IN RE GAILEN JOEL FOSTER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of GAILEN JOEL FOSTER, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 31, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 271080
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-000038-DL
GAILEN JOEL FOSTER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, a juvenile, appeals as of right from a dispositional order adjudicating him
guilty of domestic violence, third offense, MCL 750.81(4). We affirm. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The offense arises from an altercation involving respondent, then 15 years old, and his
brother Jovon, who was 16 years old at the time. Respondent entered Jovon’s room and asked
him to resume playing a song. Jovon asked respondent to leave. After respondent repeatedly
refused, Jovon grabbed respondent’s arm and tried to pull him out. Respondent pushed and hit
Jovon. Jovon testified that he did not hit back and his 16-year-old cousin Jared Gibbons broke it
up. Respondent testified that he hit Jovon in the chest once and they “tussled” for two or three
minutes. The altercation lasted about ten minutes total.
Gibbons testified that after Jovon tried to pull respondent from the room, respondent
pushed Jovon and they “started swinging.” When they “got into it,” a phone was dropped. 1
Gibbons broke it up and tried to keep them separated. They started looking for the phone, but
were unsuccessful. Jovon again asked respondent to leave, and they “got into it again.” They
stood face-to-face, and respondent asked Jovon to get out of his face. When Jovon did not back
up, respondent pushed him and “they started getting into it again.” While they were “getting into
1
Gibbons believed that Jovon was on the phone. Jovon testified that respondent was on the
phone.
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it the second time,” their sister saw them and summoned their mother. She broke up the fight
and called 911 when they would not calm down. Respondent denied that there were two
altercations and maintained that there was “just one big one.”
The trial court found:
[I]nitially Jovon Foster made the first forceful violent or offensive
touching on Gailen, his brother, and there was a mutual fray that ensued after that.
However, the Court is persuaded by the testimony of Jared Gibbs [sic, Gibbons]
that there was a time when the mutual fray, so to speak, had ceased; and Gailen
Foster was standing face-to-face in front of Jovon Foster, and neither of them
were touching at that time, Gailen asked Jovon to get out of his face, Jovon asked
Gailen to get out of his room. And then Gailen is the one who then pushed Jovon,
starting a second fray. And that is what the Court finds to be the assault in this
case.
Respondent argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because the
evidence showed that he and his brother engaged in a mutual fight.
This Court reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at a bench trial.
People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 738; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). The evidence is viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the trial court could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Domestic violence is a specific intent crime that is proved by establishing that the
accused and the victim were related to each other in a manner described by MCL 750.81(2) and
that the accused either intended to batter the victim or the accused’s unlawful act placed the
victim in reasonable apprehension of being battered. People v Corbiere, 220 Mich App 260,
266; 559 NW2d 666 (1996). “The theory of ‘mutual fight’ may be asserted not for purposes of
showing a justification or an excuse for what would otherwise be an assault, but rather to
characterize the affray for purposes of negating a specific intent such as the intent to do great
bodily harm.” People v Sherman, 14 Mich App 720, 722; 166 NW2d 22 (1968).
Although respondent disputes the trial court’s determination that the altercation included
a second “fray” started by respondent, the court’s findings are consistent with Gibbons’s
testimony. The theory of mutual fight is directed at negating specific intent, but offers no basis
for relief on appeal, inasmuch as the question of respondent’s intent was a matter for the trier of
fact to resolve. People v Osantowski, 274 Mich App 593, 613; 736 NW2d 289 (2007), lv
pending. Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to
support the trial court’s determination that the initial “mutual fray” had ceased and that
respondent initiated the “second fray.”
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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