WILLIE WRIGHT V MICRO ELECTRONICS INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIE WRIGHT,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 274668
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-050906-NO
MICRO ELECTRONICS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
TONY NUNEZ and FRANK ANGELUCCI,
Defendants.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Sawyer and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s opinion and order granting defendant
Micro Electronic, Inc.’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).1 We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This action arises from the posting of plaintiff’s photograph at several locations inside
defendant’s Madison Heights store where plaintiff was employed. Plaintiff filed this action on
July 1, 2003, alleging that the photographs were posted on or about July 2, 2002. Written on
each of the photos were the following remarks:
WANTED
For Transmiting [sic]
Aid To Hundreds
of underage
Boys.
1
The individual defendants, Tony Nunez and Frank Angelucci, were dismissed by stipulation,
with prejudice.
-1-
Last Seen:
Making away
By foot. Near
Basketball court.
If Seen:
Shoot to
Kill.
Contact
www.Autoless or
Plaintiff’s complaint included claims for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and race discrimination and hostile work
environment harassment under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2201 et seq.
This Court reviews the trial court’s grant or denial of summary disposition de novo.
MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 332; 628 NW2d 33 (2001). A motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Id. The trial
court must consider any pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary
evidence filed by the parties in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine
whether a genuine issue of fact exists. MCR 2.116(G)(2); Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley,
461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the
record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon
which reasonable minds might differ.” Allstate Ins Co v Dep’t of Mgt & Budget, 259 Mich App
705, 709-710; 675 NW2d 857 (2003). The motion should be granted only if the evidence
demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. MacDonald, supra at 332.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in relying on Gladych v New Family Homes,
Inc, 468 Mich 594, 595; 664 NW2d 705 (2003), to conclude that his defamation claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. We agree.
The limitations period for a defamation claim is one year. MCL 600.5805(9); Mitan v
Campbell, 474 Mich 21, 25; 706 NW2d 420 (2005). Although plaintiff filed his complaint on
July 1, 2003, less than one year after the alleged defamatory conduct on July 2, 2002, the trial
court, relying on Gladych, supra, found that plaintiff’s defamation claims were barred by the
one-year limitations period because service was not accomplished until August 2003, after the
one-year period expired. We conclude that Gladych is not applicable to this case.
In Gladych, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich
474, 481; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), which held that the statute of limitations is tolled upon the
filing of a complaint. Instead, the Court in Gladych concluded
that the unambiguous language of MCL 600.5805 and MCL 600.5856 provides
that the mere filing of a complaint is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
-2-
In order to toll the limitations period, one must also comply with the requirements
of [MCL 600.5856]. [Gladych, supra at 595.]
However, observing that there had been extensive reliance on Buscaino’s interpretation of
§ 5856, the Court in Gladych held that its decision would be given
limited retroactive application, applying only to those cases in which this specific
issue has been raised and preserved. In all other cases, the decision is given
prospective application, effective September 1, 2003.” [Gladych, supra at 607
608.]
In this case, plaintiff filed his complaint on July 1, 2003, the same day that Gladych was
decided. Although defendant filed an answer and raised the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense, that answer was not filed until January 30, 2006. Thus, at the time Gladych
was decided, defendant had neither raised nor preserved this specific issue. Because this action
was filed before September 1, 2003, and because defendant had neither raised nor preserved this
specific issue at the time Gladych was decided, we conclude that Gladych does not apply.
Accordingly, this case is controlled by Buscaino, and plaintiff’s filing of his complaint less than
one year after the alleged defamatory conduct occurred was sufficient to toll the limitations
period. Thus, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition on this basis.
The trial court alternatively concluded that even if the defamation claims were timely
filed, defendant was not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. We agree with plaintiff
that the trial court erred in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact whether
defendant could be liable under this doctrine.
“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the general rule is that an employer is not
liable for the torts intentionally or recklessly committed by an employee when those torts are
beyond the scope of the employer’s business.” Zsigo v Hurley Medical Ctr, 475 Mich 215, 221;
716 NW2d 220 (2006). In Zsigo, the Supreme Court observed that 1 Restatement Agency, 2d,
§ 219(2) sets forth the general rule of respondeat superior and also lists certain exceptions to
employer nonliability:
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency in question.
