DETROIT EDISON CO V MPSC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
ASSOCIATION, ALGER DELTA
COOPERATIVE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION,
CHERRYLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
CLOVERLAND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
GREAT LAKES ENERGY COOPERATIVE,
HOMEWORKS TRI-COUNTY ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, MIDWEST ENERGY
COOPERATIVE, ONTONAGON COUNTY
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ASSOCIATION,
PRESQUE ISLE ELECTRIC & GAS
COOPERATIVE, and THUMB ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE,
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2004
Appellants,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR FAIR
COMPETITION, DETROIT EDISON
COMPANY, ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESSES
ADVOCATING TARIFF EQUITY, ENERGY
MICHIGAN, INC., CONSUMERS ENERGY
COMPANY, WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPORATION, UPPER PENINSULA POWER
COMPANY, WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY, d/b/a WE ENERGIES, and
NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY
WISCONSIN, d/b/a XCEL ENERGY,
Appellees.
CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY,
Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
and
-1-
No. 244425
MPSC
LC No. 00-012134
MICHIGAN STATE UTILITY WORKERS
COUNCIL,
Intervenor-Cross-Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
and MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR FAIR
COMPETITION,
No. 244429
MPSC
LC No. 00-012134
Appellees-Cross-Appellees,
and
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, ASSOCIATION
OF BUSINESSES ADVOCATING TARIFF
EQUITY,
ENERGY
MICHIGAN,
INC.,
WISCONSIN
PUBLIC
SERVICE
CORPORATION, UPPER PENINSULA POWER
COMPANY, WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY, d/b/a WE ENERGIES, NORTHERN
STATES POWER COMPANY, d/b/a XCEL
ENERGY,
and
MICHIGAN
ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
Appellees.
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY,
Appellant,
v
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR FAIR
COMPETITION, MIDLAND COGENERATION
VENTURE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESSES
ADVOCATING TARIFF EQUITY, ENERGY
MICHIGAN, INC., CONSUMERS ENERGY
COMPANY, WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPORATION, UPPER PENINSULA POWER
COMPANY, WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY, d/b/a WE ENERGIES, NORTHERN
STATES POWER COMPANY WISCONSIN,
-2-
o. 244531
N
MPSC
LC No. 00-012134
d/b/a XCEL ENERGY, and MICHIGAN
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
Appellees.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Markey and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases appellants Michigan Electric Cooperative Association
(MECA), Consumers Energy Company (CEC), Michigan State Utility Workers Council, and
Detroit Edison Company (DEC) appeal as of right orders entered by appellee Michigan Public
Service Commission (PSC) approving compliance plans and granting in part and denying in part
the utilities’ requests for waivers. We affirm in each case.
I. Underlying Facts and Proceedings
DEC and CEC agreed to adhere to provisional codes of conduct designed to govern their
relationships with their affiliates in connection with their retail open access programs.1
Subsequently, the PSC initiated a contested case proceeding pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq., to determine what modifications, if any, should be
made to the codes of conduct. Prior to the issuance of a final order in the case, 2000 PA 141, the
Customer Choice and Electricity Reliability Act (Act 141), MCL 460.10 et seq., became
effective. Act 141 required the PSC to establish a code of conduct applicable to all electric
utilities. MCL 460.10a(4) provided:
Within 180 days after the effective date of the amendatory act that added
this section, the commission shall establish a code of conduct that shall apply to
all electric utilities. The code of conduct shall include, but is not limited to,
measures to prevent cross-subsidization, information sharing, and preferential
treatment, between a utilities regulated and unregulated services, whether those
services are provided by the utility or the utility’s affiliated entities. The code of
conduct established under this subsection shall also be applicable to electric
utilities and alternative electric suppliers consistent with section 10, this section,
and sections 10b through 10bb.
After conducting further hearings, the PSC adopted a new code of conduct applicable to
all electric utilities and alternative electric suppliers. The PSC concluded that the language of
1
Retail open access refers to the ability of a utility’s customers to purchase electric power from
either a competitive affiliate of the utility or an alternative electric power supplier, and to have
the utility deliver the power to the point of use.
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MCL 460.10a(4) indicated that the Legislature intended the code of conduct to apply beyond
those services directly related to retail open access.2
Appellants filed compliance plans and requests for waivers from various sections of the
code of conduct. The PSC approved the compliance plans, and granted in part and denied in part
the waiver requests. The waiver orders contained guidelines to which appellants were required
to adhere to maintain full functional separation between regulated and unregulated activities.
II. Analysis
A party aggrieved by an order of the PSC must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the order is unlawful or unreasonable. MCL 462.26(8). To establish that a PSC order is
unlawful, the appellant must show that the PSC failed to follow a mandatory statute or abused its
discretion in the exercise of its judgment. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich
396, 427; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). An order is unreasonable if it is not supported by the evidence.
Associated Truck Lines, Inc v Public Service Comm, 377 Mich 259, 279; 140 NW2d 515 (1966).
We give due deference to the PSC’s administrative expertise, and will not substitute our
judgment for that of the PSC. Attorney General v Public Service Comm No 2, 237 Mich App 82,
88; 602 NW2d 225 (1999). A reviewing court must give great weight to any reasonable
construction of a regulatory scheme that the PSC is empowered to administer. Champion’s Auto
Ferry, Inc v Public Service Comm, 231 Mich App 699, 708; 588 NW2d 153 (1998).
