LINDA D JOHNSON V GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA D. JOHNSON,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 275909
WCAC
LC No. 05-000228
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Donofrio and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, General Motors Corporation, appeals by leave granted a January 22, 2007,
order of the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (“WCAC”) affirming a magistrate’s
denial of defendant’s petition to stop the payment of worker’s compensation benefits to plaintiff,
Linda D. Johnson. Because this case must be resolved within the confines of MCL 418.301(5),
we vacate the WCAC’s order and remand this matter for further proceedings including but not
limited to a determination of plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits under MCL 418.301(5) and any
necessary findings of fact. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
In 1994, plaintiff was found to suffer from a disabling knee condition attributable to her
employment with defendant. Plaintiff was granted an open award of benefits by the worker’s
compensation bureau. However, plaintiff returned to work, albeit subject to physician-imposed
restrictions. In October 2002, plaintiff filed a new petition for benefits at a different rate, based
on an injury suffered while performing reasonable employment.1
While plaintiff’s new petition was pending, defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment.
The termination was based on an October 2004, confrontation involving plaintiff and defendant’s
1
“Reasonable Employment” is “work that is within the employee’s capacity to perform that
poses no clear and proximate threat to that employee’s health and safety, and that is within a
reasonable distance from that employee’s residence. The employee’s capacity to perform shall
not be limited to jobs in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training.” MCL
418.301(9).
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representative, and occurred after a hearing in the worker’s compensation bureau. Defendant
contended that plaintiff “attacked” the representative. Consequently, in December 2004,
defendant filed a petition to stop the payment of benefits to plaintiff pursuant to the prior award.
Defendant argued that, by her actions, plaintiff effectively refused reasonable employment and
removed herself from the workforce, and that because plaintiff lost her job through her own
fault, she was no longer entitled to benefits.
The magistrate denied plaintiff’s petition for benefits based on a new injury, and then
denied defendant’s petition to stop the payment of benefits under the terms of the 1994 open
award. In regard to the petition to stop, the magistrate stated that it was not clear that plaintiff’s
termination was her own fault since the issue was still being pursued through the grievance
process, and that plaintiff’s filing of the grievance established that she did not wish to voluntarily
remove herself from the workforce.
Defendant appealed to the WCAC. The WCAC affirmed, finding that defendant failed to
offer any authority for stopping the payment of benefits under the facts of this case.
At issue here is the interpretation and application of MCL 418.301, which provides in
part:
(4) As used in this chapter, "disability" means a limitation of an
employee's wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and
training resulting from a personal injury or work related disease. The
establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss.
(5) If disability is established pursuant to subsection (4), entitlement to
weekly wage loss benefits shall be determined pursuant to this section and as
follows:
(a) If an employee receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment
from the previous employer, another employer, or through the Michigan
employment security commission and the employee refuses that employment
without good and reasonable cause, the employee shall be considered to have
voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force and is no longer
entitled to any wage loss benefits under this act during the period of such refusal.
***
(d) If the employee, after having been employed pursuant to this
subsection for 100 weeks or more loses his or her job through no fault of the
employee, the employee shall receive compensation under this act pursuant to the
following:
(i) If after exhaustion of unemployment benefit eligibility of an employee,
a worker's compensation magistrate or hearing referee, as applicable, determines
for any employee covered under this subdivision, that the employments since the
time of injury have not established a new wage earning capacity, the employee
shall receive compensation based upon his or her wage at the original date of
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injury. There is a presumption of wage earning capacity established for
employments totalling 250 weeks or more.
(ii) The employee must still be disabled as determined pursuant to
subsection (4). If the employee is still disabled, he or she shall be entitled to wage
loss benefits based on the difference between the normal and customary wages
paid to those persons performing the same or similar employment, as determined
at the time of termination of the employment of the employee, and the wages paid
at the time of the injury.
(iii) If the employee becomes reemployed and the employee is still
disabled, he or she shall then receive wage loss benefits as provided in
subdivision (b).
(e) If the employee, after having been employed pursuant to this
subsection for less than 100 weeks loses his or her job for whatever reason, the
employee shall receive compensation based upon his or her wage at the original
date of injury.
Defendant essentially argues that the WCAC erred in failing to find that subsection (5)(d) is
applicable to this case and renders plaintiff ineligible for benefits.
The WCAC found that plaintiff was employed in reasonable employment for more than
100 weeks, and also accepted defendant’s assertion that plaintiff’s employment was terminated
because she attacked her manager. However, the WCAC went on to conclude that because
defendant alleged that plaintiff lost her job through some fault of her own, and because
subsection (5)(d) pertains only to situations where the employee loses his or her job through “no
fault” of their own, that subsection was inapplicable here. In fact, the WCAC opined that no
provision of subsection (5) applied, stating:
The subtle undercurrent of defendant’s argument is that once an employee
returns to work at reasonable employment, all rights and responsibilities of the
parties both during the performance of reasonable employment, and thereafter,
can be found within the confines of MCL 418.301(5). We disagree. MCL
418.301(5) is an elaborate statutory scheme filled with phrases that set forth
criteria to be utilized in cases involving reasonable employment, which means
that it is necessary to fit the facts of any given case into MCL 418.301(5) to see if
it informs the result. If the criteria of any provision in MCL 418.301(5) is met,
the result is supplied by MCL 418.301(5). However, if the provisions of MCL
418.301(5) do not apply because it is not shown that plaintiff fits within the
criteria of any of the subsections, the result is nonetheless supplied by the Act, but
not by anything that is stated in MCL 418.301(5). [Johnson v General Motors
Corporation, 2007 Mich ACO 9, pp 11-12.]
We disagree with the WCAC’s analysis. In Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 Mich 602, 610;
608 NW2d 45 (2000), our Supreme Court held that the language of MCL 418.301 is clear, and
that if a disability is established pursuant to subsection (4), then entitlement to weekly wage loss
benefits “shall” be determined pursuant to subsection (5). In other words, the statute is
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comprehensive, and only the statute may be examined to determine entitlement to benefits. Id. at
610-611. Therefore, the WCAC’s decision, which advocates an interpretation of MCL 418.301
requiring looking outside the statute to determine plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits, is improper.
Perez, supra. Defendant is correct that this matter must be resolved solely within the confines of
MCL 418.301(5).
The WCAC’s order is vacated, and this case is remanded to the WCAC for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The WCAC shall, among other things, determine
plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits and in particular determine whether a termination of
employment, through the fault of the employee here, results in the permanent forfeiture of
benefits pursuant to MCL 418.301(5)(d). If necessary, the WCAC may remand this case to the
magistrate for further fact finding. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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