HAMID R KHORRAMI V BOSTON TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HAMID R. KHORRAMI,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2004
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,
v
No. 250426
Ionia Circuit Court
LC No. 02-022524-AZ
BOSTON TOWNSHIP,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellee.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Sawyer and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order granting summary disposition to
defendant on defendant’s counterclaim seeking enforcement of its junkyard ordinance and on
plaintiff’s claim for an alleged violation of the Michigan Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL
15.261 et seq. We affirm, and award costs and attorney fees on appeal to defendant as a sanction
for the filing of a vexatious appeal by plaintiff, the amount to be determined by the trial court on
remand.
Plaintiff argues first that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in
this case, noting that the authority to give declaratory relief depends on the authority to try
actions on the same claim as that on which it is providing declaratory relief. Plaintiff contends
that only a district court may hear a case involving a municipal civil infraction, so that a circuit
court has no jurisdiction in such a case. We disagree.
Plaintiff states the rule correctly: A court’s jurisdiction over a declaratory action depends
on its having jurisdiction of the same action in a non-declaratory case. MCR 2.605(A)(2).
However, this rule does not bar the circuit court’s jurisdiction in this case because the court
would have jurisdiction in an underlying action.
The township junkyard licensing ordinance states that any violation of it is a nuisance per
se. MCL 252.202, consistent with that approach, declares junkyards not conforming to state
statutory requirements to be public nuisances. MCL 600.2940(1) authorizes circuit courts to
hear claims for abatement of nuisances and to enjoin nuisances. MCL 600.8302(4)(a)
specifically states that, although district courts have jurisdiction to hear municipal civil infraction
cases, this does not deprive the circuit courts of jurisdiction to hear claims to abate nuisances, to
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determine the validity of municipal ordinances creating civil infractions, or to determine the
applicability of such ordinances to particular defendants. Therefore, the circuit court has
jurisdiction both of underlying claims involving nuisances resulting from violation of the
junkyard licensing ordinance and of declaratory judgment claims regarding the same subject.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court was wrong to grant summary disposition without
allowing discovery. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s entry of summary disposition de novo. West v General
Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). The standard is whether, when the
evidence is considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material
fact. MCR 2.116(C)(10); Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517
(1999). The nonmovant receives the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Hall v McRea Corp,
238 Mich App 361, 369-370; 605 NW2d 354 (1999), remanded on other grounds 465 Mich 919;
638 NW2d 748 (2001). The benefit of the doubt is given to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Marlo Beauty Supply, Inc v Farmers Ins Group, 227 Mich App 309, 320; 575
NW2d 324 (1998). If the record, when viewed in this way, leaves open an issue on which
reasonable minds could differ, summary disposition is inappropriate. Allstate Ins Co v Dep’t of
Mgmt & Budget, 259 Mich App 705; 675 NW2d 857 (2003). Summary disposition is rarely
proper in cases where credibility, intent or state of mind is crucial. Michigan Nat’l BankOakland v Wheeling, 165 Mich App 738, 744-745; 419 NW2d 746 (1988). Findings of fact may
not be made or credibility weighed by a court deciding a summary disposition motion. Skinner v
Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). Thus, when the truth of a material
factual assertion depends on credibility, a genuine factual issue exists and summary disposition
may not be granted. Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Reist, 167 Mich App 112, 121; 421 NW2d 592
(1988).
Under this standard, entry of summary disposition was appropriate. As to plaintiff’s
OMA claim, defendant presented unrefuted, corroborated evidence, through affidavits from its
clerk and supervisor, that the board went into closed session to meet with its attorney to discuss
enforcement procedures. Plaintiff presented nothing to counter it. Plaintiff asserts that, had he
been permitted to depose and cross-examine these persons, he might have been able to show
their statements to have been untrue. This is pure speculation and conjecture. Summary
disposition cannot be withheld on this basis. Detroit v General Motors Corp, 233 Mich App
132, 139; 592 NW2d 732 (1998). It was also uncontroverted that plaintiff had no license for his
junkyards, that operation of unlicensed junkyards is per se a public nuisance, and that a circuit
court has authority to abate such nuisances by enjoining them. Therefore, entry of summary
disposition in favor of defendant on its counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief was
also appropriate.