The law of the case doctrine provides that an appellate ruling on a particular issue binds
the appellate court and all lower tribunals with regard to that issue. A question of law decided by
an appellate court will not be decided differently on remand or in a subsequent appeal in the
same case. Reeves v Cincinnati, Inc (After Remand), 208 Mich App 556, 559; 528 NW2d 787
(1995). The doctrine applies to questions specifically decided in an earlier decision and to
questions necessarily determined to arrive at that decision. Webb v Smith (After Second
Remand), 224 Mich App 203, 209; 568 NW2d 378 (1997).
In these appeals of the compliance and waiver orders entered pursuant to the code of
conduct, appellants raise the following arguments: the PSC exceeded its statutory authority by
requiring compliance with a code of conduct for nonregulated activities not directly related to
retail open access and by denying waiver requests for such activities; the PSC acted unlawfully
by denying waiver requests and requiring adherence to guidelines pursuant to a code of conduct
2
DEC, MECA, AND CEC appealed the PSC’s orders, arguing that: the PSC exceeded its
authority by imposing a code of conduct on unregulated activities not related to retail open
access; the PSC violated the APA by failing to promulgate the code of conduct as a rule; the
code of conduct improperly usurps management activities; the code of conduct is
unconstitutionally vague; the code of conduct is invalid at least in part because it is preempted by
federal law; and the code of conduct violates various provisions of the United States
Constitution. In Detroit Edison Co v Public Service Comm, 261 Mich App 1; 680 NW2d 512
(2004), another panel of this Court rejected appellants’ arguments and affirmed the PSC’s orders.
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that was not promulgated under the rulemaking provisions of the APA; the code of conduct and
the waiver orders unlawfully usurp management decisions; the code of conduct is
unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to give adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited, and
the waiver orders are unlawful because they do not exempt utilities from complying with the
code of conduct; the code of conduct, at least in part, is preempted by federal law; and the code
of conduct violates various constitutional provisions.
Each of these arguments was raised and rejected in appellants’ appeals of the PSC’s
orders adopting the code of conduct. Detroit Edison Co, supra.3 In that case we held as follows:
the Legislature’s use of expansive language in MCL 460.10a(4) to describe the code of conduct
provided the PSC a legislative mandate to adopt a code of conduct that applied to utilities’
unregulated activities not directly related to retail open access, id. at 9-10; the code of conduct is
not a rule that must be promulgated pursuant to the APA because it comes within the parameters
of the exception to the definition of a rule in MCL 24.207(f), id. at 11-12; the PSC’s
implementation of the code of conduct does not intrude on management decisions of regulated
utilities, id. at 12-13; the code of conduct is not unconstitutionally vague, and uses terms that are
as reasonably precise as possible under the circumstances, id. at 15-16; the code of conduct is not
preempted by federal law, id. at 13-14; and the claim that the code of conduct violated various
constitutional provisions is speculative and not ripe for review, id. at 16.4
The law of the case doctrine requires that we adhere to the holdings in that decision in
these appeals, Reeves, supra; Webb, supra, and to conclude that the PSC’s compliance and
waiver orders are not unlawful or unreasonable. MCL 462.26(8). The PSC had the statutory
authority to require appellants to conduct unregulated activities in compliance with the code of
conduct, Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 155-159; 596 NW2d 126
(1995), and did not exceed its authority by denying appellants’ requests for waivers for
unregulated activities not directly related to retail open access. The contested case proceeding
3
That decision sets out the substantive law for each argument raised by appellants in these
appeals.
4
At oral argument, appellants argued that there exists a conflict between Michigan Electric v
MPSC, 252 Mich App 254; 652 NW2d 1 (2002), and Detroit Edison, supra. We disagree. The
primary distinction between the two cases is statutory nomenclature. In the earlier Michigan
Electric case, we found that the MPSC intentionally avoided prescribed rulemaking procedures
by instituting a “contested case” against nobody in particular and invited concerned companies to
intervene. Michigan Electric, supra, at 267-268. We said that the action was not a bona fide
“contested case,” so the resulting order was improperly adopted absent the MPSC’s adherence to
ordinary rulemaking strictures. Id. In Detroit Edison we did not even approach this issue
because the MPSC clearly named a party, and it was truly a “contested case.” Detroit Edison,
supra, at 11. Therefore, the order produced was not a “rule,” MCL 24.207(f), that would require
the MPSC to follow rulemaking procedure. Rather, it was an order from a contested case that
acts as binding precedent. Id. Because the latter denomination applies to the instant “contested
case” just as it did in Detroit Edison, Michigan Electric is distinguishable.
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afforded all participants due process of law, see Westland Convalescent Center v BCBSM, 414
Mich 247, 269; 324 NW2d 851 (1982), and produced a code of conduct and waiver orders that
were supported by the requisite evidence. Const 1963, art 6, § 28. Furthermore, because the
code of conduct does not usurp management prerogatives and is neither unconstitutionally vague
nor preempted by federal law, the waiver orders, which determine whether and in what manner
the code of conduct applies to specific activities undertaken by the utilities but do not require
utilities to either cease any activities or commence engaging in particular activities, are similarly
valid. Finally, the constitutional claims have been afforded no further development, and
continue to be without factual context and to lack ripeness.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the PSC in each case.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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