IN RE JOHN F ERVIN TESTAMENTARY TRUST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re JOHN F. ERVIN TESTAMENTARY TRUST.
JANE PEARSON EVANS, a/k/a MARY JANE
PEARSON EVANS,
UNPUBLISHED
February 28, 2008
Petitioner-Appellant/Cross Appellee,
v
No. 270498
Washtenaw Probate Court
LC No. 61-447121-TT
BANK ONE TRUST COMPANY, NA,
Respondent-Appellee/CrossAppellant,
and
ERVIN INDUSTRIES, JOHN PEARSON,
NANCY P. RANDOLPH, and ANN E.
JORGENSON,
Appellees.
Before: Bandstra, PJ, and Donofrio and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Jane Pearson Evans (“Evans”) appeals as of right the probate court orders
dismissing her objections to the 18th account of the John F. Ervin Testamentary Trust1 and to the
18th and final account of the John F. Ervin Trust for the benefit of Mary Ervin Pearson
(collectively referred to herein as “the 18th Accounts”) submitted by respondent Bank One Trust
1
This trust, originally established by John F. Ervin for the benefit of his daughter and four
grandchildren, including Evans, was divided into five separate trusts in 1987 so that each
beneficiary had his or her own individual testamentary trust. The trust for Ervin’s daughter
terminated in 2005, following her death. For convenience, the four remaining testamentary trusts
originating from the single trust established by John Ervin will be referred to in this opinion as
the singular “Trust.”
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Company (now known as JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.) (“Bank One”), and awarding Bank One
$375,000 in attorney fees and costs, payable from the income of Evans’ testamentary and
revocable inter vivos trusts. We reverse and remand for entry of a revised order regarding
attorney fees and for further review and fact finding on whether Bank One’s requested attorney
fees and costs should be reduced, but otherwise affirm.
Evans first argues that the probate court erred by “peremptorily” dismissing her
objections to the 18th Accounts, except to the extent that they related to Ervin Industries’
acquisition of The Nanosteel Company (“Nanosteel”), at the January 12, 2006 hearing, in the
absence of a pending motion for summary disposition, without adhering to the timing and notice
requirements for those motions set forth in MCR 2.116, and without allowing any discovery. We
disagree.
Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties, or their privies, when the
facts or evidence essential to the action are identical to those essential to a prior action. Sewell v
Clean Cut Management, Inc, 463 Mich 569, 575; 621 NW2d 222 (2001); Chestonia Twp v Star
Twp, 266 Mich App 423, 429; 702 NW2d 631 (2005). The purposes of res judicata are to relieve
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, to conserve judicial resources, and to
encourage reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions. Pierson Sand &
Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 380; 596 NW2d 153 (1999); Richards v Tibaldi,
272 Mich App 522, 530; 726 NW2d 770 (2006). Res judicata applies where: (1) the prior action
was decided on the merits; (2) the decree in the prior action was a final decision; (3) the matter
contested in the second case was or could have been resolved in the first; and (4) both actions
involved the same parties or their privies. Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478
Mich 412, 418; 733 NW2d 755 (2007); Baraga County v State Tax Comm, 466 Mich 264, 269;
645 NW2d 13 (2002); Richards, supra at 531. The burden of establishing the applicability of res
judicata is on the party asserting it. Baraga County, supra. The test to determine whether the
two actions involve the same subject matter is whether the facts are identical in, or the same
evidence would sustain, both actions. If so, the two actions are the same for the purpose of res
judicata. Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 123-124; 680 NW2d 386 (2004). Michigan courts take
“a broad approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already
litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising
reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.” Id. at 121.
