PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES MITCHELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 28, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 248636
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-010881-01
JAMES MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his convictions by a jury of carrying a concealed weapon
(CCW), MCL 750.227, being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant argues he was
denied his right to counsel of choice, the trial court erred by communicating with the jury during
its deliberations, the prosecutor’s misconduct denied him a fair trial, and he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel. We find done of these alleged errors merit a new trial.
Defendant also argues that his convictions and sentences for being a felon in possession of a
firearm and felony-firearm arising out of the same event violated his rights under the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. We affirm.
This case arises out of a traffic stop at 3:45 a.m. in the city of Detroit. At trial, two
Detroit police officers testified defendant was a passenger in the vehicle and possessed open
beer. The driver of the vehicle, Ricky Boyer, did not have a driver’s license. Both Boyer and
defendant were frisked for weapons at the rear of the vehicle. The officer who frisked defendant
testified that he found a pistol in one of defendant’s socks. The officer removed the gun to the
street, yelled “gun” to alert his partner, and pushed defendant against the car. After a brief
struggle, the officers secured defendant. At the police station, defendant refused to sign an
interview form that contained identification information.
At trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated that defendant had previously been
convicted of a specified felony and that defendant had not had his firearm’s rights stored.
Defendant testified. He denied that he possessed or carried the pistol in his sock but
acknowledged that he possessed open beer; defendant also admitted that he had been drinking
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beer since the afternoon before his arrest. Defendant also testified that Boyer was a friend of his
whom defendant could contact by “asking around.” Boyer did not testify.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion denying defense counsel’s
first-day-of-trial motion to adjourn to permit defendant to retained counsel. We disagree.
This Court considers four factors to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion
in denying a defendant’s motion for adjournment to retain counsel. People v Peňa, 224 Mich
App 650, 660-661; 569 NW22d 871 (1997), modified on other grounds 457 Mich 885; 586
NW2d 925 (1998). These factors are: (1) whether the defendant was asserting a constitutional
right, (2) whether the defendant had a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) whether
defendant was guilty of negligence, and (4) whether defendant had previously caused the trial to
be adjourned. Id. at 661. Even if these factors indicate the trial court abused its discretion,
defendant must still establish that he was prejudiced by the decision. Id., citing People v Wilson,
397 Mich 76, 81; 243 NW2d 257 (1976).
Although defendant asserts the constitutional right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment does
not provide defendants with an absolute right to an attorney of their choice. People v Akins, 259
Mich App 545, 557; 675 NW2d 863 (2003); People v Krysztopaniec, 170 Mich App 588, 598;
429 NW2d 828 (1988). Rather, courts must balance an accused’s right to counsel of his choice
with “the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Id.
Here, defendant had not previously caused the trial to be delayed, but our review of the
other Peňa factors convinces us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion to adjourn. Contrary to defendant’s assertions, the record fails to show that
defendant had a legitimate reason for asserting his right to choose new counsel. Defense counsel
stated that although he had repeatedly attempted to contact defendant, defendant had not
contacted counsel in the 46 days between the final pretrial conference and the first day of trial.
Also, counsel noted he had requested but defendant had not provided him with the driver’s
(Boyer’s) address or telephone number. Defendant indicated that he wished to reject the final
plea bargain offered by the prosecution. Nothing in the record indicates the existence of an
irreconcilable difference of opinion between defendant and his attorney. See People v Williams,
386 Mich 565, 575-578; 194 NW2d 337 (1972).
Defendant was also guilty of negligence. In general, it is not an abuse of discretion to
deny a motion to adjourn at trial when the reason for the request is known before trial. See, e.g.,
Krysztopaniec, supra at 598, and People v Stinson, 6 Mich App 648, 653; 150 NW2d 171
(1967). In moving to adjourn, defense counsel stated he had not been told until the first day of
trial that defendant had been represented by other counsel when the instant charges had been
dismissed without prejudice because one of the officers was unavailable to testify. The clear
inference from this record is that defendant never informed defense counsel of a desire to retain
other counsel until the first day of trial.
Based on our review of the Peňa factors, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion to adjourn. The record does not support defendant’s
contention that he had a legitimate reason for substituting new counsel, defendant was negligent
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for not having attempted to retain or express a desire for other counsel earlier, and this record
demonstrates no discernable prejudice.
Next, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court denied him a fair trial by providing a
written response to a written question by the jury without notice to or consent by the parties.
MCR 6.414(A) provides in pertinent part as follows:
The court may not communicate with the jury or any juror pertaining to the case
without notifying the parties and permitting them to be present. The court must
ensure that all communications pertaining to the case between the court and the
jury or any juror are made a part of the record.
