GEORGE K NTIRI V BETTYE A WRIGHT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE K. NTIRI,
UNPUBLISHED
January 31, 2008
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant,
v
No. 274806
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-511738-CH
BETTYE A. WRIGHT,
Defendant/Cross-DefendantAppellant,
and
OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/CrossPlaintiff/Third-Party PlaintiffAppellee,
and
MID-STATE SURETY CORPORATION and
PATRICIA L. SCULLY,
Third-Party Defendants.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Bettye A. Wright appeals as of right from an amended default judgment
awarding Option One Mortgage Corporation (“Option One”) $35,000 on its cross-claims of
fraud and breach of contract. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff George K. Ntiri1 and Wright owned a condominium as cotenants. They
defaulted on a mortgage loan from Long Beach Mortgage Company (“Long Beach”), and Long
1
Ntiri is not a party to this appeal.
-1-
Beach’s successor instituted foreclosure proceedings. Wright then forged Ntiri’s signature on a
quit claim deed purporting to deed Ntiri’s interest in the property to her. Acting alone, Wright
used the deed to obtain a $155,000 mortgage loan on the condominium from Option One.
Wright used the loan proceeds to pay off the Long Beach mortgage debt and some other
obligations. Option One subsequently foreclosed on the property.
Ntiri brought an action for partition against Wright and Option One, seeking to avoid the
Option One mortgage. Option One filed, among other things, a cross-complaint raising
allegations of fraud and breach of contract against Wright. A default judgment was entered
against Wright, under which it was determined that she had no interest in the condominium.
After a settlement was reached between Ntiri and Option One, pursuant to which Ntiri conveyed
his one-half interest in the condominium to Option One for the sum of $35,000, the trial court
granted Option One’s motion to amend the default judgment against Wright to add damages in
that amount.
Wright’s challenge to the default judgment is not preserved for appellate review because
no motion to set aside the default was brought in the trial court. See MCR 2.603(D)(1).
Moreover, leaving aside Wright’s failure to adequately brief the merits of her arguments
on appeal2—two of which were explicitly abandoned below—each of these arguments concerns
her liability rather than the amount of damages awarded. “It is an established principle . . . that a
default settles the question of liability as to well-pleaded allegations and precludes the defaulting
party from relitigating that issue.” Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 413 Mich
573, 578; 321 NW2d 653 (1982). The entry of a default is the equivalent of an admission by the
defaulting party with respect to the well-pleaded allegations. Kalamazoo Oil Co v Boerman, 242
Mich App 75, 79; 618 NW2d 66 (2000). Since Wright’s challenges went to liability and not the
amount of damages, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $35,000 to Option
One in the amended default judgment without first conducting an evidentiary hearing on
damages.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
2
It is not enough for an appellant to simply announce a position and then leave it up to this Court
to discover and rationalize the basis for the claims, and then search for authority either to sustain
or reject his position. Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d
756 (2002).
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
