PEOPLE OF MI V AARON FLETCHER LEAPHEART
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 276694
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-100086
AARON FLETCHER LEAPHEART,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Jansen and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted a circuit court order affirming a district court order that
dismissed this case based on illegal seizure grounds. Because the district court’s rationale for
suppressing the evidence at issue was flawed, we remand this case to the district court for
appropriate reconsideration of the suppression decision. We decide this case without oral
argument under MCR 7.214(E).
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Defendant Aaron Fletcher Leapheart was charged with carrying a concealed weapon,1
being a felon in possession of a firearm,2 and possessing a firearm during commission of a
felony.3 Detroit Police Officer Robert Skender was the sole witness at Leapheart’s preliminary
examination, which also amounted to a hearing on his motion to suppress evidence as the result
of an illegal seizure. Officer Skender testified that on October 5, 2006, at about 11:15 p.m., he
saw Leapheart standing by a truck in the street; as the officer approached, Leapheart started
walking away. Officer Skender said that as Leapheart was walking away, “he was attempting to
walk to the back between the two houses, and we[4] stopped him due to him being in the street.”
Officer Skender expressed a belief that “it is a violation of Michigan law to stand in the street to
1
MCL 750.227.
2
MCL 750.224f.
3
MCL 750.227b.
4
Officer Skender was working with three partners when he encountered Leapheart.
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engage in conversation where sidewalks are provided” and that this conduct also violated a city
ordinance. Officer Skender also said that there was a prohibition against impeding vehicular
traffic that would apply to the situation.
Officer Skender testified as follows about his initial interaction with Leapheart:
As we approached, like I said he was walking away attempting to walk between
the houses. My focus was on him since he was on my side of the car. As I called
him not by his name, I just said let me talk to you for a second. He complied with
that, and as he approached me he stated to me that he had a gun in his pocket.
[Emphasis added.]
Apparently based on this statement, the police arrested Leapheart and charges were brought
against him.
In the course of explaining its decision to suppress the critical evidence (and thus dismiss
the charges against Leapheart), the district court stated, “And, I agree with counsel that if indeed
Officer Skender indicated that he was in uniform, that upon being asked to return back to him or
talk to him, that you felt that you were obligated to do so.” The circuit court adopted the district
court’s findings and upheld its decision. The prosecution now appeals.
II. Seizures
A. Standard Of Review
The prosecutor argues that the district court erred in suppressing the evidence because the
initial encounter between Officer Skender and Leapheart, involved only a request for voluntary
action and a voluntary response from Leapheart, and did not constitute a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Leapheart responds that there was no question that he was not free to
leave and that the encounter thus constituted a seizure. We review for clear error a lower court’s
factual findings at a suppression hearing, and we review de novo the trial court’s ultimate ruling
on the motion to suppress.5
B. Applying The Legal Standards
A seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes occurs “only if, in view of all the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”6 Here,
the district court’s rationale for apparently concluding that Officer Skender’s initial contact with
Leapheart constituted a seizure was quite vague. Specifically, as noted above, the district court
stated that “if indeed Officer Skender indicated that he was in uniform, that upon being asked to
return back to him or talk to him, that you felt that you were obligated to do so.” The district
court appears to have concluded that merely because Officer Skender was in uniform and
5
People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005).
6
People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32; 691 NW2d 759 (2005).
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expressed a desire to talk to Leapheart, a reasonable person in Leapheart’s circumstances would
not have felt free to leave. Taken literally, the district court’s remark could be viewed as
improperly determining whether Leapheart subjectively felt obligated to comply with Officer
Skender’s request that Leapheart talk to him, rather than considering whether a reasonable
person in Leapheart’s circumstances would have felt free to leave. However, given that no
testimony was taken from Leapheart, we presume that the district court was not actually
purporting to have determined his subjective belief about whether he was free to leave.
Generally, the mere fact that a uniformed police officer makes a request of a person to
provide information or answer questions does not amount to a seizure of the person. In
particular, the United States Supreme Court has stated that, “In the ordinary course a police
officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment.”7
Accordingly, because in the ordinary course of a patrol a police officer is in uniform, a
uniformed police officer’s mere request to talk to a person does not amount to a seizure. Thus,
we conclude that the district court erred in effectively finding that Officer Skender seized
Leapheart in his initial contact with him merely because the officer was in uniform when he
asked Leapheart to talk with him.
Apart from this, we note that, because of the lack of other critical factual findings by the
district court, it is not clear whether the district court would have found that the initial contact
between Officer Skender and Leapheart constituted a seizure. It is true that Officer Skender said
that the officers “stopped [Leapheart] due to him being in the street.” However, even if Officer
Skender had a subjective intent to restrain Leapheart, that would not be dispositive of whether
Leapheart was actually seized when Officer Skender first made contact with him (that is, when
Officer Skender said that he wanted to talk with Leapheart), unless Officer Skender objectively
expressed that intent.8
Rather, if a reasonable person in Leapheart’s circumstances would have taken Officer
Skender’s initial communication as a mere request to voluntarily talk with him, there would be
no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. But if a reasonable person in such circumstances
would not have felt free to leave, then Leapheart would have been seized within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. This is not a determination we can properly make as an initial matter.
Accordingly, we must remand to the district court to reconsider its suppression decision.
Specifically, the district court must determine whether Officer Skender’s manner of expressing
to Leapheart a desire to talk to him constituted a command that a reasonable person in
Leapheart’s circumstances would have felt compelled to obey (and thus a seizure), or a mere
request that a reasonable person in such circumstances would have felt free to disregard (and so
7
Hiibel v Sixth Judicial Dist Court of Nevada, 542 US 177, 185; 124 S Ct 2451; 159 L Ed 2d
292 (2004).
8
See Michigan v Chesternut, 486 US 567, 575 n 7; 108 S Ct 1975; 100 L Ed 2d 565 (1988) (“Of
course, the subjective intent of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment
implications of police conduct only to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to the person
confronted.”); see also Jenkins, supra at 32 n 6 (“only objective conduct and circumstances are
relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes.”) (emphasis in original).
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not a seizure). In making this determination, the district court should not repeat the error of
considering the mere fact that a request to talk was made by a uniformed police officer as
indicating that a seizure occurred.
In summary, we conclude that the district court’s rationale for granting the suppression
motion was flawed. Therefore, we must remand this case to the district court for reconsideration
of the suppression issue because proper resolution of this issue requires further factual
determinations that initially must be made by the district court.
C. Investigatory Stop
The prosecutor also advances an alternative argument that, even if Leapheart was seized
by the initial encounter with Officer Skender, there was reasonable suspicion to justify this as an
investigatory stop, and that the district court improperly applied a probable cause standard to
evaluate whether an investigatory stop was justified. However, this argument is not properly
brought because it is outside the scope of the prosecutor’s statement of the question presented,
which raised only the issue of whether there was merely a voluntary encounter between Officer
Skender and Leapheart.9 Further, this alternative argument is outside the scope of this Court’s
order granting leave to appeal in this case, which was “limited to the issues raised in the
application” because only the voluntary encounter argument was raised in the prosecutor’s
application for leave to appeal to this Court.
We remand this case to the district court for reconsideration of its decision consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Alton T. Davis
9
People v Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172; 604 NW2d 781 (1999).
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