In People v France, 436 Mich 138, 142; 461 NW2d 312 (1990), our Supreme Court held
that communications with a jury in the process of deliberation must be limited, but based on the
“realities of trial practice,” a rule requiring automatic reversal when such communications occur
“goes beyond the limits necessary to safeguard the right of a defendant to a fair trial.” Only if an
ex parte communication prejudices a defendant may a reviewing court reverse. Id. at 163. The
reviewing court must first categorize the communication into one of three categories: (1)
substantive communications, including supplemental instructions on the law, (2) administrative
communications, including those regarding the availability of evidence and instructions that
encourage a jury to continue its deliberations, or (3) housekeeping communications, which may
concern matters such as meals and restroom facilities. Id. at 163-164. A substantive
communication creates a presumption of prejudice; administrative communications are presumed
harmless; and housekeeping communications carry a presumption of no prejudice. Id.
In this case, the jury sent the trial court a note asking two questions. First, it wanted to
know whether it is “standard operating procedure for police to check [for] fingerprints on a
weapon when it is found on a person.” Second, it asked for the definition of “reasonable doubt.”
In response to the first question, the trial court wrote “rely on evidence + general knowledge and
common sense.” The trial court responded to the second question as follows:
A reasonable doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the evidence or lack of
evidence. It is not a flimsy or fanciful doubt, but a doubt based on reason and
common sense. A reasonable doubt is just that -- a doubt that is reasonable, after a
careful and considered examination of the facts and circumstances in this case.
The parties agree that the trial court’s responses constituted supplemental instructions on
the law and were therefore substantive communications. But the prosecution correctly argues
that it may rebut the resulting presumption of prejudice by making a “firm and definite showing
of an absence of prejudice.” France, supra at 143 (emphasis in original). We conclude that the
prosecutor has rebutted the presumption of prejudice because both of the trial court’s responses
constitute restatements of instructions it previously gave to the jury without objection from
defendant.
Next, defendant contends that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by improperly
arguing facts not in evidence, by improperly vouching for the credibility of her witnesses, and by
expressing her personal disdain for defendant. Because defendant failed to preserve these
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claims, we review them for plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v Goodin, 257
Mich App 425, 431-432; 668 NW2d 392 (2003). To avoid forfeiture, defendant must establish
(1) misconduct by the prosecutor; (2) that the misconduct was plain (i.e., clear or obvious); and
(3) prejudice or that the misconduct was outcome determinative. People v Watson, 245 Mich
App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). We find no plain, outcome-determinative misconduct
here. Moreover, even if plain misconduct is found, we may reverse only when the misconduct
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when the misconduct seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, independent of the
defendant's innocence. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We
cannot say that the alleged misconduct here resulted in the likely conviction of an innocent
defendant; nor can we say that the alleged misconduct seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, independent of the defendant’s innocence. Id.
When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court examines the pertinent
portion of the lower court record and evaluates the alleged misconduct in context to determine
whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App
269, 283; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). “The prosecution is free to comment with respect to the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence as it relates to its
theory of the case.” Id. at 284, citing People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659
(1995). Further, prosecutors are accorded wide latitude in making their arguments and need not
use the blandest of all possible terms. Id.; People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 112; 631 NW2d
67 (2001). But a defendant’s opportunity for a fair trial may be jeopardized when the prosecutor
interjects issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. People v Rice (On Remand),
235 Mich App 429, 438; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). We also note that otherwise improper
prosecutorial conduct or remarks might not require reversal if they address issues raised by
defense counsel. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 353; 662 NW2d 376 (2003).
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor improperly argued facts not in evidence. At
trial, the arresting officer testified that at the time of defendant’s arrest his patrol car was parked
directly behind the vehicle in which defendant had been riding. The officer further stated that
the patrol car was equipped with a video camera that continues to run once a traffic stop has been
made. But the officer did not know if the patrol car’s camera was working on the morning of
defendant’s arrest or if anyone preserved the video tape. During closing arguments, when
commenting on the credibility of the arresting officers, defense counsel argued that although all
police cars are now equipped with cameras, “[e]very time [video tapes] show something negative
about a client of mine, they’ve got it” but when a video tape “doesn’t show anything or maybe
shows something favorable, they didn’t preserve [it]” or the “camera wasn’t working” or the
patrol car “isn’t equipped with [a camera].” Defendant claims the prosecutor committed
misconduct when she responded in rebuttal argument:
Ladies and Gentlemen, like you today I heard for the first time that this car
had a video camera. I love those cameras. I mean they either help my case or
under the law if they hurt my case, I must give it to the defense. And if it hurts
my case by showing the officers are liars, then I dismiss my case. I love those
tapes. It either makes my job easy because it corroborates everything the officers
say and I win or it makes my job easy because I can dismiss the case because the
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officers lied. So I win, I mean I love those videotapes. I always ask for
videotapes if I know they exist. Unfortunately, I didn’t know.
