IN RE BINGHAM MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ADRIAN GUY BINGHAM,
JORDAN LEVI BINGHAM, SVNOYI
ANISGVSDEE CEANDREA JOBE, and ISAYA
DOHSA EDI BIGMEAT, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 277862
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-118926-NA
MELISSA LYNN JOBE,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of ISAYA DOHSA EDI BIGMEAT,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 277863
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-118926-NA
JAMES BIGMEAT II,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of ADRIAN GUY BINGHAM and
JORDAN LEVI BINGHAM, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 278103
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Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-118926-NA
TRACY BINGHAM,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Murphy and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIUM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Melissa Jobe, James Bigmeat II, and Tracy
Bingham appeal as of right from the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the
minor children. The court terminated the parental rights of Jobe, the mother of all four children,
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). The parental rights of respondent
Bigmeat, the father of Isaya, were terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (g), and (j).
Finally, the parental rights of respondent Bingham, the father of Adrian and Jordan, were
terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.1
All three appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that a statutory ground for
termination was established by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
A petitioner must prove a statutory ground for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) by clear
and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Only a single
statutory ground need be established to terminate parental rights. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App
47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). One of the children, Isaya, is an Indian child. To terminate
parental rights to an Indian child, in addition to proving a statutory ground for termination by
clear and convincing evidence, a petitioner is required to present evidence, supported by the
testimony of a qualified expert witness, that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that continued
custody by the parent is likely to cause serious emotional or physical damage to the child. In re
SD, 236 Mich App 240, 246; 599 NW2d 772 (1999); MCR 3.980(D); 25 USC 1912(f).
This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.
MCR 3.977(J). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445
NW2d 161 (1989). Deference must be accorded to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses before it. In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 65; 472 NW2d 38 (1991).
Once a statutory ground for termination is established, the court must issue an order
terminating parental rights unless there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that
termination is not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 354. The
court should decide the “best interests” question based on all of the evidence, without regard to
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of Svnoyi’s father, Michael French, but he is not a
party to this appeal.
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which party produced the evidence. Id. at 352-354. The court’s best interests decision is also
reviewed for clear error. Id. at 356-357.
I. Docket No. 277862
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j) were
each established by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Jobe.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the three oldest children because of Jobe’s
heroin addiction and use of marijuana while pregnant with Isaya. The court later assumed
jurisdiction over Isaya after he was born addicted to drugs and suffered from severe symptoms of
withdrawal at birth. Jobe had just begun methadone treatment for her heroin addiction when the
original petition was filed in November 2004. According to Jobe’s counselor, Jobe would not be
able to successfully overcome her heroin addiction until she was no longer using methadone. At
the time of the termination hearing, approximately 2-1/2 years later, Jobe was still using
methadone and her methadone dosage had remained substantially the same throughout the
pendency of the case. Moreover, she was continuing to take methadone despite her more recent
pregnancy, just as she did when she was pregnant with Isaya, and she again failed to obtain
appropriate prenatal care. The court found that Jobe’s unsupported testimony that the results of
her drug tests were altered was not credible. Considering Jobe’s lack of progress in treating her
substance abuse problem, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(c)(i) was
established by clear and convincing evidence.
With regard to § 19b(3)(c)(ii), the trial court referred to Jobe’s continued use of
methadone, but also appeared to rely on Jobe’s failure to understand or accept the children’s
needs, particularly with regard to health matters, throughout this case. Her continued smoking
posed a risk of harm to Isaya and Svnoyi, as well as her unborn child. There were many other
instances in which Jobe ignored recommendations or orders regarding the children’s medical
care, which placed the children at risk of harm. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that termination was warranted under § 19b(3)(c)(ii). Even if the court erred in relying on this
statutory ground, however, the error was harmless because there were other statutory grounds to
support termination of Jobe’s parental rights.
Jobe argues that her compliance with the parent-agency agreement precluded a finding
that § 19b(3)(g) was established. We disagree. Although a parent’s compliance with a parentagency agreement is evidence of her ability to provide proper care and custody, In re JK, 468
Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003), the evidence here showed that Jobe did not successfully
comply with critical aspects of her treatment plan. Jobe completed parenting classes, but failed
to show that she benefited from them. She had housing at the time of the termination hearing,
but had lived there only a short while and was unable to consistently maintain housing
throughout the case. She participated in psychological and psychiatric evaluations and
counseling, but did not successfully complete the recommended counseling. She also failed to
show that she had steady employment and relied on Bigmeat’s father for support. Most
significantly, she failed to resolve her substance abuse problem. The trial court did not clearly
err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence.
