IN RE BRANDON RICHARD FREDRICKSON MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRANDON RICHARD
FREDRICKSON, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 27, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 249959
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-052108-NA
ANNTOENETTE LYNN FREDRICKSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KEVIN JAMES FREDRICKSON,
Respondent.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to
exist), (c)(ii) (new conditions exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j)
(child will be harmed if returned to parent).1 We affirm.
Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights
to her son, who was eight years old at the time of the termination proceedings. Specifically,
respondent alleges that, prior to March 2003, petitioner made no referrals for services to
respondent, and that this failure to provide timely referrals impeded respondent’s compliance
with the terms of the parent/agency agreement. Respondent contends that, in light of petitioner’s
1
The court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s father, Kevin James Fredrickson,
who has been in a North Dakota prison since 2001. He has not appealed that decision and is not
a party to this appeal.
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minimal assistance and the fact that referrals were not made in earnest until three or four months
prior to trial, the trial court clearly erred in concluding, despite findings of partial compliance on
the part of respondent, that termination of her parental rights was warranted.
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Once a statutory
ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence, the court must order termination
of parental rights, unless the court finds from the evidence on the whole record that termination
is clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341,
353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The court’s decision is reviewed for clear error. Id. at 356-357. A
finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left
with a firm and definite conviction a mistake was made. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445
NW2d 161 (1989). To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or probably
wrong. In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). In applying the clearly
erroneous standard, regard must be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to assess the
credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. MCR 2.613(C); Miller, supra at 337.
This case began in December 2001, when the minor child was removed from
respondent’s custody. The principal conditions that led to the adjudication were respondent’s
alcohol and substance abuse, mental health issues, domestic violence, and neglect. The petition
alleged that respondent had been found passed out in the grass with a blood alcohol level of 0.30.
Her son helped a neighbor get his mother back in the house. On more than one occasion,
respondent was found to be intoxicated to the point that she was unable to care for her son.
Respondent suffers from an alcohol addiction that has spanned a period of at least twelve years.
Respondent admitted to an amended petition in January 2002, and her son became a ward of the
court in April 2002.
At the termination proceedings which began in April 2003, respondent admitted that she
was given a parent/agency agreement in February 2002, which required parenting classes, a
psychological evaluation, psychiatric services, substance abuse assessment, domestic aggression
counseling, suitable housing and income, and regular visitation. However, in April 2002, shortly
after adjudication, respondent moved to Colorado, where her parents lived, and remained there
for approximately seven months. She was extremely ill and suffering from liver failure at this
time due to her drinking. Respondent unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an interstate compact
to allow her son to move in with her parents. Respondent testified that she was sober for six of
the seven months she spent in Colorado, but started drinking again before she returned to
Michigan. Respondent admitted that she had made poor choices and had chosen not to do
anything about recovery between the time she returned from Colorado until she finally entered
her current treatment beginning in early 2003. Indeed, the record indicates that on her return to
Michigan, respondent was hospitalized from mid-November to mid-December 2002, on account
of her excessive drinking and a kidnapping that resulted in a rape and beating. She was
hospitalized again on December 24, 2002, for three days for alcohol poisoning. Respondent was
sent to a “three-quarter” house at Faith Recovery Center in Lincoln Park, but she was terminated
from the program because she left for an extended period of time without permission.
Respondent testified that after her return from Colorado, her “main issue” had been to
focus on her substance abuse problem. Respondent explained that she did not start attending
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parenting classes or domestic aggression therapy because her therapist wanted her to concentrate
only on her dual diagnoses. Respondent admitted, however, that her therapist did not
specifically state that she should not do any other classes; rather, respondent simply assumed that
was what the therapist had intended.