Plaintiff argues that the board’s unanimous vote to go into closed session as reflected in
the minutes was not taken by roll call as required by MCL 15.267 and therefore violated the
OMA. Plaintiff asserts that because the closed session involved a discussion between
defendant’s board and its attorney about legal enforcement strategies against plaintiff, the
enforcement action presumably was a result of the closed session, and because the closed session
was illegal, the enforcement action is barred. We disagree.
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We review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether, under a given set of facts, the
OMA has been violated. Morrison v East Lansing, 255 Mich App 505, 517; 660 NW2d 395
(2003); In re Jude, 228 Mich App 667, 670; 578 NW2d 704 (1998).
The vote to go into closed session was unanimous. Therefore, the positions of the
respective members were recorded as clearly as if a roll call vote had been taken. Any OMA
violation by not taking a roll call vote, then, had no practical effect, and so there is no basis for
granting relief to plaintiff because of it. Willis v Deerfield Twp, 257 Mich App, 541, 556-557;
669 NW2d 279 (2003).
Plaintiff next raises two arguments connected with the township board’s minutes, arguing
that the original minutes should have stated the reason for going into closed session, pursuant to
MCL 15.267 and MCL 15.269, and that the minutes were not corrected on this point in a timely
fashion, pursuant to MCL 15.269(1), as the correction was not made until six months later.
Plaintiff is correct that the initial minutes were deficient and that the correction was late.
However, there is nothing in the record to indicate, and plaintiff has presented no argument to
show, that any harm was caused by either violation. Therefore, there is no ground for affording
relief. Willis, supra, 257 Mich App 556-557. Moreover, given that the minutes have now been
corrected, the issue would appear to be moot. Morales v Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 32; 676
NW2d 221 (2003).
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in finding that the board went into closed
session for a proper purpose, i.e., the discussion of confidential matters with its attorney. There
is no question that this is a proper basis for a closed session of a public body, both pursuant to
statute, MCL 15.268(h) and MCL 15.243(1)(g), and case law, Booth Newspapers, Inc v Regents
of Univ of Mich, 93 Mich App 100, 106-107; 286 NW2d 55 (1979). However, plaintiff argues
that the attorney-client privilege may not be used as a pretext for discussing matters outside the
privilege in closed session simply because an attorney submits a document referring to the
matters. He then asserts that the board, in closed session, did exactly that by discussing the
merits of plaintiff’s junkyard applications and the pros and cons of taking enforcement action
against him.
Plaintiff is correct that the attorney-client privilege cannot be used as a pretext for
discussing non-privileged matters outside the privilege simply because an attorney is used as a
conduit for information. People v Whitney, 228 Mich App 230, 247-249; 578 NW2d 329 (1998).
However, he submitted no evidence to support his contention that the non-privileged matters
were discussed in the closed session, and the uncontroverted evidence is to the contrary. The
trial court, therefore, properly disregarded this contention under MCR 2.116(H), and properly
entered summary disposition in favor of defendant.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by not holding that the township board failed to
approve the minutes of its closed session, as required by MCL 15.267. He makes two arguments
on this point. The first is that, although there were two affidavits from township officials stating
that in approving the minutes for the August 14, 2002, meeting the board approved both the open
session minutes and the closed session minutes, this did not happen. However, as with the
previous issue, plaintiff offered no evidence to support this contention, and so it was properly
disregarded by the trial court. Second, plaintiff argues that MCL 15.267 does not allow open and
closed session minutes to be approved at the same time, but requires that their approval be
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separate. The short answer is that MCL 15.267 has no such requirement, and indeed is silent as
to the means by which minutes may be approved. The trial court did not err on this issue.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not invalidating, because
of OMA violations, actions that defendant’s board took at the August 14, 2002, meeting, in
denying his junkyard license applications, and in authorizing the township supervisor to issue
infraction citations to him. We disagree.