The Zsigo Court explained that the fourth exception, § 219(2)(d), has not been adopted in
Michigan because it would amount to a strict liability policy. Id. at 227.
-3-
Here, the trial court found that defendant could not be liable under a respondeat superior
theory because the submitted evidence showed that the objectionable photographs were posted
by an employee, Tony Nunez, who was acting outside the scope of his employment duties. We
conclude that the trial court erred by focusing only on whether it was within the scope of
Nunez’s employment to write the allegedly defamatory comments on the photographs and post
them in the workplace.
There was evidence that photographs of employees were often posted in the store and that
Tony Nunez sometimes posted signs in the scope of his employment. Even excluding the
hearsay evidence that Frank Angelucci may have helped Nunez edit the language on the
photographs, Angelucci testified that he taught Nunez how to make color copies when Nunez
asked for instruction in order to post something. More significantly, there was evidence that
several store managers, including Colleen Niemiec, a customer service manager, Matt
McLennan, the retail sales manager, and Gary Dingeman, the store’s general manager, were
present for two days while the pictures were allegedly posted throughout the workplace.
Although they each denied ever observing the photographs, the evidence showed that the photos
were posted in several different locations at the workplace and Angelucci, who was plaintiff’s
supervisor, testified that a person would have to be “blind” not to see them. Angelucci also
stated that if the managers were doing their jobs, they would have walked by the photographs at
least ten times during an eight-hour day.
Further, plaintiff testified that he did not complain to Niemiec because he observed her
looking at the photograph “on multiple occasions” and she laughed when she looked at it.
Additionally, plaintiff testified that McLennan, Angelucci’s supervisor, saw the photograph and
told plaintiff that he could not sue defendant over this. Angelucci testified that he confronted
McLennan, Niemiec, and the store’s general manager, Gary Dingeman, about the photographs,
telling them that they should be ashamed for not having the photos removed, and McLennan
responded by stating, “What, don’t you have a sense of humor?” Thus, even though McLennan,
Niemiec, and Dingeman all denied seeing the photographs, plaintiff submitted circumstantial
evidence showing that the photographs were conspicuously displayed in their presence and other
direct evidence indicating that they were aware of and had viewed the photos. Questions of
credibility are for the jury to resolve. Mich Nat’l Bank v Wheeling, 165 Mich App 738, 744-745;
419 NW2d 746 (1988).
Given the evidence that management personnel were aware of the photos and not only
tolerated their display, but engaged in conduct that may have tacitly reflected their endorsement
or approval of the displays, and rebuked comments suggesting that they were in poor taste, we
conclude that a question of fact exists whether defendant may be liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior because it either intended Nunez’s conduct or consequences, or because its
own negligent or reckless conduct permitted the displays. Zsigo, supra at 221. Thus, the trial
court erred in determining that defendant could not be liable under a respondeat superior theory.
We also agree with plaintiff that he established a prima facie case of defamation per se.
“The elements of a defamation claim are: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the
plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to
negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective
of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by publication.”
Mitan, supra at 24. MCL 600.2911(10) provides that “[w]ords imputing a lack of chastity to any
-4-
female or male are actionable in themselves and subject the person who uttered and published
them to a civil action for the slander in the same manner as the uttering or publishing of words
imputing the commission of a criminal offense.”
The photographs of plaintiff contained the following written comments:
WANTED
For Transmiting [sic]
Aid To Hundreds
of underage
Boys.
Although defendant argues that the statements must be considered “in context” as a joke, we
believe that a reasonable trier of fact could interpret the statements as suggesting that plaintiff
had a sexually transmitted disease, which he transmitted to hundreds of underage boys, thereby
implying his participation in sexual acts with hundreds of underage boys. Such a statement, if
believed, is actionable irrespective of special harm. Linebaugh v Sheraton Michigan Corp, 198
Mich App 335, 339; 497 NW2d 585 (1993).