Similarly, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action
between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the
issue was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding. Leahy v Orion Twp, 269
Mich App 527, 530; 711 NW2d 438 (2006); Ditmore v Michalik, 244 Mich App 569, 577; 625
NW2d 462 (2001). Much like res judicata, collateral estoppel, too, is intended to relieve parties
of multiple litigation, conserve judicial resources, ease fears of prolonged litigation, prevent
inconsistent decisions, and encourage reliance on adjudication. Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469
Mich 679, 692-693; 667 NW2d 843 (2004); Minicuci v Scientific Data Mgt, Inc, 243 Mich App
28, 33; 620 NW2d 657 (2000). Generally, for collateral estoppel to apply (1) a question of fact
essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, (2) the same parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and
(3) there must be mutuality of estoppel. Mona, supra at 682.
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In Evans’ prior probate court action, filed in 2001, Evans raised objections to certain
transactions entered into by Ervin Industries in 1993, 1996 and 1998, and to loans from Bank
One affiliates to Ervin Industries relating to the those transactions. Evans also asserted that Bank
One had breached its legal duties as trustee by virtue of its lending relationship with Ervin
Industries and alleged lack of due diligence regarding Ervin Industries’ investments, and sought
its removal as trustee. Those claims were resolved against Evans on a variety of grounds.
Pertinent to the instant action, this Court specifically determined that loans made to Ervin
Industries by Bank One affiliates were authorized by applicable law and were reasonable and
prudent, and that Bank One had not breached its fiduciary duties as trustee in its management of
the trust. In re John F Ervin Testamentary Trust, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued February 14, 2006 (Docket No. 249974), slip op at 7-9.
Evans filed a second action in 2003, against Bank One, Ervin Industries, Pearson and
others in federal court alleging various state-law claims relating to the three business transactions
previously at issue in the probate court action. Those claims were also dismissed, on res
judicata, collateral estoppel and statute of limitations grounds. Evans v Pearson Enterprises, Inc,
434 F3d 839, 845-846 (CA 6, 2006).
At the hearing on her objections to the 18th Accounts, Evans’ counsel specifically
indicated that Ervin Industries’ acquisition of Nanosteel was the only material transaction to
which Evans’ objections pertained that took place during the time period covered by the 18th
Accounts. Counsel also implicitly acknowledged that the other transactions and conduct
complained of in Evans’ objections occurred prior to the current accounting period and were
raised, or could have been raised, in the prior actions.2 Thus, the probate court did not err in
dismissing the portion of Evans’ objections pertaining to conduct prior to the period covered by
the 18th Accounts; those objections were barred by the decisions issued in the prior probate court
and federal court actions. Washington, supra at 419; Sewell, supra at 575; Chestonia supra at
429.
As for Evans’ claim of procedural error, we note that Evans affirmatively requested that
the court sustain her objections and take other action thereon on January 12, 2006, a date selected
by her counsel for the hearing on her objections. Therefore, Evans cannot now be heard to
complain that the court ruled on a portion of her objections at the hearing. Further, despite the
representation that Evans’ objections to the 18th Accounts raised “several” new issues never
previously before a court, Evans’ counsel repeatedly indicated that the only transaction and
related conduct at issue to which Evans objected and which occurred during the relevant
accounting period was the “Nanosteel transaction and loans.”3 Therefore, counsel effectively
2
Evans’ counsel suggested that because Evans’ prior actions were decided on statute of
limitations and other procedural grounds, the prior issues, including loans that “continue to exist
and make Bank One money,” were “properly before the [c]ourt on the objections” to the 18th
Accounts. However, because Evans’ prior actions were dismissed with prejudice, those prior
rulings constitute rulings on the merits, resolving those claims against Evans. Washington, supra
at 417; MCR 2.504(B)(3). Any suggestion otherwise lacks merit.
3
Evans’ counsel did indicate that Evans wished to “explore whether or not the fact that [the
(continued…)
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conceded that the only conduct properly placed at issue by Evans’ objections to the 18th
Accounts was that relating to Ervin Industries’ investment in Nanosteel.