If a public body takes action in proceedings violating the OMA, and the violation impairs
the rights of the public, a trial court has discretion to invalidate the public body’s action. MCL
15.270(2); Morrison, supra, 255 Mich App 520-521. A trial court’s decision whether to
invalidate the public body’s action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Morrison, supra. This
Court “will invalidate a decision made in contravention of the OMA if noncompliance with the
OMA has impaired the rights of the public.” Jude, supra, 228 Mich App at 672. The standard of
review of the trial court’s decision whether a violation gives rise to the right to injunctive relief is
also an abuse of discretion. Morrison, supra, 255 Mich App at 520.
As our previous discussion makes clear, we do not believe that plaintiff has shown a
substantial violation of the OMA, and on that ground alone, we would not reverse the trial
court’s decision not to invalidate the township board actions. Willis, supra, 257 Mich App 556557. However, we note two additional points. First, the threshold requirement is that harm to
the public be shown, and plaintiff has shown none. Instead, there is unrefuted evidence that
plaintiff was committing public nuisances with his junkyards and that defendant’s board, after
confidential conversation with its attorney on how to do so, proceeded with enforcement action
against plaintiff and did so openly. This is the precise opposite of harm to the public, and the
action was done openly, in a way that did not violate the openness of government that the OMA
protects. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying relief to plaintiff on this
claim.1
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in not granting injunctive relief to enjoin
any future OMA violations by defendant. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether a violation gives rise to the right to
injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. Morrison, supra, 255 Mich App 520. The usual rule
that injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only when justice requires it, there
is no adequate remedy at law, and there is a real and imminent danger of irreparable injury
applies in OMA cases. Nicholas v Meridian Twp, 239 Mich App 525, 533-534; 609 NW2d 574
(2000). Plaintiff has shown none. The worst that the record establishes, with respect to
defendant’s actions, is that its minutes originally failed to state clearly how and why the board
went into closed session and that it corrected this deficiency belatedly, though it has now done
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Because we reject plaintiff’s argument on this basis, we find it unnecessary to address
defendant’s contentions that plaintiff’s claim for invalidation of the actions was untimely, that he
lacked standing to bring the claim, and that the issue is now moot.
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so. This is hardly the type of conduct that provides a basis for injunctive relief. The trial court,
therefore, did not abuse its discretion in declining to order it.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by not awarding him attorney fees. We
disagree.
Entitlement to an award of attorney fees is a question of construction of a statute, MCL
15.271(4), so this Court reviews the trial court’s ruling on it de novo. See Manning v East
Tawas, 234 Mich App 244, 253-254; 593 NW2d 649 (1999).
Attorney fees are available only when a party “succeeds in obtaining relief in the action.”
MCL 15.271(4). Plaintiff has obtained no relief in this action. Therefore, he is not entitled to
attorney fees.
Defendant asks this Court to award it costs and attorney fees on appeal for the reason that
plaintiff’s appeal is wholly frivolous. This Court may award costs and attorney fees, on its own
motion or that of a party, as a sanction for a vexatious appeal. MCR 7.216(C)(1), DeWald v
Isola (After Remand), 188 Mich App 697, 700; 470 NW2d 505 (1991). The rule is designed to
prevent clear abuse of the appellate process. Haliw v Sterling Heights, 257 Mich App 689, 704;
669 NW2d 563 (2003), lv gtd 470 Mich 869; 682 NW2d 84 (2004). If an appeal is taken for
purposes of hindrance and delay, or in the absence of a reasonable basis for believing that the
party has a meritorious issue to raise, or if the party grossly disregards the requirement that
issues be fairly presented to the court, it is vexatious. Id. at 702-703; MCR 7.216(C)(1)(a).
We believe that under that standard, this appeal is vexatious, and costs and attorney fees
should be awarded as a sanction. Plaintiff’s arguments in this appeal are without merit. Plaintiff
surely had no reasonable basis to believe that it had meritorious issues to raise with respect to,
for example, the existence of jurisdiction in the circuit court, its entitlement to injunctive relief,
or there being a basis for this Court to rule that matters outside the attorney-client privilege were
discussed in the closed session. Moreover, plaintiff’s statements to this Court on this and other
factual issues with no support in the record and with uncontroverted evidence to the contrary,
breached the duty of fair representation of matters to the tribunal.
Affirmed, with costs and attorney fees on appeal awarded to defendant. The trial court
shall, on remand, determine the appropriate amount to be awarded. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
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