PEOPLE OF MI V JUAN CASIMIR TORREZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 24, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 274582
Ogemaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-002556-FH
JUAN CASIMIR TORREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and the
trial court sentenced defendant to five to 20 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right.
We reverse and remand. This case is being decided without oral argument in accordance with
MCR 7.214(E).
The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that, on December 21, 2005, defendant, along
with his son and others, armed with baseball bats and rods or pipes, entered the home of an
elderly woman without permission and confronted the lady’s grandson. The party injured both
grandmother and grandson before leaving upon hearing that the police were coming.
Defendant testified that he had known the young man for a few years, and added that he
had gone to the house intending to talk to the grandmother, and was invited inside. Defendant
maintained that he and the persons with him were unarmed, but that the young man was holding
a bat and soon became belligerent with it. Defendant testified that, in the fracas that ensued, he
picked up a shovel and threatened to strike others with it in order to rescue his son from a
dangerous predicament.
Defendant challenges his conviction on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying a
request for a jury instruction on self-defense, and in precluding evidence that the young man he
had confronted had earlier robbed defendant’s own son.
I. Self-Defense Instruction
The trial court refused a request to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of selfdefense, explaining as follows:
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[Defendant] is not entitled to the self-defense argument because he denied doing
anything wrong. . . . According to his testimony, the only thing he did was go in
to talk . . . , entered with permission with a knock, and then the only . . . thing he
did wasn’t involving the assault.
The only thing he did was try to remove his son from the altercation
between his son . . . and [the young man at the premises]. So it is my position
that, one, I wasn’t sure that a self-defense applied to the crime charged. But . . .
[the] self-defense request wasn’t consistent [with] what his testimony was, what
his policy was.
“Questions of law, including questions of the applicability of jury instructions, are
reviewed de novo.” People v Perez, 469 Mich 415, 418; 670 Mich 655 (2003). Instructions
must cover each element of each offense charged, along with all material issues, defenses, and
theories that have evidentiary support. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 53; 523 NW2d 830
(1994). Conversely, an instruction should not be given that is without evidentiary support.
People v Johnson, 171 Mich App 801, 804; 430 NW2d 828 (1988).
Defendant points out that an armed assault can satisfy one of the aggravating elements for
first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2)(a), and argues that because he admitted to having
threatened to strike persons on the premises with a shovel who were holding and threatening his
son, the jury should have had the opportunity to excuse that activity through an instruction on
defense of another. We agree.
Although first-degree home invasion is not necessarily an assaultive offense, to the extent
that an assault is used to establish an element of the offense, the affirmative defense of selfdefense, or defense of another, can negate that element. In this case, the trial court expressly
instructed the jury that to find defendant guilty of first-degree home invasion it had to conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed an assault. The jury had before it various
accounts of defendant’s engaging in assaultive behavior, but, lacking an instruction on defense of
another, the jurors could well have concluded that defendant’s own testimony satisfied the
assault element, and thus not concerned itself with the other evidence in that regard. We must
conclude that this curtailment of defendant’s theory of the case was “inconsistent with
substantial justice,” MCR 2.613(A), and thus that reversal is required.
II. Earlier Robbery
The trial court disallowed testimony concerning allegations that the young man he had
confronted had earlier that day robbed his own son. Indications from counsel were that any
earlier conflict related to a drug deal that went awry. Defendant argues that the court thus
erroneously limited his ability to expose bias on the part of complainant. We disagree.1
1
Our conclusion that reversal is required because of the instructional issue obviates our need to
reach this issue. We do so, however, because it may arise again on retrial.
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We review a trial court’s evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. People v
Martzke, 251 Mich App 282, 286; 651 NW2d 490 (2002). An abuse of discretion occurs where
the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside a “principled range of outcomes.” People v
Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003); People v Kahley, 277 Mich App 182, 184;
744 NW2d 194 (2007).
Evidence that tends to show bias on the part of a witness is always relevant, and thus
admissible. See Martzke, supra at 290-292. A jury is entitled to learn “the full context in which
disputed events took place.” People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 74; 556 NW2d 851 (1996).
However, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” MRE 403.
In this case, the trial court explained its decision not to allow evidence of the alleged
earlier altercation as follows:
[W]e are trying to keep the issue narrowed here. . . . [A]n earlier robbery . . .
doesn’t allow them to use self help. . . .
***
. . . [W]hat happened, I have no clue. I am not going to go try what
happened two and a half hours before, five hours before, two days before or
whatever. It has got to be relevant issues, keep the issues narrow.
***
. . . Even if it is . . . tangentially relevant, the probative value is so far, so
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the
jury, consideration of undue delay, waste of time, needless presentation. I just
can’t believe that we are going to sit here in a trial about this . . . .
***
You can certainly call into question inconsistencies but . . . if you bring in
the fact that there was supposedly a robbery, she is going to be able to bring in her
explanation supposedly that there was a drug buy, there was a pound of marijuana
sold and there was four hundred fifty dollars or four hundred dollars cheated out
of.
That is so far out of the realm of what is reasonable . . . . [T]his issue is
narrowly crafted. We have got five attorneys. We are going to keep it on point.
. . . [W]e are not going to try whether there was an armed robbery or
whether there was a drug deal gone bad. We are going to try whether or not there
was a breaking and entering and whether someone was present. I don’t care quite
frankly whether there is an armed robbery or drug deal gone bad. If they break in
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while someone is present either to collect the money from the armed robbery or
collect the money for the drug deal, it is still a breaking and entering. So what
their motivation is, it is not like . . . self defense.
We agree with the trial court that, if evidence of an earlier altercation might have brought
to light a possible bias on the part at least one prosecution witness,2 such evidence might have
confused the jury concerning which crime was being tried, or improperly caused the jurors to
view the sort of violent self-help that the prosecution witnesses would then have described as
mitigating criminal responsibility. The trial court’s decision to banish that alleged incident
entirely for the sake of keeping the trial narrowly focused on the actual charges before the jury
did not lie outside a “principled range of outcomes.” Babcock, supra; Kahley, supra.
Accordingly, should this issue arise on retrial, the trial court will retain the discretion to limit, or
simply bar, evidence of an earlier robbery or drug deal.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction
is not retained.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
2
We further note that the evidence in question would have constituted a double-edged sword. If
it would have tended to show that especially one prosecution witness had a bias against his
visitors at the time in question, it would likewise have undercut the defense theory that defendant
and his party came to the home in question with entirely benign intentions, only to endure an
assault instigated by the young man at those premises.
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