HENRY B JOY IV V ROBERTA T JOY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HENRY B. JOY, IV,
UNPUBLISHED
May 6, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 274854
Emmet Circuit Court
LC No. 05-008995-DM
ROBERTA T. JOY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Murphy and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a judgment of divorce entered by the trial court that
incorporated a divorce settlement agreement ostensibly reached by the parties. The dispute
focuses on whether there was actually a meeting of the minds relative to the supposed agreement.
Because the words expressed by the parties in placing the agreement on the record are
unambiguous when viewed in total and support defendant’s position and the trial court’s ruling,
we affirm.
The parties were heading toward trial on issues concerning the distribution of the marital
estate and child custody, when, on the day of the pretrial conference with the court, they
unexpectedly announced that they had just reached a settlement agreement. The purported
agreement, which was not yet reduced to writing, was then orally presented to the court on the
record. Several weeks later, when a version of the alleged agreement was reduced to writing by
plaintiff in the form of a proposed consent judgment of divorce, defendant objected, claiming
that the proposed consent judgment was inconsistent with the oral agreement arrived at in court.
Plaintiff claimed that the settlement called for $2,250,000 in total assets to be awarded to
defendant, which amount included both cash and the value of property to be given to defendant.
Specifically, plaintiff contended below and contends on appeal that defendant was to receive
$1,700,000 in cash within two years, sooner if the marital home were sold,1 $400,000 in personal
property, $100,000 in motor vehicles, and $50,000, which had already been given to defendant.
But defendant claimed that the agreement called for her to receive $2,250,000 in cash, plus
1
There is no dispute that plaintiff was required to pay defendant $350,000 up front as part of the
agreement.
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named property, which included most of the marital home’s contents and various motor vehicles.
The trial court ruled in favor of defendant, finding that the settlement agreement required
plaintiff to pay defendant $2,250,000 in cash, plus defendant was entitled to various items of
property. Plaintiff now appeals, claiming that the disparity in interpretations of the agreement
indicates that there was never a meeting of the minds between plaintiff and defendant; therefore,
there was no settlement agreement or contract to enforce.
Plaintiff argues that, viewing the words of the parties and their visible acts, it is apparent
that they did not reach an agreement or understanding concerning the disposition of the marital
estate in this case, making the trial court’s enforcement of what was really a nonexistent
settlement agreement error. We disagree.
An agreement to settle a lawsuit is governed by the principles generally applicable to the
interpretation of contracts, and the existence and interpretation of a contract are legal questions
that this Court reviews de novo. Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733
NW2d 766 (2006). A settlement agreement in a divorce action regarding the distribution of
assets or property is a contract and is to be construed and applied as such. MacInnes v MacInnes,
260 Mich App 280, 289; 677 NW2d 889 (2004). “Settlements, duly arrived at by the parties and
placed on the record in open court in the presence of counsel, are entitled to a high degree of
finality.” Tinkle v Tinkle, 106 Mich App 423, 428; 308 NW2d 241 (1981). “It is a well-settled
principle of law that courts are bound by property settlements reached through negotiations and
agreement by parties to a divorce action, in the absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or
severe stress which prevented a party from understanding in a reasonable manner the nature and
effect of the act in which she was engaged.” Keyser v Keyser, 182 Mich App 268, 269-270; 451
NW2d 587 (1990); see also MCR 2.507(G)(agreements by parties made in open court are
binding). “Generally, contracts between consenting adults are enforced according to the terms to
which the parties themselves agreed.” Lentz v Lentz, 271 Mich App 465, 471; 721 NW2d 861
(2006).
The formation of a contract requires an offer and an unambiguous acceptance that is in
strict conformance with the offer. Kloian, supra at 452. “Further, a contract requires mutual
assent or a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms.” Id. at 453. “A meeting of the minds
is judged by an objective standard, looking to the express words of the parties and their visible
acts, not their subjective states of mind.” Id. at 454 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
In presenting the purported agreement, plaintiff’s counsel stated that “the ultimate
contribution from [plaintiff] to [defendant is] in the amount of $2,250,000.” And this statement
was immediately followed by plaintiff’s counsel announcing, “That is the settlement agreement
which consists not only of cash but also of property and other assets.” Counsel then proceeded
to discuss the distribution of motor vehicles and property contained in the home. If this were the
full extent of the agreement, we would agree that an ambiguity existed. However, any ambiguity
was laid to rest by the following passage articulated by plaintiff’s counsel:
The balance of the monies, Your Honor, which will again approximate to
2.25 million dollars will be payable as follows. The $350,000 forthwith at least
half of what is owing on that amount within 12 months of today’s date, or before
shall the home sell, and then those proceeds can be paid forthwith. And that
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provision will be in the language. And then the balance within two years then
from today’s date if the home is not sold or if there is not other means from which
to pay those monies to Ms. Joy. [Emphasis added.]
This language, which plaintiff fails to even acknowledge, clearly contemplates the
payment of “monies” or cash to defendant in the amount of $2,250,000. Moreover, a review of
the settlement transcript fails to reveal any mention of a cash payment to defendant in the amount
of $1,700,000. Furthermore, while plaintiff speaks of $400,000 in personal property being
awarded to defendant, along with $100,000 in motor vehicles, those dollar amounts were never
referenced or mentioned when the agreement was placed on the record. Accordingly, we find no
error in the trial court’s ruling.
With respect to plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, “a trial court is obligated to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve an ambiguity or a factual dispute that arises in a
proceeding related to a divorce only if a party specifically asks for an evidentiary hearing.”
Mitchell v Mitchell, 198 Mich App 393, 399; 499 NW2d 386 (1993). Because plaintiff did not
request an evidentiary hearing, and because there is no ambiguity with respect to the agreement,
there is no basis to order an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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