This Court has explained, in the context of MCR 2.116(C)(10), that a trial court may
grant summary disposition, without discovery, where the matter presents a question of law,
where there is no factual dispute or where there is no reasonable likelihood that discovery will
yield support for the position of the party against whom summary disposition is granted. St Clair
Medical, PC v Borgiel, 270 Mich App 260, 271; 715 NW2d 914 (2006); Ensink v Mecosta Co
General Hosp, 262 Mich App 518, 540; 687 NW2d 143 (2004). Here, although no motion for
summary disposition had yet been brought, the question whether res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel applied to bar any or all of Evans’ objections presented questions of law regarding
which there was no factual dispute. Washington, supra at 417; Adair, supra at 121-122.
Therefore, there was no reasonable likelihood that discovery would impact the appropriate
resolution of these objections. Under MCR 2.116(I)(1), a court is affirmatively required to
“render judgment without delay” when “the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Sobiecki v Dept of Corrections, 271 Mich App 139, 141; 721 NW2d 229
(2006). Therefore, the probate court did not err, proceedurally, by ruling on Evans’ objections
following the January 12, 2006 hearing.
Next, Evans asserts that the probate court erred in dismissing those objections to the 18th
Accounts relating to Ervin Industries’ acquisition of Nanosteel. Evans complained both that
Bank One did not adequately disclose Ervin Industries’ acquisition of Nanosteel in the 18th
Accounts, and that Bank One’s conduct relative to Ervin Industries’ investment in Nanosteel
itself violated the prudent investment rule set forth in MCL 700.7302. We disagree.
Courts refer to the trust instruments to determine the powers and duties of the trustees
and the intent of the settlors regarding the purpose of trusts. In re Butterfield Estate, 418 Mich
241, 259; 341 NW2d 453 (1983) (In re Butterfield II). Relevant statutes and case law further
define a trustee’s duties. In re Green Charitable Trust, 172 Mich App 298, 312; 431 NW2d 492
(1988). Thus, trustees have a statutorily imposed duty to provide trust beneficiaries with an
annual statement of account, MCL 700.7303(3)(b)(i), which reports, at a minimum, the trust
assets, their market values where feasible, the trust liabilities, receipts and disbursements, and the
source and amount of the trustee’s compensation. MCL 700.7303(3)(d). Accordingly, Bank
One was required to provide Evans, and the other Trust beneficiaries, with an annual report
identifying the Trust assets, the value of those assets, the Trust’s liabilities, receipts and
(…continued)
loans addressed in the previous actions] exist through a subsidiary of Bank One, . . .have any
influence on the objectivity of Mr. Meretta, . . . and what he does.” However, counsel did not
point to conduct by Meretta that was deficient, other than, perhaps, regarding the Nanosteel
transaction. Counsel also expressed concern that Bank One had not “undertaken its
responsibility as trustee . . . to review the [Ervin Industries’] investments for the benefit of the
beneficiaries [of the trust],” to consider that the market for metal abrasives was shrinking, and to
“diversify the investment.” However, again, counsel did not point to any specific conduct by
Bank One to which Evans objected, other than that relating to Ervin Industries’ acquisition of
Nanosteel. And, as discussed further, infra, Bank One has no duty to diversify the trust’s
holdings unless and until Ervin Industries’ stock becomes “unproductive of income.”
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disbursements, and the source and amount of Bank One’s compensation as trustee. Id. It is
undisputed that Bank One’s 18th Accounts listed the assets owned by the Trust, assigned a
market value to those assets, described the Trust’s liabilities, receipts and disbursements and
stated the source and amount of Bank One’s compensation as trustee. Evans asserts, though, that
the 18th Accounts are deficient because Bank One failed to report that Ervin Industries’ invested
in Nanosteel during the accounting period. Of fundamental importance, however, the Nanosteel
investment was not made by the Trust, but by Ervin Industries. Nothing in MCL 700.7303
requires that Bank One report on the assets, transactions, liabilities, receipts, disbursements, etc.,
of an asset of the Trust. Nor does Evans provide this Court with any authority requiring that
Bank One do so. Indeed, in In re Butterfield, 108 Mich App 363, 368-369; 310 NW2d 381
(1981), rev’d on other grounds, 418 Mich 241 (1983) (In re Butterfield I), this Court upheld a
trial court’s determination that a trustee’s account was sufficient although it did not include the
transactions of two corporations majority-owned by the holding company that was the trust’s
prime asset, where – as here – the beneficiaries received the annual financial statements of the
company.
