RICHARD L PIESER V SARA LEE BAKERY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD L. PIESER,
UNPUBLISHED
March 20, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 275608
WCAC
LC No. 05-000354
SARA LEE BAKERY and TRAVELERS
PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
SECOND INJURY FUND (VOCATIONALLY
HANDICAPPED PROVISION),
Defendant-Appellee.
RICHARD L. PIESER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277884
WCAC
LC No. 05-000354
SARA LEE BAKERY and TRAVELERS
PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
SECOND INJURY FUND (VOCATIONALLY
HANDICAPPED PROVISION),
Defendant-Appellant.
-1-
Before: White, P.J., and Hoekstra and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, the Second Injury Fund (the fund) and defendants Sara Lee
Bakery and Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company of America (defendants) appeal by
leave granted a December 27, 2006 order of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission
(WCAC) directing the fund to reimburse defendants for benefits paid to plaintiff on and after
June 29, 2005. At issue is whether defendants are entitled to the reimbursement ordered by the
WCAC as a result of a change in law precipitated by our Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey v
Oakwood Hosp & Medical Ctr, 472 Mich 685; 698 NW2d 374 (2005), which overruled this
Court’s decision in Robinson v Gen Motors Corp, 242 Mich App 331; 619 NW2d 411 (2000).
Because we perceive no reason to stray from the usual rule of limited retroactivity applicable to
judicial decisions overruling prior law, we reverse.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
This case arises out of plaintiff Richard Pieser’s employment with Sara Lee Bakery. At
all relevant times, Pieser was certified as vocationally disabled under the worker’s disability
compensation act. See MCL 418.901(a). On October 10, 1994, Pieser injured his back at work.
Pieser subsequently filed a petition for worker’s compensation benefits, and defendants filed a
petition for reimbursement against the fund. The petition for reimbursement was based on MCL
418.921, which provides that, in the case of a vocationally disabled employee, the employer’s
liability is limited to those benefits accruing during the period of 52 weeks after the date of
injury and that, thereafter, “all compensation and the cost of all medical care and expenses of the
employee’s last sickness and burial shall be the liability of the [f]und.”
Ultimately, the magistrate granted Pieser benefits but dismissed the fund from any
liability for reimbursement because defendants failed to provide the fund with the statutorily
required notice of “whether it is likely that compensation may be payable beyond a period of 52
weeks after the date of injury.” MCL 418.925(1). In support, the magistrate cited Robinson,
supra, which held that the consequence of the failure to provide the notice required by MCL
418.925(1) was dismissal of the fund from liability for reimbursement. The magistrate’s
decision was affirmed by the WCAC.
On June 29, 2005, our Supreme Court released Bailey, supra, wherein Robinson was
specifically overruled. Essentially, the Court held that the fund has an obligation to reimburse a
carrier after the fifty-second week following the injury of a vocationally disabled employee,
regardless of the carrier’s failure to provide the fund with timely notice of the injury as required
by MCL 418.925(1). Bailey, supra at 688. Soon after Bailey was released, defendants filed the
instant petition for reimbursement. Defendants claimed that, in light of Bailey, the fund should
be ordered to reimburse defendants for all benefits paid to Pieser after 52 weeks following the
date of his injury, regardless of the timeliness of the notice provided to the fund. The fund
answered by arguing that res judicata barred defendants’ petition. The magistrate agreed and
dismissed defendants’ petition.
-2-
The WCAC subsequently reversed the magistrate’s decision, opining that relief was
warranted because the general rule is to apply judicial decisions with full retroactivity, and our
Supreme Court did not limit the retroactive effect of Bailey. Thus, the WCAC ordered that the
fund reimburse defendants for benefits paid to Pieser on and after June 29, 2005, the date of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey. Both parties subsequently sought leave to appeal, which
this Court granted.
II. Analysis
Defendants challenge the WCAC’s decision to the extent it ordered reimbursement only
as of June 29, 2005, the date on which Bailey was released. Defendants contend that the general
rule of full retroactivity of judicial decisions should apply and the fund should thus reimburse
defendants for benefits paid to Pieser after October 10, 1995, which was 52 weeks after the date
of plaintiff’s injury. The fund counters that a decision such as Bailey, which overrules prior law,
applies only to the case before the Court and to those pending cases in which a party has raised
and preserved the same legal issue. Because the instant case was resolved before the release of
Bailey, the fund asserts that the decision is inapplicable and that any reimbursement is improper.
Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey should be given full retroactive effect or,
as argued by the fund, limited in its application to those pending cases in which a party has
raised and preserved the notice issue is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Lincoln v Gen Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 490; 607 NW2d 73 (2000); see also MCL
418.861a(14). While we recognize that judicial decisions generally are given full retroactive
effect, Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d 847 (1986),
“limited retroactivity” is the favored approach when overruling prior law. Tebo v Havlik, 418
Mich 350, 360, 343 NW2d 181 (1984). Both our Supreme Court and this Court have stated that
the rule of limited retroactivity means that the decision will apply to pending cases in which the
same challenge has been raised and preserved, and it has become the “usual” rule where, as here,
a decision overrules prior law. See Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 586-587, 587
n 57; 702 NW2d 539 (2005); Paul v Wayne Co Dep’t of Pub Service, 271 Mich App 617, 620;
722 NW2d 922 (2006).
In the instant case, we see no reason for this Court to stray from the “usual” rule of
limited retroactivity. Therefore, because this case was no longer pending at the time Bailey was
released, that case is inapplicable to the instant matter and the fund is correct in its assertion that
the WCAC erred in granting defendants any reimbursement at all.1
Reversed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Bill Schuette
1
In light of this conclusion, we need not address whether the WCAC erred in reversing the
magistrate’s ruling on the issue of res judicata.
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.