We disagree with defendant’s argument that the dismissal of plaintiff’s federal court
action requires dismissal of plaintiff’s state court claims based on res judicata. Because the
federal action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff was not barred by res judicata from
bringing his state claims in state court. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460
Mich 372, 381-382; 596 NW2d 153 (1989).
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for false light
invasion of privacy. We agree.
“In order to maintain an action for false-light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show
that the defendant broadcast to the public in general, or to a large number of people, information
that was unreasonable and highly objectionable by attributing to the plaintiff characteristics,
conduct, or beliefs that were false and placed the plaintiff in a false position.” Duran v The
Detroit News, Inc, 200 Mich App 622, 631-632; 504 NW2d 715 (1993). Additionally, the
defendant must have known of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized
matter and the false light in which the plaintiff was placed. Detroit Free Press, Inc v Oakland
Co Sheriff, 164 Mich App 656, 666; 418 NW2d 124 (1987).
The trial court determined that defendant was entitled to summary disposition of this
claim because plaintiff failed to show that defendant had knowledge of the photographs.
Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff could not establish that defendant knowingly
acted in reckless disregard to the falsity of the publicized matter.
We agree with plaintiff that the trial court erred in determining that there was no genuine
issue of material fact regarding defendant’s knowledge of the photographs or whether defendant
acted in reckless disregard of the falsity of the publicized matter.
As discussed previously, plaintiff submitted evidence that the photographs were
conspicuously displayed in several locations in the store. According to Angelucci, a person
-5-
would have to be “blind” not to see them, and the managers would have had to walk past them at
least ten times a day as part of their jobs. Additionally, plaintiff testified that he observed the
customer service manager, Colleen Niemiec, look at the photographs “on multiple occasions”
and laugh when she saw them. Plaintiff also testified that Angelucci’s supervisor, Matt
McLennan, made a comment about the photographs, telling plaintiff that he could not sue “over
this.” Moreover, Angelucci testified that he confronted Niemiec, McLennan, and Dingeman,
telling them that they should be ashamed for leaving the photographs up, to which McLennan
responded, “What, don’t you have a sense of humor?” Viewed in a light most favorable to
plaintiff, this evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had knowledge of the photographs.
Additionally, plaintiff testified that he did not have AIDS and had never engaged in sex
with any man or boy. Thus, plaintiff presented evidence that the comments on the photographs
attributed characteristics or conduct to him that were false, unreasonable, and highly
objectionable.
Furthermore, the evidence established an issue of fact whether defendant acted in
reckless disregard of the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which plaintiff was
placed. Viewed most favorably to plaintiff, there was evidence that defendant’s management
personnel allowed the photographs to remain posted, despite their knowledge of the photos and
the objectionable content, and that they may have engaged in conduct or commentary signifying
their endorsement or approval of the display.
The trial court also granted summary disposition of plaintiff’s false light claim because it
concluded that plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that the publication was made to the
general public or to a large number of people. We disagree.
There was evidence that the photograph was posted in several different locations in the
workplace, including a public area of the store. Moreover, the photos were posted for more than
one day. Plaintiff observed several coworkers looking at the photos. Plaintiff also testified that
Nunez showed the photographs to other employees, including plaintiff’s former fiancée, and to a
new hire, and continued to show them to people even after they were taken down. At least four
coworkers and two customers made comments to plaintiff about the photograph. One customer,
a lawyer, gave plaintiff his card. In light of this evidence, there was a genuine issue of fact
whether the photograph was published to the general public or a large number of people to avoid
summary disposition on this basis.
Next, plaintiff asserts that the trial court improperly dismissed his claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. We agree.
“The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme
and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional
distress.” Linebaugh, supra at 342. “Liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
has been found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id.
