PEOPLE OF MI V TORRI LAMAN BERRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 270383
Ingham Circuit court
LC No. 05-000833-FC
TORRI LAMAN BERRY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Meter and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his convictions following a jury trial of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.11a(2), and two counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was
sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms of 20 to 40 years for both armed robbery and firstdegree home invasion, consecutive to two concurrent terms of 2 years on each count of felonyfirearm. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
aiding and abetting felony-firearm. We review a sufficiency of evidence claim de novo to
determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
would justify a rational trier of fact in finding that all the elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Lange, 251 Mich App 247, 250; 650 NW2d 691 (2002).
Defendant cites People v Johnson, 411 Mich 50, 54; 303 NW2d 442 (1981) to support his
argument that to prove a defendant guilty of felony-firearm based on accomplice liability, the
prosecutor may not merely show that the defendant encouraged an accomplice to use a gun
during a felony but must show that the defendant aided or abetted the accomplice in obtaining or
retaining the firearm for commission of the felony. However People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 6869; 679 NW2d 41 (2004), expressly overruled Johnson:
Establishing that a defendant has aided and abetted a felony-firearm offense
requires proof that a violation of the felony-firearm statute was committed by the
defendant or some other person, that the defendant performed acts or gave
encouragement that assisted in the commission of the felony-firearm violation,
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and that the defendant intended the commission of the felony-firearm violation or
had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that the
defendant gave aid and encouragement. [Id. at 70-71.]
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding that defendant aided or abetted a violation of the felony-firearm
statute. The jury could have concluded that the gunman committed felony-firearm because
eyewitnesses testified that the gunman threatened the victims with a firearm and ordered the two
of them to open a home safe at gunpoint. Further, defendant himself told the victim who actually
opened the safe that she would be shot if she did not open it. Indeed, he threatened her with a
countdown that implied she was only seconds away from being shot. Thus, defendant committed
acts and gave encouragement that assisted his accomplice in violating the felony-firearm statute.
Indeed, defendant “specifically used his confederate’s possession of that firearm to intimidate
and rob” the victims. Id. at 73. The evidence was also sufficient to establish that defendant at
least knew the gunman intended to commit a felony-firearm violation at the time defendant
assisted him: Even before defendant threatened the woman who opened the safe, the gunman
threatened all the victims with the firearm in defendant’s presence and specifically threatened to
shoot the first victim who tried to open the safe in a voice loud enough to be heard in the room
where defendant was located. Accordingly, defendant’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient to support his felony-firearm conviction is without merit.
Defendant next argues that the photographic lineups shown to unspecified witnesses
should not have been admitted because the process used was unduly suggestive. It is clear from
his argument that he is referencing witnesses Chi Lau, Kamlan Lau, and Ling Chang. Defendant
argues that the process was unduly suggestive because there is no way to know whether the Laus
and Chang were given and understood an admonishment written at the top of the photographic
lineups given their limited understanding of English and because the witnesses may have,
without the knowledge of the police officers present, improperly spoken with each other in
Chinese about the lineups. This argument incorrectly places the burden on the prosecutor to
show that the witnesses were given the proper admonishment and that they did not improperly
share information. However, it is defendant who “must show that the pretrial identification
procedure was so suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial
likelihood of misidentification.” People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302-303; 505 NW2d 528
(1993).
By suggesting in the question presented that one witness (Mrs. Lau) translated to the
victims the written admonishment, defendant suggests that Mrs. Lau translated the
admonishment to all eyewitnesses who identified defendant in court. But Mrs. Lau only
translated the written admonishment to Mr. Lau (and possibly to her mother-in-law, who
apparently did not identify defendant). A police officer actually read the admonishment aloud to
Chang, and there is no indication or argument that Chang did not fully understand spoken or
written English. Indeed, Chang testified before the jury without an interpreter. Further, there is
no evidence that the argument that the witnesses spoke to each other in Chinese implicates
Chang because defendant has not shown that Chang was involved in such a conversation.
