DENNIS J CZERYBA V ENZO MARZOLO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DENNIS J. CZERYBA, CAROL LORENZ,
CHERYL GEHRINGER, KRISTIN MOHLER,
JOHN CZERYBA, MICHAEL CZERYBA,
FRANK GEHRINGER, TERRY AARDEMA,
RUTH AARDEMA, ALFRED GREEN,
PATRICIA GREEN, CHARLES LINDSEY and
SHARON LINDSEY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 2004
Plaintiffs-CounterdefendantsAppellees/Cross-Appellants,
No. 246955
Benzie Circuit Court
LC No. 00-005936-CH
v
ENZO MARZOLO, Trustee of the ENZO
MARZOLO LIVING TRUST,
Defendant-CounterplaintiffAppellant/Cross-Appellee.
DENNIS J. CZERYBA, CAROL LORENZ,
CHERYL GEHRINGER, KRISTIN MOHLER,
JOHN CZERYBA, MICHAEL CZERYBA,
FRANK GEHRINGER, TERRY AARDEMA,
RUTH AARDEMA, ALFRED GREEN,
PATRICIA GREEN, CHARLES LINDSEY and
SHARON LINDSEY,
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-
Appellants,
v
No. 247754
Benzie Circuit Court
LC No. 00-005936-CH
ENZO MARZOLO, Trustee of the ENZO
MARZOLO LIVING TRUST,
Defendant-Counterplaintiff-
Appellee.
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Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 246955, defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s order and judgment
in which the trial court held that plaintiffs had both an express and prescriptive easement over
defendant’s property. Plaintiffs cross-appeal as of right, arguing that the trial court erred in
determining the scope of plaintiffs’ easements. In Docket No. 247754, plaintiffs appeal as of
right the trial court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for expenses under MCR 2.313(C). We
affirm in part, and reverse in part.
This easement case involves real property located on and near Crystal Lake in Benzie
County Michigan. The case arises over a dispute regarding the scope of an express easement
granting plaintiffs “access” to Crystal Lake over defendant’s property as well as the existence
and scope of a prescriptive easement over the same portion of defendant’s property. Defendant
owns lot I, which is a riparian1 lot on Crystal Lake. Crystal Lake borders defendant’s lot from
the north, and Mollineaux Road borders defendant’s lot from the south. Plaintiffs are the owners
of lots B, C, D, E, F and G. Plaintiffs’ lots are non-riparian lots that are located immediately
south of Mollineaux Road, across from defendant’s property. At one time, Zella Stuart owned
all of plaintiffs’ lots. Over the years, after her husband died, Stuart conveyed lots B, C, D, E, F
and G to plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest, who are all relatives of her deceased
husband. Plaintiffs’ deeds each contain an express easement. The express language of those
easements is nearly identical and provides for “an easement and right-of-way 20 feet in width for
use in common with the grantor and her assigns, for access from Mollineaux Road on the South
to the beach and waters of Crystal Lake on the North over and across a roadway 20 ft. in width.”
In November 1978, Stuart conveyed lot I to the Smiths. The deed clearly granted the
Smiths “all riparian rights pertaining thereto.” The Smiths sold lot I to defendant in October
1993. Defendant’s deed also expressly granted defendant “full riparian rights.” Defendant put
up a “No Trespassing” sign in 1995 and put up a fence blocking plaintiffs’ access to the
easement in July 2000.
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant seeking a declaration that their
express easements included riparian rights and that they had acquired a prescriptive easement
over defendant’s property and also seeking injunctive relief. The trial court, while observing that
the express language of plaintiffs’ easements did not grant plaintiffs riparian rights, nevertheless
held that plaintiffs’ express easements included the right of plaintiffs to maintain and use a dock
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“Strictly speaking, land which includes or abuts a river is defined as riparian, while land which
includes or abuts a lake is defined as littoral.” Thies v Holland, 424 Mich 282, 288 n 2; 380
NW2d 463 (1985), citing McCardel v Smolen, 404 Mich 89, 93 n 3; 273 NW2d 3 (1978).
Because the term “riparian” is often used to describe both riparian and littoral property, we will
use the term riparian in this opinion.
