IN RE SHAMEEK MARQUIS WELLS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHAMEEK MARQUIS WELLS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 278182
Isabella Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-000156-NA
CLARISSA L. HARRIS, a/k/a CLARISSA
LOUISE FERGUSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
PARIS LEE WELLS,
Respondent.
In the Matter of SHAMEEK MARQUIS WELLS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 278430
Isabella Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-000156-NA
PARIS LEE WELLS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CLARISSA L. HARRIS, a/k/a CLARISSA
LOUISE FERGUSON,
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Respondent.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murphy and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right the order of the trial court
terminating their parental rights to the minor child. Respondent mother’s parental rights were
terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Respondent father’s parental rights
were terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(h), (j), and (k). We affirm.
Respondent mother challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental
rights is warranted under statutory subsection (3)(c)(i), contending the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to demonstrate that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist
and that there was no reasonable likelihood that they would be rectified within a reasonable time
given the age of the child. We disagree. The minor child has many special needs as a result of
shaken baby syndrome suffered at the hands of his father. These include hydrocephalus (water
on the brain), developmental delays in cognition, speech, and vision, and a mild form of cerebral
palsy. He requires a special diet, and his physical delays cause him to fall more than other
toddlers, thus his caregiver has to be more aware of safety concerns than a typical parent.
Respondent mother’s therapist testified that respondent was unable to meet the child’s physical
needs, particularly regarding safety. The record indicates that, although respondent mother
complied with some aspects of the case service plan, she ultimately stopped seeing her individual
counselor. Several experts testified that respondent mother’s detrimental behavior patterns could
only be addressed through consistent individual counseling. Further, the trial court found that
respondent-mother had attempted to mislead the court regarding her relationship with Michael
Jackson who, contrary to respondent’s testimony, lived with her on and off from January to April
2007, moved in with her in April 2007, and was later incarcerated for third degree criminal
sexual conduct and first-degree home invasion. Thus, there was evidence that respondent mother
continued to involve herself with dangerous persons. We conclude that there was clear and
convincing evidence that respondent mother failed to demonstrate that her lifestyle choices had
been rectified or that they would be rectified within the foreseeable future.
We also reject respondents’ contention that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner
had made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent mother with the child given petitioner’s
failure to provide a particular service. We disagree. When a child is removed from a parent’s
custody, the agency charged with the care of a child is required to report to the trial court the
efforts made to rectify the conditions that led to the removal of the child. MCR 3.973(E)(2); In
re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). Before the trial court enters an order
of disposition, it is required to state whether reasonable efforts have been made to prevent the
child’s removal from the home or to rectify the conditions that caused the child to be removed
from the home. MCL 712A.18f. In this case, there has been no demonstration that respondent
mother was entitled to the service in question, or that the service, if provided, would have
enabled her to progress where she failed to benefit from the other numerous services provided.
Fried, supra. Because one statutory ground was established by clear and convincing evidence,
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we need not address respondent mother’s challenge regarding another statutory ground. In re
Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting petitioner’s motion to
reopen the proofs. There has been no showing, either below or on appeal to this Court, that the
reopening of proofs to admit the newly discovered material evidence resulted in prejudice or
surprise to respondents or in undue advantage to petitioner. See People v Solomon, 220 Mich
App 527, 532; 560 NW2d 651 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Helene N. White
-3-
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