IN RE KRISTY MARIE MASTERS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CHARLES MICHAEL
MASTERS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 28, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 253988
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000136-NA
THERESA MASTERS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLES MASTERS,
Respondent.
In the Matter of KRISTY MARIE MASTERS,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 253990
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000137-NA
THERESA MASTERS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLES MASTERS,
Respondent.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hoekstra and Owens, JJ.
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PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent Theresa Masters appeals as of right from the
trial court’s orders terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), (g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm.
Although respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental
rights under §§ 19b(3)(c)(ii), (g) and (j), she does not challenge the trial court’s determination
that §§ 19b(3)(i) and (l) were also proven. Accordingly, any claim that clear and convincing
evidence was lacking for these later two statutory grounds is abandoned. The failure to brief the
merits of an allegation of error is deemed an abandonment of an issue. People v Kent, 194 Mich
App 206, 210; 486 NW2d 110 (1992). Because a court’s decision to terminate parental rights
need only be supported by a single statutory ground for termination, MCL 712A.19b(3); In re
Powers, 244 Mich App 111, 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000); In re SD, 236 Mich App 240, 247; 599
NW2d 772 (1999), and because §§ 19b(3)(i) and (l) alone support the trial court’s termination
decision, it is unnecessary to address respondent’s arguments concerning §§ 19b(3)(c)(ii), (g),
and (j), inasmuch as any error with regard to these subsections would be harmless. In re Powers,
supra.
Nonetheless, we have considered the trial court’s findings with respect to the children’s
nutritional and developmental deficiencies, as well as the ongoing marital conflict between
respondent and the children’s father and its effect on the children, for purposes of reviewing the
trial court’s best interest decision under MCL 712A.19b(5). We conclude that the trial court did
not clearly err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children. MCR 3.977(J); In re
JK, 468 Mich 202, 209, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). The evidence did not establish that
termination was clearly not in the children’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 344; 612
NW2d 407 (2000).
Finally, we reject respondent’s claim that she was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because she and the children’s father were jointly represented by the same attorney
before termination proceedings were initiated. We apply by analogy the principles of ineffective
assistance of counsel developed in the criminal law context. In re CR, 250 Mich App 185, 197198; 646 NW2d 506 (2001). Because respondent did not raise this issue in an appropriate
motion in the trial court, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Riley
(After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). Here, it is not apparent that
counsel’s joint representation of respondent and her husband constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. The record does not disclose what advice, if any, counsel gave respondent about the
possible implications of joint representation, or the advantages and risks involved. MRPC
1.7(b)(2).
Respondent argues that joint representation of respondent and her husband constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel was unable to advise her to leave her husband.
To succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the aggrieved party must demonstrate
that but for the ineffective assistance, the results of the proceeding probably would have been
different. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). Respondent fails to
demonstrate that she would have followed counsel’s advice where she exhibited on more than
one occasion an unwillingness or inability to comply with advice of professionals and testified
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that she did not want to leave her husband or ask him to leave. Moreover, respondent is unable
to demonstrate that the result probably would have been different if she had left her husband
where numerous witnesses testified that she did not have the ability to properly care for the
children, and petitioner’s expert in child welfare testified that neither parent had the capacity to
care for the children alone. Respondent has not demonstrated that “‘an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected’” counsel’s performance. People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 556-557; 581
NW2d 654 (1998), quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 692; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
2d 674 (1984).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurt T. Wilder
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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