PEOPLE OF MI V JEROME DEQUAN SHIPP
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276003
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-003356-FC
JEROME DEQUAN SHIPP,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Donofrio and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of assault with intent to
commit murder, MCL 750.83, carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227, discharging
a firearm at a building, MCL 750.234b, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Dawan Gordon became involved in a physical altercation with Jervon Ward. While the
two fought, defendant moved behind Gordon, raised a pistol and fired two shots at Gordon’s
back. The first shot went through Gordon’s coat. However, the bullet from the second shot,
which Gordon testified occurred approximately four seconds later, struck Gordon in the area of
his lower rib cage on the right side of his back. The bullet passed near Gordon’s spine,
permanently paralyzing his legs, and the remainder of the bullet lodged in his abdominal cavity.
Gordon testified that, as he collapsed on a nearby table, he turned to see defendant pointing the
gun at him. Gordon spoke to the defendant, but then “played dead” when defendant continued to
aim the weapon at him. Defendant left the house. While Gordon lay on the floor, Ward stomped
on him, and then left.
Defendant first argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that he
actually intended to kill Gordon, and thus failed to present sufficient evidence of the crime of
assault with intent to commit murder. We disagree.
We review a defendant’s allegations of insufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v
Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. However, we will
not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
-1-
the witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich
1202 (1992). Satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime can be shown by circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757;
597 NW2d 130 (1999). It is for the trier of fact to determine what inferences can fairly be drawn
from the evidence and the weight to be accorded to those inferences. People v Hardiman, 466
Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of
the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
Assault with intent to commit murder is a specific intent crime that requires “(1) an
assault, (2) with an actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.”
People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 147; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). “An assault may be
established by showing either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act that places
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” People v Starks, 473
Mich 227, 234; 701 NW2d 136 (2005). As with all elements of an offense, the intent to kill can
be reasonably inferred from any facts in the evidence, including circumstantial evidence. People
v Warren (After Remand), 200 Mich App 586, 588; 504 NW2d 907 (1993). Moreover, because
of the difficulty of proving a person’s state of mind, even minimal circumstantial evidence is
sufficient. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW 2d 95 (1999).
We conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of defendant’s intent to
kill. Witnesses testified that defendant aimed two shots at the victim’s torso, an area of the body
containing vital organs. This evidence supports the finding of an intent to kill. People v Miller,
91 Mich 639, 644; 52 NW 65 (1892). See also People v Kvam, 160 Mich App 189, 193-194;
408 NW2d 71 (1987). Additionally, the fact that defendant shot at Gordon multiple times at
close range, after aiming between shots, indicates a determined effort by defendant to kill
Gordon. Further supporting this conclusion is Gordon’s testimony that defendant left only after
Gordon pretended to be dead. Had Gordon not survived the assault, defendant would have
committed murder. The prosecution was not required to disprove any other theory, such as
defendant’s claim that he fired at Gordon “in an attempt to stop the fight from escalating
further.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). The prosecution
presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction for assault with intent to commit murder.
Defendant, who was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, argues that
he is entitled to have his habitual offender conviction vacated because the sentence enhancement
was improperly based on a misdemeanor conviction. We disagree.
We review questions of statutory construction de novo. People v Hill, 257 Mich App
126, 144; 667 NW2d 78 (2003).
At sentencing, defendant objected to the use of a prior conviction for attempted resisting
and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), which was in fact a misdemeanor, with a oneyear maximum sentence. See MCL 750.92(3). However, MCL 769.10 provides in relevant part:
(1) If a person has been convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony,
whether the conviction occurred in this state or would have been for a felony or
attempt to commit a felony in this state if obtained in this state, and that person
commits a subsequent felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon
-2-
conviction of the subsequent felony and sentencing under section 13 of this
chapter as follows: [Emphasis added.]
This Court has consistently held that a conviction for an attempt to commit a felony
supports a supplemental information, even if that conviction constitutes a misdemeanor offense.
See People v Slocum, 156 Mich App 198, 200-201; 401 NW2d 271 (1986), People v Davis, 89
Mich App 588, 594, 595-596; 280 NW2d 604 (1979). A plain reading of the statute supports this
analysis. Defendant was convicted of “an attempt to commit a felony” and thus the trial court
did not err when it considered defendant’s prior conviction in calculating defendant’s sentence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.