termination was not contrary to the best interests of the
child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
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