CHASE MANHATTAN BANK V JAMES BOS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 247603
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 02-049870-CK
JAMES J. BOS and AMERICUS L.L.C.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
REBECCA A. BOS,
Defendant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Smolenski and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action for injunctive and equitable relief to set aside a property foreclosure sale,
plaintiff appeals as of right the decision of the trial court denying plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and granting defendant Americus’ motion under the same
rule. We affirm.
I
Plaintiff is the mortgagee on property originally mortgaged by both James and Rebecca
Bos. Defendants Bos defaulted on the mortgage and plaintiff conducted a foreclosure sale by
advertisement. Plaintiff was the only bidder at the sheriff’s sale, bidding $41,672.81. The
outstanding debt, including costs and fees, was $108,795.61, and the market value of the
property was approximately $136,000. Plaintiff alleges that it intended to start bidding at
$108,795.61, but that due to a calculation mistake, the amount that plaintiff instructed its
attorney to bid at the sale, via e-mail, was $41,672.81.
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After the sheriff’s sale plaintiff realized its error and brought suit seeking an order
enjoining defendants Bos or their agents from tendering the redemption amount in satisfaction of
the mortgage sale and/or sheriff’s deed. Defendant Americus intervened as a party defendant,
stating that James Bos’ interest in the property was transferred to Rebecca Bos as part of a
divorce, and in turn, Rebecca’s interest was transferred to Americus. As a result, Americus
claimed status as a bona fide purchaser for value. Plaintiff and Americus filed cross-motions for
summary disposition; the court denied plaintiff’s and granted defendant’s on the grounds that the
mistake was unilateral, brought about by plaintiff’s own negligence, therefore not entitling it to
have the sale set aside.
II
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the sale because
Americus is not a bona fide purchaser for value. We disagree.
We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The particular question of
whether to set aside a sale made upon the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate is one
resting largely in the discretion of the trial court and should not be interfered with on appeal
unless it appears such discretion has been misused. Nugent v Nugent, 54 Mich 557, 558-560; 20
NW 584 (1884).
The general and long established rule in Michigan is that the inadequacy of a sale price in
relation to the actual value of property will not vitiate an otherwise fair and regular statutory
foreclosure. Macklem v Warren Const Co, 343 Mich 334, 339; 72 NW2d 60, 63 (1955); Carlisle
v Dunlap, 203 Mich 602; 169 NW 936 (1918). However, a sale may be set aside if there is both
a grossly inadequate sale price and some other defect, such as a mistake. Id. at 608.
Plaintiff does not argue that the sheriff’s sale was other than a regular statutory
procedure. Rather, plaintiff argues that defendants knew or should have known of the mistake
because they were aware of the disparity between the debt, the market value of the property, and
the price bid. In essence, plaintiff argues that these facts known to Americus were sufficient to
make Americus aware of plaintiff’s mistake and that because of that knowledge Americus could
not be a bona fide purchaser for value. While not precisely articulated, plaintiff seems to claim
that Americus’ knowledge renders this a case of mutual mistake.
However, in support of its motion for summary disposition, Americus offered an
uncontested affidavit averring that foreclosure sales occur, relatively frequently, where the
amount bid by the mortgagee is less than the amount of the debt thus clearly countering
plaintiff’s claim that Americus must have known there was a mistake. Plaintiff on the other hand
failed to provide any other evidence to suggest that defendants knew or should have known of
the mistake or were otherwise guilty of fraud, concealment, misrepresentation, or other
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inequitable conduct.1 We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
Americus was a bona fide purchaser for value.
Moreover, here, the mistake complained of by plaintiff was brought about by its own
negligence. In Federal Land Bank of St Paul v Edwards, 262 Mich 180; 247 NW 147 (1933),
our Supreme Court specifically stated that a sale may be vacated on the basis of a mistake where
the party seeking to set the sale aside “is guilty of no negligence or lack of attention.” Id. at 183.
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff made a negligent calculation error. Accordingly, relief in the
form of vacating the sale is not available to plaintiff under these facts.
III
Plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred in ruling that MCL 600.3280 would provide
a defense to defendant James Bos in a subsequent action for a deficiency judgment. Even if
plaintiff is correct regarding the trial court’s analysis of the effect of that statute,2 the issue is not
properly before this Court in this appeal because the trial court’s statements constitute mere dicta
and not a binding order or ruling.
MCL 600.3280, generally restricts a mortgagee from seeking a judgment for the
deficiency on the debt secured by the mortgage if the mortgagee takes title to the property by
way of a foreclosure sale and that property’s value is equal to, or more than, the amount of the
debt. However, this is not an action for deficiency on the debt. Therefore, the statements of the
trial court regarding this issue do not constitute an actual decision of the trial court, but are mere
dicta. Reynolds v Bureau of State Lottery, 240 Mich App 84, 95; 610 NW2d 597 (2000)
(defining dicta as “a principle of law not essential to the determination of the case”).
In any event, this issue is not ripe for judicial review. Our Supreme Court recently
reiterated the principles of legal standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"--an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or
imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be
"fairly ... traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it
must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be
"redressed by a favorable decision." [National Wildlife Federation v Cleveland
Cliffs Iron Co, __ Mich __; 684 NW2d 800 (Docket No. 121890, issued 7/30/04),
1
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the evidence of foreclosure sales for less than the amount of the
debt owed occur when the market value of the property is less than the debt. However, this
argument was not made in the trial court and plaintiff presented no evidence in support of it or
that any of the sales cited by Americus fell into that category.
2
See Bankers Trust Co v Rose, 322 Mich 256; 33 NW2d 783 (1948).
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slip op, 25, quoting Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-561; 112 S Ct
2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).]
In order for MCL 600.3280 to be applicable, plaintiff must take title to the property, meaning
that the mortgagors failed to redeem. See Bankers Trust Co v Rose, 322 Mich 256; 260; 33
NW2d 783 (1948). This may or may not happen. Accordingly, under the principles of standing,
this issue is not ripe as the facts only present speculation or a hypothetical scenario, not an actual
set of facts.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Bill Schuette
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