The trial court dismissed this claim because it concluded that plaintiff could not show that
the photographs were extreme and outrageous, noting that plaintiff never even complained about
-6-
the photos. Although plaintiff did not complain about the photographs to management, he
explained that this was because he was concerned for his job and he did not want to “make
waves” at work. Moreover, there was evidence suggesting that plaintiff had legitimate reasons
for believing that complaining would not have helped the situation. Plaintiff presented evidence
that Colleen Niemiec openly laughed at the photos, and that McLennan told plaintiff that he
could not sue “over this.” Further, contrary to the trial court’s determination, we believe that
publicly posting a person’s photograph with the suggestion that the person is a pedophile who
transmitted a sexually transmitted disease to hundreds of underage boys is conduct that may be
considered sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support submission of this issue to the trier of
fact. See Linebaugh, supra at 342-343 (a depiction of the plaintiff engaged in a sexual act with a
coworker was sufficiently outrageous and extreme in character to support submission of the issue
to the trier of fact).
The trial court also determined that there was no evidence that plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress. “[E]motional distress ‘includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such
as fright, horror, grief, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and
nausea.’ ” Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 235; 551 NW2d 206 (1996), quoting 1
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 46, Comment j, p 77. “Severe distress must be proved; but in many
cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct is in itself important
evidence that the distress has existed.” Id. It is not necessary that the plaintiff seek medical
treatment. Id.
Plaintiff testified that he no longer wanted to go to work after the photograph was posted,
that he became more angry as time went by, and that he was embarrassed by the photos, and that
he believed that his coworkers thought less positively about him. The evidence raised a genuine
issue of material fact whether the posting of the photographs caused severe emotional distress.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed his negligence claim. To
establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that (1) the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached the duty, (3) the defendant’s breach of the duty
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages.” Smith v
Stolberg, 231 Mich App 256, 258; 586 NW2d 103 (1998).
Plaintiff submitted evidence of defendant’s written employment policy, which states that
harassment, including “offensive conduct which creates an intimidating work environment or
interferes with work performance,” is a violation of company policy. Angelucci testified that the
photograph violated defendant’s harassment policy, that the other managers were aware of the
photos when they were posted, that the managers did not act to remove the photos, and that when
Angelucci confronted the managers about them, they responded without interest. Plaintiff
testified that he observed the managers looking at the photograph, that Niemiec laughed at it, and
that McLennan warned him that he could not sue defendant because of it. Plaintiff testified that
the photographs damaged his reputation, was the cause of repeated comments from his
coworkers, and caused him to avoid the workplace. Giving plaintiff the benefit of reasonable
doubt, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant’s conduct regarding the photograph
-7-
was negligent. Allstate Ins Co, supra at 709-710. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing
plaintiff’s negligence claim.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly dismissed his claims for race
discrimination and hostile work environment harassment based on plaintiff’s race.
To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, a
plaintiff must provide “enough evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.”
Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 607-608; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). “Proof
of discriminatory treatment in violation of the [Civil Rights Act] may be established by direct
evidence or by indirect or circumstantial evidence.” Sniecinski v Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 132; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). “Direct evidence” is evidence that, if
believed, “requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor.”
Harrison, supra at 610. In cases involving indirect evidence, a plaintiff must use a burden
shifting approach by first presenting “a rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from
which a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination.”
Sniecinski, supra at 134.
To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that he belonged
to a protected group, (2) that he was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of his
protected status, (3) that the conduct or communication was unwelcome, (4) that the unwelcome
conduct was intended to or did in fact create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment, and (5) respondeat superior. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 368-369;
547 NW2d 314 (1996).
We agree with the trial court that plaintiff failed to present evidence, direct or indirect,
that the posting of the photographs, or the comments thereon, were based on plaintiff’s race.
Although Angelucci referred to Nunez as “a racist,” the photographs did not refer to plaintiff’s
race and there was nothing overtly racist about any of the comments on the photos. Plaintiff
admitted that he had no proof that the photographs had anything to do with his race and that he
was not really sure why Nunez posted them. Contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion on appeal, we do
not believe that the mere statement that plaintiff was seen near a basketball court raises a general
issue of fact regarding whether race was a factor that led to the posting of the photographs.
Indeed, plaintiff admitted that he and Nunez played basketball together. Accordingly, the trial
court properly dismissed plaintiff’s claims for race discrimination and hostile work environment
harassment based on plaintiff’s race.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.