In re Butterfield involved a trust, the corpus of which consisted solely of all of the stock
of Bijou Theatrical Enterprise Company, a holding company, which itself was the majority
owner of W.S. Butterfield Theatres, Inc. and of Butterfield Michigan Theaters Company. In re
Butterfield I, supra at 365. One of the trust beneficiaries objected to the trustee’s 37th account,
complaining primarily about the amount of earnings retained by the two Butterfield companies
and the trustee’s failure to include information about the Butterfield companies in its account.
Id. at 367-368. This Court concluded that the probate court had the authority to require the
trustees to justify the retention of any amount of earnings in excess of 25% of the net income of
the Butterfield companies, and agreed with the trial court that, as the beneficiaries received
financial statements of the Butterfield companies at least annually, and as the “theatrical business
is a highly competitive business . . . a more detailed accounting on the public record should not
be required.” Id. at 368-370.
On appeal, our Supreme Court reversed this Court’s determination regarding the probate
court’s authority to require justification for retained earnings; it did not address the contention
that the trustee was required to report on transactions of the Butterfield companies in its trust
accounting. In re Butterfield II, supra 257-258. Evans correctly points out that in its decision in
Butterfield, our Supreme Court noted that:
In those situations where a corporation is wholly owned by the trust and
directly holds and controls all of the corporation’s assets, courts are less reluctant
to ignore the corporate entity and to consider the corporation, which is usually a
holding company, an adjunct of the trust.
However, the Court also explained that “each case must be evaluated on its own facts with due
consideration given to the settlor’s intent . . .” Id. Here, unlike in In re Butterfield, Ervin
Industries is a separate corporation; it is not wholly owned by the Trust.4 And, Ervin Industries
4
While the Trust owns all of the voting shares of Ervin Industries’ stock, it owns only about 8%
(continued…)
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is not merely a holding company, but rather is a fully operational manufacturing company. Thus,
we find no basis to ignore the corporate form so as to treat Ervin Industries merely as an adjunct
of the Trust in this case. Further, here, as in In re Butterfield, Evans receives Ervin Industries’
audited financial statements, apprising her of the activities, transactions, and circumstances of
the company. Indeed, it is from Ervin Industries’ financial statements that Evans learned of the
Nanosteel transaction. Therefore, both this Court’s opinion and our Supreme Court’s opinion in
the In re Butterfield case instruct that Bank One had no duty to report on Ervin Industries’
acquisition of Nanosteel in its statement of account for the Trust.
Evans also asserts that Bank One acted imprudently with regard to Ervin Industries’
acquisition of Nanosteel. That is, Evans claims that the Nanosteel investment violates the
prudent investor rule, because that investment did not generate a favorable return. Evans also
argues that Bank One has imprudently failed to diversify the trust. However, even were Ervin
Industries to be treated merely as an adjunct of the Trust, such that Bank One would be
answerable for Ervin Industries’ business activities, including its acquisition of Nanosteel, the
documents creating the Trust exempt the trustee from the reach of the prudent investor rule.
MCL 700.7302 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, the trustee shall act as
would a prudent person in dealing with the property of another, including
following the standards of the Michigan prudent investor rule. If the trustee has
special skills or is named trustee on the basis of representation of special skills or
expertise, the trustee is under a duty to use those skills. [Emphasis added.]
