PEOPLE OF MI V BRUCE ROBERT HIGBEE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 248956
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-187625-FH
BRUCE ROBERT HIGBEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hoekstra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction for first-degree retail fraud, MCL
750.356c, for which the trial court sentenced him to eighteen months to ten years in prison. We
affirm.
Defendant first alleges that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his
first-degree retail fraud conviction. We disagree. In sufficiency of the evidence claims, this
Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determines whether
a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999); People v
Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 270; 677 NW2d 66 (2004).
Defendant’s conviction arises from the theft of approximately $800 worth of golf clubs
that normally would have constituted second-degree retail fraud, MCL 750.356d. However,
MCL 750.356c(2) provides that if a defendant previously has been convicted of one of the
offenses under the statute, conduct that would otherwise constitute second-degree retail fraud is
elevated to first-degree retail fraud. People v Johnson, 195 Mich App 571, 572, 575; 491 NW2d
622 (1992). Defendant herein does not dispute that he has a prior conviction of second-degree
retail fraud.
To establish the charged offense, the prosecution was required to prove that (1) defendant
took property that the store offered for sale, (2) moved the property, (3) intended to steal the
property, (4) the incident happened either inside the store or in the immediate vicinity of the
store, when the store was open to the public, and (5) the property taken was offered for sale at a
price of $200 or more, but less than $1000. MCL 750.356d(1)(b); MCL 750.356c(2); CJI2D
23.13.
-1-
In the present case, there was no direct evidence that defendant took two “Big Bertha”
drivers, which retailed for $399 each, from the Nevada Bob’s golf retail store in Rochester Hills
(“the Rochester Hills store”). However, it is well settled that circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences that arise from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); Fennell,
supra. Defendant’s intent to commit first-degree retail fraud may be inferred from all the facts
and circumstances. See People v Safiedine, 163 Mich App 25, 29; 414 NW2d 143 (1987). All
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. People v Fletcher, 260
Mich App 531, 562; 679 NW2d 127 (2004).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On the day of the incident,
during the time in which the Rochester Hills store was open to the public, a salesman observed
defendant walking around the partitions that held the golf clubs while defendant’s female
companion occupied the salesman with questions regarding a potential gift for her father. The
evidence showed that defendant was wearing a bulky coat and baggy sweatpants, that there were
only ten customers that day, that none of the other customers were couples, that none purchased
golf clubs, and that none spent more than a casual amount of time looking at clubs. Among all
the customers, only defendant was not assisted by the salesman because the salesman was
assisting defendant’s female companion. Defendant and his female companion spent about ten
minutes in the store and left together without purchasing anything. Approximately forty-five
minutes thereafter, a check of inventory revealed that the two Big Bertha drivers were missing
from the golf club partitions. Between the time that defendant left the store and the time that the
two Big Bertha drivers were found missing from the store, there had been no other customers in
the store. The evidence also established that shortly after defendant and his female companion
left the Rochester Hills store, they went to a Nevada Bob’s store in Sterling Heights.
Defendant’s female companion asked a salesman to show her a pair of shoes for her father while
defendant walked the opposite way, toward the golf clubs. As the salesman assisted the woman,
he could not observe defendant. After a short period of time, the salesman heard the bell on the
door, which signaled that defendant had left the store. Shortly thereafter, defendant reentered the
store and told the woman that they should get going. The salesman became suspicious about the
couple and wrote down the license plate number of their vehicle. After defendant and the
woman left, a check of the store inventory revealed that two Callaway woods were missing. The
store manager then called the Rochester Hills store to notify them that clubs were stolen from the
Sterling Heights store and “to be on the lookout” with regard to the couple, who actually had
already been in the Rochester Hills store. At the Sterling Heights store, there was only one other
customer that day who was still hitting golf balls in the back of the store when the two golf clubs
were taken. From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could infer that the defendant employed
the same scheme of using his female companion as a diversion to create an opportunity to steal
the two Big Bertha drivers from the golf store and find that the essential elements of retail fraud
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also contends that his silence or unresponsiveness to the police officer’s
request to come down to the police station for questioning was protected by his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, and thus, the trial court erred in admitting his silence or nonresponsive conduct as substantive evidence at trial. We disagree.
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The applicability of the constitutional protections depends on whether a defendant's
silence occurred when he was in a position to have his testimony compelled and then asserted his
privilege. The privilege applies when a defendant was subjected to police interrogation while in
custody or deprived of his freedom in any significant way and when a defendant’s silence
follows Miranda1 warnings. People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 164-165; 486 NW2d 312
(1992). In this case, defendant’s silence or non-responsive conduct did not occur during
custodial interrogation or in reliance on Miranda warnings.2 Therefore, defendant cannot assert
the privilege against self-incrimination and his pre-custodial, pre-Miranda silence or nonresponsive conduct was properly admitted as substantive evidence. Id. at 165-167. Moreover, as
the trial court noted, defendant opened the door to the introduction of the challenged evidence
when defense counsel elicited testimony from a detective that in a phone conversation defendant
denied taking any golf clubs. Thus, it was permissible for the prosecutor to then inquire during
redirect-examination about the rest of the conversation and defendant’s conduct. See MRE 401
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 337; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence of defendant’s pre-custodial, pre-Miranda silence or nonresponsive conduct. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998) (a trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
In the alternative, defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel if this Court deems
defense counsel’s “belated objection” insufficient to preserve this issue for appeal. We need not
address this argument because we find counsel’s objection timely, and therefore this issue is
preserved. Regardless, counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to properly admitted
evidence. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 401; 648 NW2d 648 (2002).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
2
Although defendant relies on Combs v Coyle, 205 F3d 269, 283 (CA 6, 2000), the facts are
distinguishable. There, the defendant was in custody when he said “talk to my lawyer.” Id. at
284-285. Here, defendant was not in custody and did not tell the detective to contact his lawyer.
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