PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL BAKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 17, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 274718
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-007618-01
MICHAEL BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Zahra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury of armed robbery, MCL
750.529. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL
769.12, to 35 to 60 years in prison. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted, under MRE
404(b), other-acts evidence of a robbery of Julia Williams. (The present case involved the
robbery of Jahnille Allen). We disagree. This Court reviews the admissibility of other-acts
evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 609; 709 NW2d 595
(2005). A court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome that lies outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Orr, 275 Mich App 587, 588-589; 739 NW2d 385
(2007).
Generally, “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an individual is inadmissible to
prove a propensity to commit such acts.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d
785 (1998); MRE 404(b). Such evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes under
MRE 404(b)(1s), which states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
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Generally, to be admissible under MRE 404(b)(1), other-acts evidence must (1) be
offered for a proper purpose; (2) be relevant under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b);
and (3) have probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), mod 445 Mich
1205 (1994). Additionally, the trial court, upon request, shall provide a limiting instruction. Id.,
p 75. However, where the other-acts evidence is offered to show identity through modus
operandi, as is the case here, the four-part test of People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 309; 319
NW2d 518 (1982), applies. VanderVliet, supra, p 66; People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 186; 585
NW2d 357 (1998). The Golochowicz test requires that:
(1) there is substantial evidence that the defendant committed the similar act (2)
there is some special quality of the act that tends to prove the defendant’s identity
(3) the evidence is material to the defendant’s guilt, and (4) the probative value of
the evidence sought to be introduced is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. [Ho, supra, p 186.]
Evidence of the robbery of Williams satisfies the Golochowicz test of admissibility.
First, substantial evidence that defendant committed that robbery existed because Williams
identified him and he was pursued and arrested near the scene of the robbery. Second, special
qualities of the robberies existed to prove defendant’s identity in the present case. The robberies
both occurred outside, within close proximity. They were also committed within two days of
each other. Both victims were female. Their robber wore a camouflage jacket and dark pants
and shoes, and he did not obscure his face. His demands for money were similar: “Look, B----,
give me what you got and hurry up” and “B----, give me all you got.” The robber implied he had
a gun, but did not show it or discharge it. Although the robber succeeded in kidnapping
Williams only, he wanted both victims to go with him afterward.
Third, evidence of the robbery of Williams was material to defendant’s guilt. To be
relevant, evidence must make a fact at issue more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. MRE 401. Defendant’s identity as the robber was particularly at issue because
defendant argued that he was not the robber and that Allen’s identification of him in the lineup
was mistaken. Evidence that defendant robbed another woman under similar circumstances,
therefore, made defendant’s identity as Allen’s robber more probable.
Fourth, the probative value of the testimony was not outweighed by its potential for
unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudice exists when there is a tendency that the evidence will be given
undue or preemptive weight by the trier of fact. People v McGuffey, 251 Mich App 155, 163;
649 NW2d 801 (2002). The record does not establish a tendency that the other–acts evidence
would be given preemptive or undue weight by the jury. Moreover, the trial court and the
prosecutor informed the jury that evidence of the Williams robbery should only be used as
evidence of identity in Allen’s robbery. The trial court also instructed the jury that evidence of
the Williams robbery should not be used to decide that defendant is a bad person or that he is
likely to commit crimes. We hold that the evidence cannot be characterized as unfair under
McGuffey. Furthermore, the determination of whether the probative value of evidence is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect is “best left to a contemporaneous assessment
of the presentation, credibility, and effect of testimony . . . .” People v Magyar, 250 Mich App
408, 416; 648 NW2d 215 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We conclude
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that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the robbery of
Williams.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor failed to present legally sufficient evidence that
defendant was armed to support his armed robbery conviction. We disagree. This Court reviews
sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d
322 (2002). This Court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597
NW2d 73 (1999).
The elements of armed robbery are: “(1) an assault, (2) a felonious taking of property
from the victim's presence or person, (3) while the defendant is armed with a weapon described
in the statute.” People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 458; 687 NW2d 119 (2004) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The existence of some object, whether actually seen or obscured by clothing or
something such as a paper bag, is objective evidence that a defendant possesses a
dangerous weapon or an article used or fashioned to look like one. Related
threats, whether verbal or gesticulatory, further support the existence of a weapon
or article. [People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 469; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).]
Moreover, MCL 750.529 indicates that guilt may be predicated on the defendant’s having
“represent[ed] orally or otherwise that he or she is in possession of a dangerous weapon.”
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for the jury to conclude that the “dangerous weapon”
element of the statute was satisfied. Jolly, supra, pp 470-471.
Allen testified that she feared the way defendant held his right hand inside his jacket and
pointed out at her. She believed he had a weapon. She also believed that she was being robbed
because defendant said, “Look, B----, give me what you got and hurry up.” Taken together,
there was objective evidence that defendant had an object obscured in his jacket that was a
dangerous weapon or fashioned to look like one or that defendant represented orally or otherwise
that he was in possession of a dangerous weapon. There was sufficient evidence for a trier of
fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed as required by the statute.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument and rebuttal included
instances of prosecutorial misconduct that require reversal. We disagree. This Court reviews
prosecutorial misconduct claims under the plain error doctrine when the claims are not properly
preserved by a contemporaneous objection and a request for a curative instruction. People v
Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). To warrant reversal, there must have
been a clear or obvious error that affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair trial.