The document creating the Trust specifically allows the trustee “to invest and reinvest . . . in
income-producing assets in accordance with [its] judgment, not being limited by any present or
future investment laws . . . .” In other words, as allowed by the statute, the document creating the
Trust makes the statute’s prudent investor rule inapplicable to any evaluation of Bank One’s
management of the Trust assets.5
We observe further that the document creating the Trust specifically permits the trustee to
retain Ervin Industries’ stock “without liability for any loss that may be incurred thereby, and
without regard to the proportion that [it] may bear to the whole” Trust unless and until “any
substantial amount of [it] shall be or become unproductive of income,” at which point the trustee
“shall within a reasonable time either convert such property to income-producing property, or
compensate the income beneficiary or beneficiaries out of the [T]rust corpus” Certainly, the
Ervin Industries’ stock held by the Trust is not currently “unproductive of income” and Evans
does not assert otherwise. Therefore, Bank One has had no duty to diversify the Trust’s holdings
at any time, and there is no basis for Evans to complain that Bank One has failed to do so.
(…continued)
of all outstanding shares.
5
Consequently, there is no basis for Evans’ argument on appeal that the probate court incorrectly
applied the prudent investor rule by concluding that Evans could not challenge Ervin Industries’
acquisition of Nanosteel because of Ervin Industries’ overall positive return to the Trust.
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We conclude that there is no legal basis for Evans’ claims that Bank One has a duty to
diversify Ervin Industries, by controlling the business activities of, investments made by, and
transactions entered into, by the company, or to diversify the Trust, or that Bank One has a duty
to report Ervin Industries’ activities in its statement of accounts for the Trust. Bank One’s duty
is to manage the Trust’s holdings, including the Ervin Industries’ stock, in accordance with the
document creating the Trust and applicable law. In re Butterfield II, supra at 259. Evans’
objections do not establish that Bank One has acted otherwise. Therefore, the probate court did
not err in dismissing Evans’ objections to Bank One’s 18th Accounts of the Trust.
Finally, both Evans and Bank One take issue with the probate court’s award of attorney
fees and costs to Bank One. We agree with Bank One that it was entitled to reasonable attorney
fees and costs. We also agree with Bank One that the probate court properly ordered that the
awarded fees be paid from the income of Evans’ individual testamentary trust. However, we
agree with Evans that the probate court improperly determined that the attorney fee award should
also be paid from the income of Evans’ revocable trust.
This Court reviews the probate court’s decision to award attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. Stoudemire v Stoudemire, 248 Mich App 325, 344; 639 NW2d 274 (2001); In re
Estate of L’esperance, 131 Mich App 496, 501; 346 NW2d 578 (1984). The factual findings of
the probate court supporting its decision are reviewed for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); Gumma v
D&T Construction Co, 235 Mich App 210, 221; 597 NW2d 207 (1999).
Pursuant to MCL 700.7401(1), a “trustee has the power to perform in a reasonable and
prudent manner every act that a reasonable and prudent person would perform incident to the
collection, preservation, management, use, and distribution of the trust property to accomplish
the desired result of administering the trust legally and in the trust beneficiaries' best interest.”
This includes the authority to retain and reasonably compensate an attorney “to perform
necessary legal services or to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of the trustee’s
administrative duties.” MCL 700.7401(2)(w). See also, In re Estate of Hammond, 215 Mich
App 379, 387; 547 NW2d 36 (1996) (“Attorney fees incurred by an executor to defend against a
petition for his removal are properly chargeable against the estate where no wrongdoing is
proven”); In re Gerber Trust, 117 Mich App 1, 15-16; 323 NW2d 567 (1982), In re Eddy Estate,
354 Mich 334, 351-352; 92 NW2d 458 (1958).6 Therefore, Bank One was entitled to hire
6
Evans asserts that this Court’s conclusion in In re Gerber that the attorney fees incurred by a
trustee that fully prevails in an action brought by a beneficiary are allowable as charges against
the trust was based on MCL700.541, which has since been repealed, and therefore it is of no
import to the instant case. However, Evans ignores that MCL 700.7401 specifically allows a
trustee to employ and reasonably compensate an attorney, as well as this Court’s decision in In
re Estate of Hammond, supra at 387 that “[a]ttorney fees incurred by an executor to defend
against a petition for his removal are properly chargeable against the estate where no wrongdoing
is proven.” Therefore, the assertion that there is no basis in law to award Bank One its fees is
without merit. Further, Evans cites In re Baldwin’s Estate, 311 Mich 288, 314; 18 NW 827
(1945), for the proposition that expenses incurred by a trustee for its own benefit or in its own
defense ordinarily are not chargeable to the trust. However, as noted by this Court in In re
Gerber, supra at 15, such a reading selectively ignores the Baldwin Court’s comment that a
(continued…)
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counsel to defend against, and to reasonably compensate its attorneys for fees necessitated by,
Evans’ prior lawsuits against it. Consequently, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Bank One attorney fees and costs incurred in defending those actions.
