PEOPLE OF MI V JIMMIE DELL SHINE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 31, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 274493
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-010360-01
JIMMIE DELL SHINE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this prosecutor’s appeal, the people appeal from the trial court’s order quashing a
search warrant, suppressing evidence, and dismissing the criminal charges against defendant.1
We reverse and remand. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
Following the execution of a search warrant and the seizure of evidence from defendant’s
home, he was charged with possession of less than 50 grams of heroin with intent to deliver,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, possession of less
than 25 grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The warrant was issued after an unsuccessful attempt
at a controlled buy of narcotics from defendant at his home. The affidavit in support of the
warrant indicated, among other things, that: (1) the police department had received numerous
complaints of narcotics being sold from defendant’s home; (2) a police officer, working through
an unnamed but reliable informant, attempted to purchase drugs from defendant; (3) defendant
declined the informant’s request to buy a small amount of heroin, saying “I don’t know you; I
have never sold any thing to you. Come back with somebody I know”; and (4) the police officer
subsequently observed three people arrive and leave the home on separate occasions over a
thirty-minute period, which the officer believed, pursuant to his training and experience, was
consistent with drug trafficking.
1
The prosecutor claimed an appeal by right. But because the claim was filed more than twentyone days after the order appealed from, it was not timely under MCR 7.204(A)(1)(a).
Nevertheless, in the interests of justice and judicial economy, we will treat the case as an
application for delayed leave to appeal, and will decide it as on leave granted.
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At the suppression hearing, the trial court noted that the affidavit did not indicate what
the police were looking for, or what was being packaged or sold, and that surveillance found
only that three people came to the house in the course of a half hour. The court concluded that
the affidavit was deficient and that the warrant should not have been signed, and therefore that
the evidence seized as the result should be suppressed. The court further concluded that the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The court subsequently dismissed
the charges against defendant.
A trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed on appeal
for clear error, but conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich
687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 (2001). “A magistrate’s ‘determination of probable cause should be
paid great deference by reviewing courts.’ ” People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 604; 487 NW2d 698
(1992), quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983). More
particularly, appellate review of a magistrate’s determination whether probable cause exists to
support a search warrant “involves neither de novo review nor application of an abuse of
discretion standard. Rather, the preference for warrants . . . requires the reviewing court to ask
only whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a ‘substantial
basis’ for the finding of probable cause.” Russo, supra at 603.
A search warrant shall not issue unless probable cause exists to justify the search. US
Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; MCL 780.651; People v Gillam, 479 Mich 253, 260; 734
NW2d 585 (2007). “Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists where there is a ‘substantial
basis’ for inferring a ‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417-418; 605 NW2d 667 (2000).
The information provided in the affidavit in this case is simply not sufficient to justify
issuance of a warrant to search a home. The few statements attributed to defendant in rejecting
the attempt at a controlled buy and the observation of three different individuals going briefly to
defendant’s door in a thirty-minute period do not, without more, add up to a reasonable
probability that illegal drugs would be found at the location in question. The affidavit makes no
further mention of suspicious behavior, such as money being exchanged, and gives no indication
of what types of controlled substances might be involved. The trial court thus correctly found
that a reasonably cautious person could not have concluded that there was a substantial basis for
finding probable cause.
Ordinarily, evidence seized under a warrant issued without probable cause is inadmissible
at a criminal trial. People v Hellstrom, 264 Mich App 187, 193; 690 NW2d 293 (2004). The
exclusionary rule is not constitutionally based but rather is a judicially created rule. People v
Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 528-29; 682 NW2d 479 (2004), citing United States v Leon, 468 US
897, 906; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984). The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police misconduct, not to rectify the errors of magistrates. Goldston, supra at 529-531.
The exclusionary rule is subject to various exceptions, including the good-faith exception, which
our Supreme Court formally adopted in Goldston, supra at 532. In doing so, the Goldston Court
made the following comments in approval of Leon:
The [United States Supreme] Court concluded that the exclusionary rule
should be employed on a case-by-case basis and only where exclusion would
further the purpose of deterring police misconduct. The Court emphasized,
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however, that a police officer’s reliance on a magistrate’s probable cause
determination and on the technical sufficiency of a warrant must be objectively
reasonable. Evidence should also be suppressed if the issuing magistrate or judge
is misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant either knew was false or
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.
Further, the Court stated that the good-faith exception does not apply where the
magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role or where an officer relies on a
warrant based on an affidavit “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” [470 Mich at 531,
quoting Leon, supra at 923, quoting Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 610; 95 S Ct
2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).]
In the instant case, there is no suggestion that the magistrate was misled, or abandoned
his or her judicial role. However, as Goldston reiterated, law enforcement officers share in the
responsibility to respect probable cause requirements, such that one executing a warrant that
cannot reasonably, objectively, be understood to be predicated on probable cause is not acting in
good faith. In this case, however, the reliance by the police on the signed warrant was
objectively reasonable. The affidavit spoke to some, if not enough, activity at the address that
comported with drug dealing, and of receiving information from a knowledgeable informant.
Although those indications did not add up to probable cause as constitutionally required, that
deficiency was not so obvious as to render the officers’ belief in its existence, and thus the
validity of the warrant, “entirely unreasonable.”
The trial court order suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against
defendant is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings on the charges. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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