Defendant has not established plain error with respect to the admission of the photographic
lineup viewed by Chang. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
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As for Mr. and Mrs. Lau, the record shows that Mrs. Lau spoke some English. Further, a
police officer testified that when she read the admonishment to Mrs. Lau, she appeared to have
no problem understanding it. Mrs. Lau did indicate at trial that she needed an interpreter;
however, this also demonstrated that she has the ability to ask for language help when she
needed to. Additionally, when asked if she “expect[ed] to see the picture of one of the people at
the house” when she looked at the photographic lineup, she responded, “At the police station
they want me to see if these three guys are among those in the pictures.” The use of the
uncertain conjunction “if” shows that she understood that the perpetrator(s) might not be in the
lineup. Also, the fact that she only identified one photograph when she was looking to see “if
these three guys are among those in the pictures” shows that she understood that the lineup may
or may not have the perpetrators displayed. Moreover, the conversation between Mrs. Lau and
her husband occurred after her identification; consequently, it could not have influenced it.
Therefore, defendant fails to establish plain error with respect to the admission of the
photographic lineup viewed by Mrs. Lau.
Mr. Lau testified that he understood some English, and his ability to speak and
understand English is shown by the events of the robbery itself. But there is some evidence to
suggest that Mr. Lau might not have understood the admonishment. Nonetheless, any possible
problems with the translation of the admonishment do not amount to error requiring reversal.
Indeed, Mr. Lau did identify defendant in the photographic lineup, and defendant conceded in
closing argument that he admitted in a videotaped interview played for the jury that he was at the
scene of the robbery. The fact that defendant disputed that he entered the house and took part in
the robbery is an issue of witness credibility related to the events of the crime not on whether
defendant was at the home.
Citing People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78, 91; 252 NW2d 807 (1977), defendant also argues
that the in-court identifications of these three witnesses should have been suppressed because
they were the product of unduly suggestive photographic lineups. This argument was not
presented below. Having failed to establish that the photographic lineups were unduly
suggestive, defendant cannot sustain this argument. In any event, defendant conceded his
presence at the home on the night of the robbery.1
Finally, defendant raises an unpreserved allegation that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct at trial. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly told the jury
how to conduct its deliberations by asking a potential juror if he would be willing to articulate
any doubts he had for his fellow jurors to determine whether his doubt was reasonable.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of police witnesses when he
asked a juror that although there would be allegations that the police did not do their jobs
properly, “[D]o you think it’s appropriate to give our police some benefit for knowing their jobs
1
Defendant also makes much of the fact that defendant purportedly had a large and visible
growth on his ear that none of the witnesses saw. Assuming defendant has such a growth, there
was also eyewitness testimony that defendant had been wearing a hat. The jury was in the best
position to view defendant’s physical appearance and determine whether a hat would have
covered this allegedly distinguishing characteristic.
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the same as you gave the bridge builder?” After the juror responded affirmatively, the
prosecutor posed the question to the entire panel, asking if anyone had “a problem” with such a
presumption. The transcript does not reflect any response from the panel. Prosecutorial
comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the
relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 152;
703 NW2d 230 (2005).
Regarding the first alleged impropriety, it seems clear that the prosecutor was attempting
to articulate a manner in which a doubt about guilt could be evaluated in order to determine
whether it is, as the court itself later instructed, “not merely an imaginary or possible doubt, but a
doubt based on reason and common sense.” Strictly speaking, there is no requirement that in
order for a doubt to be reasonable it must be capable of articulation. But to the extent that this
line of questioning was improper, any possible confusion could have been alleviated by a timely
curative instruction. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
The questioning about police officers being given the benefit of the doubt with respect to
knowing their job is tautological. In any event, to the extent that the questioning hinted that a
police officer’s testimony warrants deference, such an inference was effectively countered by the
court’s instruction that the testimony of police officers “is to be judged by the same standard you
use to evaluate the testimony of any other witness.” “It is well established that jurors are
presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229
(1998).
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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