Respondent testified that she had been sober since February 18, 2003. She stated that she
was attending AA or NA meetings on a regular basis, had started a twelve-step group in her
church, attended group counseling twice a week, continued individual counseling, and met with
her sponsor on a regular basis. Respondent acknowledged that she was working hard to stay
sober and, realistically, was just at the beginning of recovery and mental health treatment. At the
time of the termination hearing, she was on a waiting list for parenting classes and had started an
anger management class. Respondent felt that she was bonding with her son and stated that her
visits with him had gone well, although she had missed some visits or was late because of
transportation problems. Respondent testified that she had turned her life around and wanted her
son to be part of it. Respondent repeatedly claimed that she had not received any referrals for
any treatments required under the parent/agency agreement until March 2003, following a court
hearing. In essence, respondent blamed petitioner for her inability to follow through with the
requirements of the parent/agency agreement during the fifteen-month period preceding the
termination hearing.
However, the testimony provided by respondent’s current caseworker and her foster care
worker contradicted respondent’s contention that petitioner’s failure to provide referrals in effect
precluded respondent’s compliance with the parent/agency agreement. The caseworker testified
that she had given respondent referrals for parenting classes after respondent returned from
Colorado and that respondent had not completed the classes. The caseworker spoke to
respondent weekly while respondent was in Colorado, mailed her a copy of the parent/agency
agreement, and advised her to find a place to go for parenting classes and to provide
documentation. However, such documentation was never forthcoming. When respondent
returned from Colorado in October 2002, the caseworker met her for the first time at the
permanency planning hearing on December 4, 2002, and gave her another copy of the
parent/agency agreement. The caseworker testified that shortly thereafter she gave respondent
parenting, substance abuse, and psychological referrals. Respondent, however, was hospitalized
on December 18, 2002, and never attended the parenting classes or the substance abuse
evaluation and did not obtain a psychological referral.
Upon respondent’s return from Colorado, she was referred by her caseworker to
treatment and parenting programs in Ann Arbor. According to the caseworker, respondent’s
boyfriend had indicated that he was attending treatment in Ann Arbor three or four times a week,
and respondent would therefore be able to attend therapy and classes there. Drug screens were
also set up in Ann Arbor at respondent’s request. However, the caseworker testified that
respondent missed phone calls and urine tests and failed to complete twelve weeks of drug
screens as required by the parent/agency agreement. Those drug screens that actually were done
were negative. The caseworker testified that respondent likewise failed to provide the requisite
documentation showing compliance with portions of the parent/agency agreement. In addition,
the caseworker testified that respondent was required to participate in psychiatric services and
had, in fact, been seeing a counselor since April 2003. The caseworker also gave respondent a
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referral for anger management in March 2003. The caseworker testified that, because of
respondent’s hospitalizations and the like, some referrals were not made until early 2003.
Respondent’s caseworker opined that respondent had not complied with the requirement
that she provide suitable housing. Since returning from Colorado in October 2002, respondent
had lived at various addresses with her boyfriend’s parents, with a friend, and at places in
Brighton, Taylor, Lincoln Park, and the Cass Corridor, in addition to time at Faith Recovery and
in Brighton Hospital. Her longest stay had been three months at a trailer in Taylor. She had also
been homeless, apparently after being terminated from Faith Recovery.
Respondent
acknowledged that these frequent moves did not provide a stable environment for her son. At
the time of the termination hearing, respondent and her boyfriend lived with his cousin in the
upper portion of a duplex, but she testified that they were remodeling the lower portion to turn it
into a three-bedroom home for themselves and her son.
The caseworker further testified that at the time of the termination hearing, respondent
was unemployed, having been fired from her job at a gas station, and received disability income
that was insufficient to provide for her son or to allow her to be self-sufficient. Respondent had
not gone to all of her visits with her son; some were suspended, respondent missed one, she was
hospitalized for several, and she was usually late. Respondent had missed several drug screens,
but those actually done were negative. According to the caseworker, respondent had continually
failed to follow through with the required documentation requests to confirm her alleged
compliance with parts of the parent/agency agreement. The caseworker ultimately recommended
termination of respondent’s parental rights, concluding that the conditions of the original petition
still existed and would not be rectified in the near future. The caseworker specifically noted that,
at the time of the termination hearing, respondent had only been sober for three or four months;
in addition, there was a problem with her housing and employment.
