PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID LEROY MCGORMAN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272423
Mason Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001590-FH
DAVID LEROY MCGORMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Cavanagh and O’Connell, J.J.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC III), MCL 750.520d(1)(a). The trial court sentenced defendant as a third habitual
offender, MCL 769.11, to 7 to 30 years in prison. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
Defendant shared a home with his ex-wife, their two-year-old daughter, and the 14-yearold daughter of his ex-wife, who is the victim in the instant case. The allegations arose from an
incident that occurred while the victim’s mother was working one evening and defendant was
watching the victim and his daughter. The victim claimed that, after defendant’s daughter went
to bed, she and defendant showered together and he touched her “boobs” and attempted to touch
her with his penis. She asserted that defendant pinned her down on his bed after the shower and
removed their towels. The victim claimed that defendant touched her vagina with his penis and
she felt him penetrate her to the extent of about one inch.
Defendant initially denied ever being in the bathroom at the same time as the victim, but
he eventually admitted that he had been in the shower once when she joined him and he may
have accidentally touched her buttocks or breasts. Defendant also admitted that he and the
victim engaged in wrestling after the shower incident and he held her down on the bed.
According to defendant, he was wearing a towel and she was wearing underpants but no shirt.
Defendant admitted to being aroused during this incident and acknowledged that there was a
chance his towel could have come undone, but he denied that he had touched the victim’s vagina.
The victim told her mother about the incident, and they saw an emergency room doctor,
who found no physical trauma. Six days later, the victim was examined by a pediatrician with
special training in child abuse and neglect. This doctor, who was certified as an expert witness at
-1-
trial, found a genital rash or redness but no physical trauma, which resulted in a “nonspecific”
physical examination finding. After combining this finding with the victim’s history and
disclosures, the doctor reported her overall evaluation as “probable abuse.”
II. Expert Witness Testimony
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the expert witness’s testimony that
the victim suffered “probable abuse” because it constituted an inadmissible opinion regarding the
victim’s veracity and defendant’s guilt. We disagree. We review unpreserved issues for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). Even with a showing of prejudice, reversal is necessary only if defendant is actually
innocent or the error damaged the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id.
MRE 702 governs expert testimony and provides that an expert witness may testify if the
trial court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact. However, “[a]n expert may not vouch for the veracity of a victim.” People v Dobek, 274
Mich App 58, 71; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Relying on People v Smith, 425 Mich 98; 387 NW2d
814 (1986), and People v McGillien #2, 392 Mich 278; 220 NW2d 689 (1975), defendant argues
that the challenged testimony constituted improper vouching for the veracity of the victim and
opinion regarding defendant’s guilt. However, Smith does not exclude all expert testimony as an
impermissible opinion on the veracity of the victim. Rather, Smith specifically approved cases
from this Court, i.e., People v Wells, 102 Mich App 558, 562; 302 NW2d 232 (1980), and its
progeny, which permitted expert testimony based on “physical findings, history given by the
victim, [the] victim’s emotional state and [the] doctor’s experience in examining alleged victims
of sexual assault.” Smith, supra at 110-112; see also Wells, supra at 562. The Smith Court held
that, when a physician draws a conclusion from the evidence without the specialized training
required to permit such inferences, that opinion is no longer expert testimony, but “merely an
inadmissible lay witness’ opinion on the believability of the complainant’s story.” Id. at 113.
In the present case, the pediatrician who examined the victim was certified “as an expert
in the field of pediatrics with special expertise in the area of child abuse and neglect[,]” without
objection from defense counsel. She had performed over 1,500 examinations on children where
sexual abuse was alleged, and had been previously certified to testify regarding those topics in 13
Michigan counties. Her undergraduate degree was in psychology, she was board certified in
pediatrics, and she was a member of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, and the Michigan Chapter of the Professional
Society on the Abuse of Children. Thus, the doctor clearly had the expertise to draw conclusions
from the evidence that were lacking in Smith. The doctor based her opinion of “probable abuse”
on a physical examination, functional neurological testing to assess the child’s cognitive level,
and the victim’s comprehensive background history and past medical history, which were
gleaned from interviewing the child and her mother.