People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 434; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided case by case, and the reviewing court
must examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s
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remarks in context to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. [Id.]
Generally, prosecutors are afforded great latitude in their closing arguments. People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
The evidence of the robbery of Williams was admitted to prove identity under MRE
404(b), but defendant claims that in her closing argument, the prosecutor improperly argued that
it was admitted as substantive evidence that defendant committed both armed robberies.
Defendant takes the prosecutor’s statement out of context. In her closing argument, the
prosecutor explained the purpose of the other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b), stating:
We heard from Miss Julia Williams. And what is important about Miss Julia
Williams’ case, you are not here to decide whether the defendant is guilty of that
case at all. What you are here to figure out in terms of Miss Williams’ case is
whether that was defendant in the green camouflage jacket that robbed both
women. This is his identity and that is very important . . . .
Taken as a whole, the prosecutor did not misstate the law during her closing argument. Rather,
she clarified that the robbery of Williams was admissible to prove identity in the present case.
Crawford, supra, p 383. Therefore, we hold that this statement was proper.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor improperly bolstered or vouched for her case
during rebuttal when she said, “Ladies and gentleman, I absolutely, one-hundred percent believe
in my case.” A prosecutor is free to argue that the evidence demonstrates that the defendant is
guilty. However, a prosecutor may not improperly vouch for the defendant’s guilt by using the
prestige of her office. People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 398-399; 535 NW2d 496 (1995).
Nevertheless, “the prosecutor’s comments must be considered in light of defense counsel’s
comments. [A]n otherwise improper remark may not rise to an error requiring reversal when the
prosecutor is responding to the defense counsel’s argument.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App
572, 592-593; 629 NW2d 411 (2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Rather than simply indicating that the evidence demonstrated defendant’s guilt, the
prosecutor’s statement arguably placed the prestige of her office behind her case. The statement,
considered alone, may have been improper, but it must be considered in the context of
defendant’s attorney’s accusations during his closing argument. He stated: “If the People
believed in their case and believed everything they had done, it would have been Miss Allen, the
police and everything. But they’re bringing this other piece in because they don’t believe in their
case . . . .” Because the prosecutor’s remark was made in response to defense counsel’s
argument, it did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal.
Next, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly misquoted Allen’s testimony when
she said that defendant told Allen, ‘“B----, give me your money or I’ll kill you, hurry up,’
something to that effect,” rather than, “Look, B----, give me what you got and hurry up.”
However, the prosecutor implied that she did not directly quote Allen when she said, “something
to that effect.” Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the “lawyers’ opening statements
and closing arguments are . . . not evidence.” We believe that this instruction was sufficient to
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cure any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s brief comment. People v Long, 246 Mich App
582, 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). The prosecutor’s statement did not deny defendant a fair trial.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his
trial attorney failed to object to the instances of alleged misconduct in the prosecutor’s closing
argument and rebuttal. We disagree. Because defendant did not move below for an evidentiary
hearing regarding the ineffective assistance issue, this Court’s review is limited to the facts
contained in the record. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
Whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 484; 684 NW2d 686
(2004). The court must first find the facts and then decide whether those facts constitute a
violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. The trial
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its constitutional determinations are
reviewed de novo. Id., pp 484-485.
Effective assistance is strongly presumed and the reviewing court should not evaluate an
attorney’s decision with the benefit of hindsight. Id., p 485. To demonstrate ineffective
assistance, a defendant must show that: (1) his attorney’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, (2) there is a reasonable probability that this performance affected
the outcome of the proceedings, and (3) the proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable.
Id., pp 485-486; People v Rogers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Counsel is
not required to raise futile objections. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d
818 (2003).
We have concluded above that the instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct either
did not constitute actual misconduct or did not affect the outcome of the proceedings;
accordingly, we find no validity to defendant’s ineffective assistance claim.
Defendant lastly argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
resentencing. Defendant claims that proof of service of the prosecutor’s intent to seek an
enhanced sentence, see MCL 769.12 and MCL 769.13, was not filed and he did not have actual
notice of the prosecutor’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence. We disagree. “[T]he
interpretation and application of statutes is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” People v
Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998). To the extent that the issues being appealed
require this Court to review the trial court’s factual findings, review is for clear error. People v
Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 125; 695 NW2d 342 (2005).
“MCL 769.13(2) . . . provides that the prosecution shall file in the lower court a written
proof of service of its notice of intent to seek an enhanced sentence.” People v Walker, 234
Mich App 299, 314; 593 NW2d 673 (1999). However, where proof of service is absent from the
lower court file, but a defendant had actual notice of intent to enhance, any error is harmless
because the defendant was able to respond to the habitual offender charge. Id., pp 314-315.
The prosecutor included notice of her intent to enhance defendant’s sentence based on his
alleged status as a fourth-offense habitual offender in defendant’s felony information.
Defendant’s attorney acknowledged receipt of the felony information. The record also reflects
that defendant’s charges, including the fourth-offense habitual offender notice, were read to
defendant at his preliminary examination. Therefore, even if proof of service is absent from the
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lower court file, defendant and his attorney had actual notice of the prosecutor’s intent to seek
enhancement from the felony information and preliminary examination. Consequently,
defendant was able to respond to the habitual offender charge. Thus, we conclude that any error
involving a failure to file proof of service was harmless and that the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion for resentencing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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