KEITH DAVID RILING V SECRETARY OF STATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KEITH DAVID RILING,
UNPUBLISHED
October 28, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 248694
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 03-000219-AL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Jansen and Bandstra, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Petitioner’s driver’s license was administratively revoked because of two alcohol-related
driving arrests in 1999 and 2001. See MCL 257.303. When petitioner sought full restoration of
his driving privileges, respondent’s Driver’s License Appeal Division (DLAD) granted a
restricted license, and required installation of a breath alcohol analyzed ignition interlock device
on petitioner’s car. Petitioner appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the DLAD and
ordered full restoration of driving privileges. Respondent appeals by leave granted. We reverse.
This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Pursuant to MCL 257.323(4), a circuit court shall set aside a decision of the DLAD only
if the petitioner’s substantial rights have been prejudiced because the determination is any of the
following: (a) in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the state constitution of 1963,
or a statute; (b) in excess of the secretary of state’s statutory authority or jurisdiction; (c) made
upon unlawful procedure resulting in material prejudice to the petitioner; (d) not supported by
competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record; (e) arbitrary, capricious, or
clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (f) affected by other substantial and
material error of law.
In this case, the hearing officer noted that petitioner’s participation in Alcoholics
Anonymous had fallen below recommended levels in recent weeks, and that petitioner’s last
arrest for an alcohol-related driving offense was within the past two years, and thus concluded
that full restoration of driving privileges was not warranted. The circuit court did not dispute the
evidentiary support for those conclusions, but instead simply implied that the DLAD was prone
to relying on habit rather than individualized judgments, expressed disagreement with its limited
role reviewing such decisions, and agreed to sign an order declaring the hearing officer’s
decision arbitrary and capricious.
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We reverse. There was competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the
hearing officer’s conclusion that full restoration of driving privileges was not yet appropriate,
and the decision to grant a restricted license, conditioned on installation of an interlock device in
petitioner’s car, was authorized by law, and was not arbitrary or capricious.
We remind the circuit court that it, like this Court, must apply specific standards when
reviewing the determination of a lower tribunal. The scope of a circuit court’s review of DLAD
decisions is sharply limited. MCL 257.323(4). The circuit court plainly erred by substituting its
judgment for that of the hearing officer.
We reverse.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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