We find defense counsel’s argument insinuated that the police failed to preserve
favorable evidence or the prosecution failed to present the video tape from the patrol car’s
camera because it would tend to exonerate defendant. This invited the prosecutor’s response.
We find both counsels’ argument improperly rested on their past experience and not on evidence
properly presented to the jury. Because the prosecutor’s argument was proportionate and
responded to defense counsel’s argument the prosecutor’s misconduct does not merit reversal
under the doctrine of invited response. Jones, supra at 353. Further, defendant has failed to
establish that this unpreserved error was outcome determinative. Carines, supra at 763. The
trial court instructed the jury, before, during, and after closing arguments, that the attorney’s
statements and arguments were not evidence. Thus, the trial court’s instructions cured any
prejudice to defendant. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004),
citing Bahoda, supra at 281, and prosecutorial misconduct did not deny defendant a fair trial,
McElhaney, supra at 284.
Next, defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the truth of the
allegations against defendant and the credibility of the police witnesses. A prosecutor may not
attempt to bolster her theory of the case by conveying a message that she has some special
knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully. Bahoda, supra at 267. But a prosecutor may
argue from the evidence that a witness is worthy or not worthy of belief. Thomas, supra at 455;
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997).
Here, the prosecutor argued that the arresting officers had nothing to gain from planting a
gun on defendant or lying under oath during their testimony. In contrast, the prosecutor asserted
that defendant had a great deal to gain by saying the gun did not belong to him. Further, the
prosecutor argued that the officers’ accounts of the events surrounding the arrest were more
reliable because they were sober at the time while defendant was highly intoxicated. The
prosecutor’s statements did not imply that she had any special knowledge of defendant’s guilt.
Rather, she merely argued that the officers’ testimony was more worthy of belief than
defendant’s testimony. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by arguing credibility
based on the facts, especially when the testimony conflicted. Thomas, supra at 455.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly voiced personal disdain for
defendant and interjected character issues by arguing defendant had a bad attitude and was a
“scary” man. It is improper for a prosecutor “to comment on the defendant's character when his
character is not in issue.” People v Quinn, 194 Mich App 250, 253; 486 NW2d 139 (1992).
Thus, when evidence of a defendant’s prior bad act is admitted for a limited purpose under MRE
404(b), a prosecutor may deprive the defendant of a fair trial by arguing that the jury should
consider the evidence as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id. Here, the prosecutor
did not base her argument on evidence admitted for a limited purpose and did not ask the jury to
draw a prohibited character to conduct inference. McElhaney, supra at 285.
In the context of a credibility contest between the police officer witnesses and defendant,
the prosecutor made the following rebuttal argument:
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He is a felon who disregards the law, Mr. Mitchell thinks he’s above the
law, thinks hey, who cares if it’s against the law to have open beers in cars. I’m
above the law. I can travel around with beer. Who cares if it’s against the law
because I’m a felon to carry a gun. I’m going to carry it anyway. His attitude has
shown over and over and corroborates what the officers said when they find a gun
and go to arrest him, he resists. He stops cooperating. He doesn’t cooperate at
the precinct. He doesn’t cooperate when Investigator McLemore interviews him.
Put your signature on paper. Oh no, I’m refusing.
That goes along with his whole attitude that it’s okay for me to carry a gun
without getting a permit. It’s okay for me to carry a gun even though I’ve got a
prior felony conviction. And it’s okay for me to drive around with open beer.
Mr. Mitchell is a scary man who doesn’t want to own up to his responsibilities,
who doesn’t want to own up to his actions and say I did it. I’m guilty. I’m asking
you to do it for him by finding him guilty.
In context, the prosecutor was not arguing that the jury should convict defendant of the
instant charges because he had a prior felony conviction, although that was an element necessary
to one of the charges, but rather that the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence
corroborated the officers’ testimony. A prosecutor during closing argument may use emotional
language based on the evidence and reasonable inference; such argument is an important tool in
the prosecutor’s forensic arsenal. See People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 454; 669 NW2d
818 (2003), and People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 678-679; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Further,
we read the prosecutor’s “scary” man comment as not urging the jury to convict because of
character but that “because defendant committed these crimes, not other crimes or bad acts, he
was” “scary.” McElhaney, supra at 285 (emphasis in the original).
