TORIBIO FLORES V E C KORNEFFEL CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TORIBIO FLORES, Personal Representative of
the Estate of JOSE A. FLORES-TOSCANO,
Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
o. 250042
N
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 01-013043-NO
E. C. KORNEFFEL COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition in this case alleging an intentional tort. We reverse. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Decedent, defendant’s employee, was assisting in the moving of concrete barriers on a
construction site. The crane boom contacted energized overhead electrical lines, causing
electricity to travel down the metal cables to which the barrier was attached. Decedent was
holding onto a cable when the contact occurred and was electrocuted as a result.
Plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit alleging that defendant required decedent to work
under conditions that defendant knew would result in injury and that defendant’s actions directly
and proximately caused decedent’s death. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., because
its conduct did not constitute an intentional tort. The trial court denied the motion, concluding
that the language of a Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MIOSHA)
citation issued to defendant after the incident, coupled with the fact that Timothy Schrieber, a
supervisor, was operating the crane, demonstrated that defendant had actual knowledge that an
injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Auto
Club Group Ins Co v Burchell, 249 Mich App 468, 479; 642 NW2d 406 (2002).
The exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA does not apply to claims arising from
intentional torts. MCL 418.131(1). An intentional tort exists only when an employee is injured
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by a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended that the injury occur.
Id. An employer is deemed to have specifically intended that an injury occur if the employer
“had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that
knowledge.” Id. To avoid the application of MCL 418.131(1), there must be a deliberate act by
the employer and a specific intent that there be an injury. Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453
Mich 149, 169; 551 NW2d 132 (1996). A deliberate act may be one of omission or commission.
Id. Specific intent existed if the employer had a purpose to bring about certain consequences.
Id. at 171. In addition, specific intent is established if an employer had actual knowledge that
an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. Id. at 179. An injury
was certain to occur if there was no doubt that it would occur. Id. at 174. An employer willfully
disregards its knowledge of the danger when it disregards actual knowledge that an injury is
certain to occur. Id. at 179. In order to show that an injury was certain to occur, a plaintiff must
show that the employer subjected him to a continuously operative dangerous condition that it
knew would cause an injury. Id. at 178. The evidence must show that the employer refrained
from warning the plaintiff about the dangerous condition. Id. Actual knowledge is required. Id.
at 173. Constructive, implied, or imputed knowledge is insufficient. McNees v Cedar Springs
Stamping Co (After Remand), 219 Mich App 217, 224; 555 NW2d 481 (1996). An employer’s
knowledge of general risks is insufficient. Agee v Ford Motor Co, 208 Mich App 363, 366-367;
528 NW2d 768 (1995). Whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff are sufficient to constitute an
intentional tort is a question of law for the court, but whether the facts are as the plaintiff alleges
is a question for the jury. Gray v Morley (After Remand), 460 Mich 738, 743; 596 NW2d 922
(1999).
In the instant case, Schrieber and plaintiff’s expert testified that injury could not be
avoided under circumstances in which a crane contacted a live electrical wire while a person was
holding a cable attached to the crane; however, that decedent’s fatal injury was certain to occur
cannot be established by relying on the laws of probability or the conclusory statements of
experts. Travis, supra at 174-175. No evidence showed, and plaintiff did not allege, that
Schrieber deliberately maneuvered the crane in order to cause it to come into contact with the
overhead wires for the purpose of causing injury to decedent. Schrieber was manipulating the
crane boom in response to signals given by decedent. No evidence showed that Schrieber was
certain that injury would occur if he followed decedent’s signals. Schrieber knew the risks
associated with operating a crane in the vicinity of energized overhead wires; however,
knowledge of general risks does not constitute actual knowledge that an injury is certain to
occur. Agee, supra. Moreover, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the fact that defendant
received a MIOSHA citation after the incident occurred does not constitute evidence that
defendant had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur. Palazzola v Karmazin
Products Corp, 223 Mich App 141, 152; 565 NW2d 868 (1997). The facts alleged by plaintiff
were insufficient to constitute an intentional tort within the meaning of MCL 418.131(1).
Defendant was entitled to summary disposition. Gray, supra.
Reversed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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