This Court has explained that generally, a court should hold an evidentiary hearing when
one party is challenging the reasonableness of the attorney fees claimed, unless a sufficient
record has been created to allow the court to review the issue. Head v Phillips Camper Sales &
Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 113; 593 NW2d 595 (1999). In support of its request for
approximately $562,000 in attorney fees and costs incurred in defending Evans’ prior actions in
probate and federal court, Bank One submitted materials setting forth the work undertaken in
both the probate court and federal litigations, the total hours spent performing that work, the
hourly rates of those performing the work, and the total amount billed to Bank One for that work.
Bank One also provided affidavits establishing that the hourly rates charged were consistent with
market rates and opining that the fees and costs charged were reasonable given the professional
standing of Bank One’s counsel, the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged, the complexity
of the litigation and the results achieved.
When determining the reasonableness of the requested fees, a court should consider:
‘“(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor
involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5)
the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.’” Michigan Tax Management Services Co v City of Warren, 437 Mich 506, 509-510; 473
NW2d 263 (1991), quoting Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737; 211 NW2d 217 (1973). A
trial court “is not limited to those factors in making its determination,” however, and “need not
detail its findings as to each specific factor considered.” Id. See also, John J Fannon Co v
Fannon Products, 269 Mich App 162, 172; 712 NW2d 731 (2006) (“[A] trial court is not
required to give detailed findings regarding each factor.”). And, “[t]he award will be upheld
unless it appears upon appellate review that the trial court’s finding on the ‘reasonableness’ issue
was an abuse of discretion.” Michigan Tax Management, supra at 510.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that, contrary to Evans’ assertions, the
probate court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Bank One $375,000 in attorney fees and
costs, considering both the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by Evans during the
course of, and the repetitive nature of the issues raised in, the successive actions. However, we
also conclude that the trial court did not adequately explain its decision to reduce the attorney
fees and costs requested by Bank One to that amount. Upon remand, the trial court should
review the documentation in support of that request, hold a hearing if necessary, reconsider its
award in this regard and articulate the reasons for its award.
Additionally, because the document creating the Trust specifically provides Bank One
with the authority to allocate expenses to Trust income, as opposed to Trust principal, where
Bank One believes that it is equitable to do so, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the award of the fees and costs to be paid from the income of the Trust, rather than the
principal. Further, this Court has upheld the assessment of attorney fees solely against the
(…continued)
different conclusion might be appropriate where, as here, the trustee fully prevails.
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beneficiary or beneficiaries that pursued the litigation, where to do otherwise would be “grossly
unjust or inequitable.” In re Estate of Hammond, supra at 387-388. It was Evans and Evans
alone that persisted, over the objection of her siblings, in litigating and relitigating the propriety
of Bank One’s conduct as trustee. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate to order that the
fee award be paid from the income of Evans’ individual testamentary trust. To force Evans’
siblings to also pay these fees would have been inequitable and unjust under the circumstances
presented. However, we conclude that the probate court overreached by also ordering that
payment be made from the income of Evans’ revocable trust. That trust was not a party to the
probate court action and was not subject to its jurisdiction.
We reverse the probate court’s decision that attorney fees be paid from the income of
Evans’ revocable trust. We remand for entry of an order requiring that they be paid from the
income of Evans’ individual testamentary trust and for further review and fact finding on
whether Bank One’s requested attorney fees and costs should be reduced. In all other respects,
we affirm. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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