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and boatlifts, to drive motor vehicles, to moor boats, and to engage in traditional beach and water
activities, such as sunbathing and picnics, as long as plaintiffs’ uses were not unduly burdensome
to the servient estate. The trial court further held that plaintiffs’ use of the easement had
included driving upon the easement, swimming on the beach, installing docks and boatlifts, and
mooring boats and that such use had ripened into prescriptive easements over the established
roadway on lot I in 1993. The trial court also granted injunctive relief, permanently enjoining
defendants from parking on, blocking, or otherwise interfering with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment
of the easement and permanently enjoining plaintiffs from trespassing on the portion of
defendant’s property that was not burdened by the easement.
The trial court opined that plaintiffs’ use of defendant’s property was limited to the
placement of not more than one dock, not more than two boat hoists, and the mooring of not
more than two boats. According to the trial court, any use exceeding this use would constitute an
undue burden on defendant’s property. The trial court also established some other limitations on
plaintiffs’ use of the easement which are not relevant to this appeal.
Docket No. 246955
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the scope of plaintiffs’ express
easements too broadly and in considering extrinsic evidence in determining the scope of
plaintiffs’ express easements. We agree. The extent of a party’s rights under an easement is a
question of fact for the trial court, which this Court reviews for clear error. Little v Kin, 249
Mich App 502, 507; 644 NW2d 375 (2002) (Little I), aff’d, Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699; 664
NW2d 749 (2003) (Little II).
According to defendant, the trial court erred in interpreting the scope of plaintiffs’
easements too broadly. Defendant contends that plaintiffs’ easements’ grant of mere “access” to
Crystal Lake did not encompass the rights for plaintiffs to construct and maintain a dock and two
boatlifts on the easement and moor two boats on the easement. We agree. Land which includes
or is bounded by a natural watercourse is defined as riparian. Thies, supra, 287-288. Defendant,
as an owner of riparian land, enjoys certain exclusive rights, including the right to erect and
maintain docks along the shore and the right to anchor boats permanently off the shore. Id., 288.
Plaintiffs are nonriparian owners because their lots do not touch the shore of Crystal Lake. Id.
Nonriparian owners and members of the public who gain access to a navigable waterbody have a
right to use the surface of the water in a reasonable manner for such activities as boating,
anchoring boats temporarily, fishing and swimming. Id.
The rights of an easement holder are “defined by the terms of the easement agreement.”
Id., 297. The easements in this case plainly provide for “access . . . to the beach and waters of
Crystal Lake.” By interpreting plaintiffs’ express easements granting “access” as permitting the
maintenance of a dock and two boatlifts and the mooring of two boats, the trial court, in effect,
concluded that the express easements in this case granted riparian rights to plaintiffs. The trial
court’s holding was erroneous. In Dyball v Lennox, 260 Mich App 698, 706; 680 NW2d 522
(2004), this Court held that a “[r]eservation of a right of way for access does not give rise to
riparian rights, but only a right of way.” (Emphasis added). In addition to Dyball, other
Michigan cases have interpreted easements granting merely a right of “access” as not
encompassing riparian rights. See Thies, supra; Delaney v Pond, 350 Mich 685; 86 NW2d 816
(1957).
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Moreover, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that the fact that the easements granted
plaintiffs “an easement and right-of-way . . . for use in common with the grantor” (emphasis
added) suggests that the easements granted rights to plaintiffs that were equal to or coextensive
with the rights of the grantor. The language of the express easement plainly grants plaintiffs an
easement for use in common with the grantor. It does not grant plaintiffs “riparian rights . . . for
use in common with the grantor” or even “rights in common with the grantor.” Michigan law
allows an owner of riparian property to grant an easement that allows others to enjoy certain
rights which are traditionally regarded as exclusively riparian. Little I, supra, 504-505.
However, such a broad grant of rights did not occur in this case because the express language of
the easements did not include riparian rights. The use of the phrase “for use in common with the
grantor,” without more explicit language evidencing an intent to grant plaintiffs riparian rights, is
insufficient to grant riparian rights to plaintiffs. See Dyball, supra, 708. The plain and
unambiguous language of the easements did not grant riparian rights to plaintiffs and did not
suggest that the right to construct and maintain a dock or boatlifts or the right to permanently
moor one or more boats was within the scope of the easements. Id.