Moreover, the lack of physical injury to the victim in the instant case did not
automatically convert the doctor’s testimony into improper vouching. In People v Beckley, 434
Mich 691, 717; 465 NW2d 391 (1990), our Supreme Court found that expert testimony will
assist a jury under certain circumstances because of the misconception “that physical injury will
almost always result from the incident” and that generally “there will be no physical evidence to
corroborate the victim’s allegations.” Thus, it is the very fact that often there is no evidence of
-2-
physical injury that helped persuade the Beckley Court to permit expert testimony. At no time
did the doctor state that she found the victim credible or affirmatively assert that defendant had
abused her. The doctor’s testimony that there was “probable abuse” cannot be read as a specific
statement identifying defendant as the abuser. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish
error, let alone plain error, affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763.
Defendant contends that trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the doctor’s
testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we find no error in the
admission of the testimony, trial counsel’s failure to object cannot constitute ineffective
assistance. People v Wilson, 252 Mich App 390, 393-394, 397; 652 NW2d 488 (2002).
III. Exclusion of Evidence of A Dream
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding a dream
the victim allegedly relayed to defendant’s sister, claiming that this alleged dream is evidence of
bias. The decision whether to admit evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion, People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003), which occurs when the trial
court chooses an outcome that falls outside the permissible principled range of outcomes, People
v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). However, the decision whether to admit
evidence often involves a preliminary question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Katt, supra at
278.
The victim allegedly told defendant’s sister that she had a dream in which she “woke up
one night, went into the kitchen, got a butcher knife, went into the bedroom, and stabbed
[defendant] and killed him.” After describing the dream, the victim said that she wanted
defendant “out of the picture.” When defendant attempted to elicit testimony about this alleged
dream from his sister at trial, the prosecution objected on hearsay grounds. Outside the presence
of the jury, defendant’s sister testified about the content of the dream. The trial court ruled that
testimony about the content of the dream was inadmissible without an expert in dream analysis
and interpretation because the images in dreams are not always an accurate representation of the
dreamer’s thoughts and feelings. The trial court ruled that defendant’s sister would be permitted
to testify that the victim wanted defendant “out of the picture” as long as the testimony was
based on something other than the dream.
Defendant correctly notes that “[a] witness’s bias is always relevant.” People v McGhee,
268 Mich App 600, 637; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). However, the victim’s dream is not necessarily
evidence of a conscious thought or bias on the part of the victim, and the trial court properly
noted that dreams are not always accurate representations of thoughts or feelings. Further,
relevant evidence may be excluded pursuant to MRE 403 “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” Because the probative value of the dream is minimal, and the danger of misleading
the jury without an expert to discuss proper analysis and interpretation of the dream, the trial
court’s decision to exclude evidence of the dream was not outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes. Babcock, supra at 269.
Moreover, exclusion of the evidence did not deprive defendant of his ability to present a
complete defense. The record demonstrates that defendant’s defense was to show that the victim
-3-
was not credible because she was a liar and a thief, and defense counsel vigorously explored the
victim’s truthfulness and instances of theft with several witnesses. We find nothing in the record
indicating that defendant was unable to present a complete defense solely because the trial court
excluded the content of the dream, particularly in light of the fact that defendant’s sister testified
that the victim did not want defendant “in the family.”
IV. Resentencing
Defendant claims that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to
recognize that it had the discretion to impose a maximum sentence of less than 30 years. We
disagree. Because defendant failed to object during sentencing, this issue has not been properly
preserved and may only be reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. Carines, supra
at 763.
In People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 388-389; 624 NW2d 227 (2001), this Court
rejected the defendant’s argument that resentencing was warranted because the sentencing court
had “failed to articulate on the record that it had discretion when imposing the maximum
sentence.” This Court recognized that “there is no legal requirement that a trial court state on the
record that it understands it has discretion and is utilizing that discretion.” Unless there is “clear
evidence that the sentencing court incorrectly believed that it lacked discretion, the presumption
that a trial court knows the law must prevail.” Id. at 389 (citations omitted). In the instant case,
there are no indications that the trial court was unaware of its discretion to impose a sentence
lesser than the statutory maximum. In fact, the trial court indicated it was “mindful” of the
“guideline range,” discussed factors it considered relevant, and considered recommendations
made by the parties. Absent any evidence that the trial court believed it lacked discretion, no
error occurred, and resentencing is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.