IRONWOOD AREA SCHOOLS V IRONWOOD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
IRONWOOD AREA SCHOOLS and
IRONWOOD AREA SCHOOLS BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
UNPUBLISHED
December 16, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
No. 249686
Gogebic Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000060-CL
v
IRONWOOD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
MEA-NEA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the order denying its motion for summary disposition and
granting plaintiffs summary disposition of their complaint, which sought to vacate an interim
arbitration opinion and award. We reverse. This case is being decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant maintains that the circuit court’s ruling exceeded the permissible scope of
review of the arbitrator’s decision. Because the parties do not dispute the underlying facts, we
review de novo the circuit court’s summary disposition ruling. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation,
456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Whether an arbitrator exceeded his contractual authority is an issue for judicial
determination, but Michigan courts have long adhered to a very limited standard of review when
considering the enforceability of labor arbitration awards. Port Huron Area School Dist v Port
Huron Ed Ass’n, 426 Mich 143, 152; 393 NW2d 811 (1986).
It is well-settled that arbitration is a favored means of resolving labor
disputes and that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of an arbitration award
when considering its enforcement. To that extent, judicial review of an
arbitrator’s decision is very limited; a court may not review an arbitrator’s factual
findings or decision on the merits. [Id. at 150.]
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The reviewing court must use caution to limit its review to whether the arbitrator exceeded his
contractual authority. Michigan State Employees Ass’n v Dep’t of Mental Health, 178 Mich App
581, 583; 444 NW2d 207 (1989).
“The party that ends up holding the short end of an arbitrator’s award may
try desperately to fit the facts within the narrow doorway to the courts, but the
judicial policy is clear. . . . Judicial review is limited to whether the award ‘draws
its essence’ from the contract, whether the award was within the authority
conferred upon the arbitrator by the collective bargaining agreement. Once
substantive arbitrability is determined . . . judicial review effectively ceases. The
fact that an arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract is wrong is irrelevant. [Id. at
583-584, quoting Ferndale Ed Ass’n v Ferndale School Dist No 1, 67 Mich App
637, 642-643; 242 NW2d 478 (1976).]
When the arbitrability of an issue is not contested, the only issue is whether the arbitrator, in
granting the award, disregarded the terms of his employment and the scope of his authority as
expressly circumscribed in the arbitration contract. Port Huron Area Sch Dist, supra at 151-152.
Plaintiffs suggest that this dispute does not qualify as arbitrable. Because no indication
exists that plaintiffs ever challenged the arbitrability of this dispute before the arbitrator, and his
opinion shows to the contrary that the “parties stipulated this matter is properly before the
arbitrator for final and binding resolution” (emphasis in original), plaintiffs may not contest
arbitrability for the first time on appeal. American Motorists Ins Co v Llanes, 396 Mich 113,
114; 240 NW2d 203 (1976). Moreover, the arbitrator’s “‘subject matter’ jurisdiction” derives
from the parties’ agreement, and in this case, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) plainly
establishes that the grievance procedure culminates in arbitration, Art XXI(B), (H) and (K), and
the parties acknowledge that Mark Kukowski filed a grievance on the basis of alleged CBA
violations. Port Huron Area Sch Dist, supra at 153.
With respect to whether the arbitrator’s interim opinion and award exceeded the scope of
his authority, the starting point for this analysis is within the parties’ CBA because the labor
arbitrator exists as a “creature of the contract.” Id. Article XXI of the CBA, entitled “Grievance
procedure,” provides that the arbitrator must render his decision in accordance with the CBA’s
provisions, and “shall have no power to alter, add to, or subtract from the terms of the
Agreement.”
A careful review of the arbitrator’s interim opinion and award demonstrates that he
recognized and adhered to the contractual limitations on his authority because he located,
interpreted, and applied throughout his lengthy opinion numerous CBA provisions in resolving
the three preliminary questions that plaintiffs wanted answered. The arbitrator repeatedly
recognized the limitation on his authority to consider and apply only the CBA’s terms, citing
CBA article XXII(A), and reviewed approximately ten CBA articles and schedules in reaching
his conclusions that (1) despite the board’s label of its October 2001, vote regarding Kukowski
as a contract nonrenewal, the vote constituted a termination of a coaching assignment for the new
school year, which assignment under the CBA automatically commenced with the new school
year, in the absence of any action of nonrenewal by the board before the beginning of the school
year, referring to Articles I(G), VII(D), X(A), (E), (F) and (H), XXIX, and Schedules B, D; and
(2) because Kukowski had begun a new coaching assignment, the CBA explicitly forbade his
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termination without just cause, referring to Articles III, IX(A) and XVIII(H)(5). In no
conceivable way did the arbitrator exceed the scope of his authority by “refus[ing] to recognize
the terms and conditions expressly circumscribing his jurisdiction and authority in resolving a
submitted dispute,” or craft an award “dependent upon . . . interpretation of provisions expressly
withheld from arbitral jurisdiction, or upon [the] arbitrator’s disregard and contravention of
provisions expressly limiting arbitral authority.” Port Huron Area Sch Dist, supra at 151-152.
Because the arbitrator did not disregard the terms of his employment and the scope of his
authority as expressly circumscribed in the CBA, and the interim award thus drew its essence
from the CBA, judicial review effectively ceases. Police Officers Ass’n of Michigan v Manistee
Co, 250 Mich App 339, 343; 645 NW2d 713 (2002). We may not further consider the
arbitrator’s factual findings or the merits of his decision, irrespective of whether he might have
incorrectly interpreted the parties’ agreement. Id. Because the circuit court’s summary
disposition ruling consists of second-guessing the arbitrator’s factual findings and application of
what he viewed as the relevant CBA terms, we reverse the circuit court’s order that granted
plaintiffs summary disposition, vacated the interim opinion and award, and permanently enjoined
further arbitration hearings.
Reversed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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