Riparian landowners “enjoy certain exclusive rights.” Thies, supra, 288. In the absence
of clear and unambiguous language expressly granting plaintiffs riparian or littoral rights or
expressly using words to indicate that the grantees’ rights were to be identical to the grantor’s,
we conclude that the plain language of the easements did not encompass the right to maintain a
dock and boatlifts and permanently moor boats on the easement, which are rights that are
typically reserved to riparian owners. The mere granting of “access . . . to the beach and waters
of Crystal Lake” was insufficient to grant plaintiffs the riparian rights that defendant, as the
owner of the riparian land, enjoyed. Dyball, supra, 706. Therefore, the trial court erred in
holding that the scope of plaintiffs’ express easements encompassed riparian rights. Moreover,
because the language of the express easements was plain and unambiguous, the trial court was
prohibited from considering extrinsic evidence in determining the scope of the express
easements. When the language of an easement is plain and unambiguous, the trial court may not
consider extrinsic evidence to determine the scope of the easement. Little II, supra, 700; Dyball,
supra, 704. Therefore, the trial court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence in determining the
scope of plaintiffs’ express easements was erroneous.
In light of our conclusion that plaintiffs’ express easements did not grant plaintiffs’
riparian rights, we need not address plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs had acquired a
prescriptive easement to drive over the burdened estate, maintain one dock and two boatlifts on
the burdened estate, and moor two boats on the burdened estate. We disagree. This Court
reviews de novo the trial court’s holdings in equitable actions. Gorte v Dep’t of Transportation,
202 Mich App 161, 165; 507 NW2d 797 (1993). In addition, this Court reviews the trial court’s
findings of fact for clear error. Grand Rapids v Green, 187 Mich App 131, 135-136; 466 NW2d
388 (1991).
An easement by prescription results from use of another’s property that is open,
notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of fifteen years. MCL 600.5801; Plymouth
Canton Community Crier, Inc, v Prose, 242 Mich App 676, 679; 619 NW2d 725 (2000). The
burden is on the party claiming an easement by prescription to show by satisfactory proof that
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the use of the defendant’s property was of such a character and continued for such length of time
as to ripen into an easement by prescription. Id.
On appeal, defendant challenges plaintiffs’ establishment of the adverse or hostile use
element necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. According to defendant, plaintiffs used
defendant’s property mutually and permissively with defendant and defendant’s predecessors in
interest, and such a use cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement when the use never became
adverse and hostile. The term “hostile,” as utilized in the law of adverse possession, is a term of
art and does not imply ill will. Id., 681. The claimant is not required to make express
declarations of adverse intent during the prescriptive period. Id. Adverse or hostile use is use
that is inconsistent with the right of the owner, without permission asked or given, which would
entitle the owner to a cause of action against the intruder for trespassing. Id.
The trial court determined that plaintiffs’ use of defendant’s property ripened into a
prescriptive easement in 1993. Defendant purchased lot I in October 1993. It is unclear from the
trial court’s holding whether the trial court determined that plaintiffs’ prescriptive easement was
established before defendant acquired lot I in 1993 or after defendant acquired lot I in 1993. In
any event, the trial court, in holding that plaintiffs had acquired a prescriptive easement over
defendant’s property, did not elaborate on the adverse or hostile use element, stating on the
record only that “the usage by the [plaintiffs’] families, the boats the docks that they put out,
were open and hostile.”
According to defendant, plaintiffs and defendant and defendant’s predecessor in interest
mutually used the easement, and plaintiffs used it with defendant’s permission. Defendant is
correct that mutual, permissive use of another’s land does not constitute adverse use that may
ripen into a prescriptive easement. Id., 683. However, we conclude that plaintiffs’ use of
defendant’s property both before and after defendant acquired title to lot I satisfies the hostile
and adverse use element of a prescriptive easement. “[I]f a claimant has obtained a conveyance
of an easement which is ineffective, his use of the subservient estate, made on the assumption
that the conveyance was legally effective, is adverse and not made in subordination to the owner
of the burdened estate.” Cook v Grand River Hydroelectric Power Co, Inc, 131 Mich App 821,
826; 346 NW2d 881 (1984), citing 3 Powell, Real Property, § 413, pp 34-109—34-110. See also
Plymouth Canton Community Crier, Inc, supra, 684-685 (for a discussion of the Restatement of
Property, Servitudes, 3d, § 2.16, which recognizes that use under an invalid express easement
may establish an easement by prescription and that such use satisfies the hostile or adverse use
element or a prescriptive easement). In this case, for reasons explained above, plaintiffs’ express
easements were not effective in conveying riparian rights to plaintiffs; however, plaintiffs
exercised their rights under the easements as if their easements contained an express grant of
riparian rights, including the rights to maintain docks and boatlifts and the right to moor boats.