Further, Jobe’s failure to show progress in resolving her substance abuse problem also
supports the trial court findings with regard to § 19b(3)(j). Contrary to what Jobe argues, it was
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immaterial that she had never physically harmed her children in the past. Section 19b(3)(j) does
not require physical abuse, but only a likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the
parent’s home. We also disagree with Jobe’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to
consider Dr. Forrer’s psychiatric evaluation. Although Dr. Forrer believed that Jobe was capable
of caring for the children, his assessment was based on information that Jobe provided during the
evaluation. Further, the counselor who worked the longest with Jobe in individual therapy
believed that Jobe required more psychiatric help than she could offer, but Jobe refused to obtain
the recommended psychiatric treatment. A counselor who subsequently worked with Jobe
reached the same conclusion, but Jobe again refused to participate in the recommended
counseling. In light of this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in rejecting Dr. Forrer’s
testimony that Jobe did not pose a risk of harm to the children. The trial court did not clearly err
in finding that § 19b(3)(j) was established by clear and convincing evidence.
Jobe next argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best
interests. We disagree. Contrary to what Jobe argues, the evidence did not show that she had
especially strong bonds with the children. Although there was a bond between Jobe and the two
older boys, it was not so strong that termination of Jobe’s parental rights was clearly not in their
best interests. There was a lesser bond between Jobe and the two younger children because of
their young ages when they were removed. However, Jobe also contributed to this by failing to
bond with the children during visits. Indeed, petitioner allowed Jobe to participate in extended
visits with Isaya so they could develop a bond, but this was unsuccessful. Also, Svnoyi and
Isaya both had medical problems that were not likely to be adequately addressed by Jobe
considering her history of failing to acknowledge the children’s needs.
Because the evidence did not clearly show that termination of Jobe’s parental rights was
not in the children’s best interests, the trial court did not err in terminating her parental rights to
the children.
II. Docket No. 277863
The trial court found that termination of Bigmeat’s parental rights was warranted under
§§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (g), and (j).2
We agree with Bigmeat that termination was not justified under § 19b(3)(a)(ii). Despite
his incarceration for substantial periods of time, the record establishes that he consistently
maintained contact with the caseworker and attempted to work on the parent-agency agreement
while incarcerated. The evidence does not support a finding that he deserted the children for a
period of 91 or more days without seeking custody.
However, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were each
established by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence disclosed that Bigmeat had an even
more serious heroin addiction than Jobe, which led to his repeated bouts of imprisonment for
2
Although Bigmeat asserts that the trial court also terminated his parental rights under §
19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii), our review of the trial court’s decision discloses that the court did not
rely on these two statutory grounds.
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violating his parole. Although Bigmeat was receiving treatment for his drug abuse while in
prison and expected to be released in the near future, it was not reasonably likely that he could
provide a safe and stable home for Isaya, who had special medical needs, especially considering
Bigmeat’s cycle of addiction and imprisonment. Indeed, applying the heightened standard for
Indian children, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Isaya would suffer serious
emotional or physical damage if returned to Bigmeat’s custody. Because of his imprisonment,
Bigmeat made no real progress in addressing the other terms of his parent-agency agreement.
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating his parental rights under
§§ 19b(3)(g) and (j).
Bigmeat also argues that termination of his parental rights was not in Isaya’s best
interests. We disagree. Although Bigmeat argues that he was not responsible for the child’s
drug addiction, it was Bigmeat who introduced Jobe to heroin and facilitated her addiction while
she was pregnant with Isaya. Further, it was his drug addiction and continued imprisonment that
prevented him from being able to physically care for his child. He admitted at the time of the
termination hearing that he was not prepared to care for Isaya because of his need to obtain
treatment for his drug dependency. Considering Isaya’s extensive medical needs, Bigmeat
would not be able to devote the time and attention the child needed anytime soon.
We disagree with Bigmeat that the trial court ignored the child’s Indian heritage by not
considering relative placement. A trial court is not required to place a child with a relative, but
the court may allow relative placement in lieu of terminating parental rights if it is in the child’s
best interests. In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453; 592 NW2d 751 (1999); In re McIntyre, supra
at 52.