Moreover, even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, we conclude that defendant
has not met his burden of establishing that the unpreserved error resulted in prejudice. Carines,
supra at 763. As noted above, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury that the attorney’s
statements and arguments were not evidence. Further, the trial court instructed the jury on the
presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, how to determine credibility, and most importantly
in this context, that its verdict must be based only on the evidence properly admitted in the case.
“Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most
errors.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003), citing People v
Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), and People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687;
521 NW2d 557 (1994). Consequently, any prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s argument was
dispelled by the trial court’s instructions. Bahoda, supra at 281; Thomas, supra at 456.
Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct denied
him a fair trial. The cumulative effect of several minor instances of prosecutorial misconduct
may warrant reversal although the individual errors would not. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich
App 635, 649; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). “Reversal is warranted only if the effect of the errors was
so seriously prejudicial that the defendant was denied a fair trial.” Id., citing People v Knapp,
244 Mich App 361, 387; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). Having concluded that the alleged individual
instances of misconduct either were proper or do not warrant reversal because they did not deny
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defendant a fair trial, we likewise conclude the alleged instances of misconduct did not combine
to deny defendant a fair trial. McLaughlin, supra; McElhaney, supra at 285.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In
particular, defendant asserts he was denied a fair trial by: (1) counsel’s failure to produce as a
witness, or request the assistance of the prosecutor and police in locating, Ricky Boyer, the
driver of the vehicle in which defendant was riding, (2) counsel’s stipulating that defendant had a
prior specified felony conviction and that his right to possess a firearm had not been restored, (3)
counsel’s failure to request a cautionary instruction that the jury was to consider defendant’s
prior felony conviction only for purposes of the felon in possession of a firearm charge, and (4)
counsel’s failure to object to the alleged improper remarks by the prosecutor.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defendant bears the burden of
overcoming this strong presumption. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 715; 645 NW2d
294 (2001). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and (2) “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
the proceedings would have been different, and the attendant proceedings were fundamentally
unfair or unreliable.” Id.
We address defendant’s last claim first. Because we have found no outcomedeterminative prosecutorial misconduct, it follows that counsel’s failure to object to the alleged
misconduct was also not outcome-determinative nor did it result in a fundamentally unfair or
unreliable trial. Accordingly, defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to the prosecutor’s remarks fails. Thomas, supra at 457; Goodin, supra at 433.
Defendant has also failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice even if counsel erred
by not producing or requesting the assistance of the police to produce Boyer as a witness.
Defendant’s claim that Boyer’s testimony would have been favorable is merely a bald assertion
without any support; defendant has provided no affidavit from Boyer or offer of proof regarding
Boyer’s supposed testimony. See People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 327; 521 NW2d 797 (1994),
and People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 369; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).
Moreover, the record establishes that counsel wanted to contact Boyer six weeks before
trial but defendant failed to provide counsel with Boyer’s address or telephone number. Yet
defendant testified at trial that Boyer was his friend whom he had the ability to contact. Thus,
defendant has failed to establish either that counsel erred or that the error was prejudicial; either
failing is fatal to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); Pickens, supra at 302303.
Defendant’s contention that counsel seriously erred by stipulating that defendant had a
prior specified felony conviction and that his right to possess a firearm had not been restored also
fails. We note that it is reasonable trial strategy to concede some points at trial while contesting
others. See, e.g., People v Emerson (After Remand), 203 Mich App 345, 349; 512 NW2d 3
(1994), and Krysztopaniec, supra at 596. Indeed, defendant concedes that counsel had a
legitimate reason for stipulating that he had previously been convicted of a specified felony.
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Defendant has also failed to establish any prejudice from counsel’s failure to request a limiting
instruction. As discussed above, defendant’s prior conviction was not used for an improper
purpose. Finally, this Court has recently held that when a defendant is charged with violating
MCL 750.224f(2), the prosecution “must prove that the defendant's right to possess a firearm has
not been restored only if the defendant produces some evidence that his right has been restored.”
People v Perkins, 262 Mich App 267, 271; 686 NW2d 237 (2004). Because defendant does not
suggest that evidence exists that his firearms rights had been restored, his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on this point is meritless.
Last, defendant argues that his convictions and sentences for both being a felon in
possession of a firearm and felony-firearm arising out of the same event violated his rights under
the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. This Court and
our Supreme Court have already held to the contrary. People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 452;
671 NW2d 733 (2003); People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163, 166; 631 NW2d 755 (2001).
We affirm.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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