Therefore, because plaintiffs used defendant’s property as if their express easements conveyed
riparian rights, plaintiffs’ use of defendant’s property satisfied the hostile or adverse use element
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. Cook, supra, 826.
Because defendant does not challenge the trial court’s holding regarding the remaining
elements of plaintiffs’ prescriptive easement claim, the trial court did not err in holding that
plaintiffs acquired an easement by prescription to maintain a dock and two boatlifts and to moor
two boats on defendant’s property. Furthermore, because the right to drive motor vehicles with
boat trailers over the easement is necessary and reasonable to effect the enjoyment of the
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easement, the trial court did not err in holding that plaintiffs’ rights under the prescriptive
easement also included that right. Killips v Mannisto, 244 Mich App 256, 261; 624 NW2d 224
(2001). The trial court did not err in holding that plaintiffs established the adverse or hostile
element of a prescriptive easement and in determining the scope of plaintiffs’ rights under the
prescriptive easement.
Docket No. 247754
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for
expenses under MCR 2.313(C) based on defendant’s failure to admit fifteen items in plaintiffs’
requests for admissions. We disagree. We review a trial court’s decision whether to impose
discovery sanctions for denying a request to admit that which is proved at trial for an abuse of
discretion. Phinisee v Rogers, 229 Mich App 547, 561-562; 582 NW2d 852 (1998); Richardson
v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 213 Mich App 447, 456-458; 540 NW2d 696 (1995).
A party may request that another party admit the truth of a matter which “relates to
statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact[.]” MCR 2.312(A). The purpose
of MCR 2.312 is to limit areas of controversy and save time, energy, and expense that would be
required to proffer proof of matters properly subject to admission. Janczyk v Davis, 125 Mich
App 683, 692; 337 NW2d 272 (1983). If a party denies the truth of the matter as requested, and
if the party requesting the admission later proves the truth of the matter, the requesting party may
move for an order requiring the other party to pay the expenses incurred in making that proof,
including attorney fees. MCR 2.313(C). “The court shall enter the order enter the order unless it
finds that”
(1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to MCR 2.312,
(2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance,
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he or she
might prevail on the matter, or
(4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit. [MCR 2.313(C).]
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for
expenses under MCR 2.313(C). At the outset, we note that “unless a matter is completely free of
controversy, it is not likely that a formal request for admissions will prove successful.”
Greenspan v Rehberg, 56 Mich App 310, 328; 224 NW2d 67 (1974). We further note that
sanctions are not required if defendant had reasonable ground to believe that he would prevail on
the matter. MCR 2.313(C)(3). Finally, we observe that the fact that a matter was proved at trial
does not alone establish that the denial of a request for admission as to that matter was
unreasonable. Richardson, supra, 457.
Nine of the fifteen requests for admissions attempted to elicit admissions from defendant
regarding the elements of a prescriptive easement. These requests for admissions were improper
because requests seeking admission of an element of a claim “is not a proper subject for
admission[.]” Richardson, supra, 457-458. One of the requests for admissions essentially
sought defendant’s admission that Zella Stuart intended to grant plaintiffs riparian rights in their
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express easements. Because plaintiffs’ easements did not explicitly grant plaintiffs riparian
rights, defendant had a reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail at trial on the issue of
the scope of plaintiffs’ rights under the express easement. MCR 2.313(C)(3).
As for the remaining requests for admissions, we conclude that defendant’s failure to
admit was not unreasonable in the sense that defendant should be liable for plaintiffs’ costs in
proving their claims at trial. The matters about which plaintiffs sought admissions were not
completely free of controversy, Greenspan, supra, 328, and defendant had reasonable ground to
believe that he might prevail on the matters. MCR 2.313(C)(3). We find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request for expenses under MCR 2.313(C).
Conclusion
In sum, in Docket No. 246955, we hold that the trial court erred in interpreting plaintiffs’
express easements as encompassing riparian rights when the plain and unambiguous language of
the easements did not provide for such rights. In addition, because the language of the easements
was not ambiguous, the trial court also erred in considering extrinsic evidence in determining the
scope of those easements. The trial court did not err however, in holding that plaintiffs acquired
a prescriptive easement to use defendant’s property that did include riparian rights. In Docket
No. 247754, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request
for expenses under MCR 2.313(C).
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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