The record discloses that Bigmeat’s mother was considered for possible placement, but
her home was determined to be inappropriate. Additionally, the Michigan Indian Child Welfare
Agency attempted to contact Bigmeat’s brother to investigate placement with him, but was never
able to contact him. Bigmeat also contends that Rashonda Bigmeat Walter was also willing to
accept placement of the child. An expert witness on the tribe’s practices in child neglect matters
testified that Walter came forward approximately a month before the termination hearing. Over
objection, she was allowed to testify that Walter was being considered for possible placement of
the child. It appears, however, that Walter was being considered for possible permanent
placement of the child or adoption if Bigmeat’s parental rights were terminated. Bigmeat never
argued that the child should be placed with Walter temporarily until he could care for the child
on his own. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to consider Walter as a possible
placement for the child in lieu of terminating Bigmeat’s parental rights.
In sum, the evidence did not clearly show that termination of Bigmeat’s parental rights
was not in Isaya’s best interests. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating Bigmeat’s
parental rights to Isaya.
III. Docket No. 278103
The trial court found that termination of Bingham’s parental rights was warranted under
§§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(ii), (g), and (j).
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Termination was proper under § 19b(a)(ii) because the evidence showed that Bingham
never participated in services or attempted to come forward to obtain custody of the children at
any point while this matter was pending. Although he contacted at least one caseworker, he
chose not to participate in the matter to request custody because of concern that he would be
arrested on an outstanding warrant for nonpayment of child support. Bingham was present for a
visit with the boys in April 2006, but admitted that he never intended to visit the children that
day and that it was contrary to the trial court’s order. Even then, however, that visit occurred
approximately a year before the termination hearing, and Bingham made no effort to seek
custody during the interim.
We question the trial court’s reliance on § 19b(3)(c)(ii) as a statutory basis for
termination. That subsection requires that the parent be given a reasonable opportunity to rectify
conditions after notice and a hearing. Because Bingham never appeared in this matter and never
received a parent-agency agreement, we believe that termination under § 19b(3)(c)(ii) was
inappropriate. But because other statutory grounds supported termination, any error was
harmless.
Termination of Bingham’s parental rights was also justified under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j).
The trial court found that Bingham had a criminal history that was linked to drug abuse, and that
he had not sufficiently addressed his drug abuse problem to break this pattern of criminal
behavior. The record does not support Bingham’s argument that he was unable to participate in
services because the caseworkers would not work with him and threatened him with his
outstanding warrant. Rather, it was Bingham who decided not to come forward because of the
warrant. Moreover, Bingham failed to participate in services even after he resolved the situation
with the warrant.
Bingham also argues that the trial court erred by failing to distinguish between “legally
admissible evidence” and “relevant and material” evidence when deciding his case. When
termination of parental rights is requested in a supplemental petition and is based on allegations
that were proven at the adjudicative phase, the Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply, except
with respect to privileges, and all relevant and material evidence, including oral and written
reports, may be relied upon by the court. In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 201; 646 NW2d 506
(2002); MCR 3.977(G)(2). Conversely, if termination is sought on the basis of new or changed
circumstances, legally admissible evidence is required. In re CR, supra; MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b).
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over Adrian and Jordan, Bingham’s children, only on
the basis of admissions by Jobe, which did not involve Bingham. Therefore, Bingham is correct
that the trial court could only consider legally admissible evidence in deciding his case.
However, Bingham does not indicate what evidence the trial court considered that was not
legally admissible. Accordingly, we find no error.
Bingham also argues that his attorney was ineffective for not objecting to evidence on the
basis that it was not legally admissible. To prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective,
Bingham must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that the representation so prejudiced him that it deprived him of a fair trial.
In re CR, supra at 198. Because Bingham does not indicate what evidence the trial court
considered that was not legally admissible, there is no basis for concluding that counsel was
ineffective.
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Bingham also argues that termination of his parental rights was not in his children’s best
interests. We disagree.
Initially, the record does not support Bingham’s claim that the trial court improperly
shifted the burden of proof when considering this issue. We find nothing in the trial court’s
decision to indicate that it required Bingham to come forward with evidence to prove that
termination of his parental rights was not in the children’s best interests, contrary to In re Trejo,
supra at 352-353. A trial court’s best interests decision may be based on evidence on the whole
record, even if no evidence is offered regarding the children’s best interests. Id. at 353. Here,
the trial court only commented that there was no evidence from either side to clearly show that
termination of Bingham’s parental rights was not in the children’s best interests.
Although Bingham had a good relationship and bond with his children in the past, he had
little contact with them in preceding two years and admitted that he had not provided for their
support since 2003. He opted not to come forward to plan for the children. Termination of his
parental rights was not contrary to the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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