Another foster care worker who had been supervising respondent since March 2002
testified at the termination hearing that she referred respondent for a psychological evaluation in
December 2002 and made a second referral for evaluation in Monroe County three weeks before
the termination hearing. Despite respondent’s assertions that she could not contact the doctor,
the foster care worker had no difficulty reaching his office. She also gave respondent detailed
advice about services to seek in Colorado, but testified that respondent did none of them. The
foster care worker testified that respondent had not completed the twelve weeks of drug screens
as required by the parent/agency agreement.
The trial court concluded that termination had been substantiated under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). In so holding, the court noted that respondent had
continually tried to maintain sobriety, but the court expressed concern about the magnitude of the
problem and discounted her claims regarding the length of her sobriety in the past. The court
further noted that, although respondent had some income, it was insufficient to support
respondent and her son. The court found partial compliance with the parent/agency agreement,
but found on the basis of the testimony that respondent had housing, transportation, and health
problems that made her compliance inconsistent at best. The court believed that some of
respondent’s testimony concerning referrals, or the lack thereof, might have been inaccurate
because of her drinking. In addition, the court concluded that while respondent’s boyfriend was
a vital support person, they had been together for only a short time and had met in rehabilitation,
making joint relapses possible. Moreover, the court opined that respondent’s partial compliance
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with visitations detrimentally affected her bonding with her son. The court concluded under the
circumstances that termination of respondent’s parental rights was warranted.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly
err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights had been established by
clear and convincing evidence. Respondent’s recent period of sobriety, standing alone, was
insufficient to preclude termination of her parental rights. See In re CR, 250 Mich App 185,
194-197; 646 NW2d 506 (2002). The testimony shows that despite petitioner’s assistance,
respondent was unable to fulfill the requirements of the parent/agency agreement. Respondent’s
testimony reflected that she blamed petitioner for her inability to follow through with the
requirements of the parent/agency agreement. However, the record indicates that, while some
referrals were not made until early 2003, this was attributable in significant part to respondent’s
own actions, i.e., her hospitalizations and inconsistent contact with her caseworkers.
In fact, the evidence indicates that respondent was only able to concentrate on her
substance abuse therapy at the time of the termination hearing. Respondent testified that her
therapist did not feel she was able to handle the parenting classes or the anger management
classes, which the trial court ordered. While respondent has apparently remained sober since
February 2003, this case has been pending since December 2001, and respondent, by her own
admission, did nothing to address the requirements of the parent/agency agreement until the case
was almost at termination. Respondent also failed to provide documentation, as requested by
petitioner, concerning her AA attendance and social security assistance. Moreover, her income
and housing situation were problematic.
Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly found that the evidence supported the
termination of respondent’s parental rights, since more than 182 days had elapsed, the conditions
which led to the adjudication continued to exist, and there was no reasonable expectation, given
the minor child’s age, that they would be rectified within a reasonable time, despite the
assistance of petitioner. In light of all of the evidence which was presented, the trial court did
not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii) had been established by clear and
convincing evidence.
The trial court likewise did not clearly err in finding that the statutory requirements of
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) had been established because the evidence clearly and convincingly
indicated that respondent was unable to care for her son, and there was not a reasonable
expectation that this would change in the foreseeable future. As previously noted, while
respondent was making progress toward maintaining sobriety, she was focusing on her substance
abuse problem, to the exclusion of the other issues that also needed to be addressed. Respondent
was unable to devote the time necessary to complete the parent/agency agreement and, thus,
could not devote the time and resources necessary to care for an active eight-year-old boy. The
evidence showed that respondent was unable to financially support her son or herself
independently of her boyfriend, whom she had known for only six months. In the eighteen
months that this case was pending, respondent was only able to maintain sobriety for the last four
or five months and to attend substance abuse therapy two times per week. Respondent only
partially fulfilled the remaining requirements of the parent/agency agreement. Consequently, the
trial court did not clearly err in concluding that respondent cannot provide proper care and
custody for her son, and there is no likelihood that this will change in the foreseeable future. See
In re CR, supra at 194-197.
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Finally, the evidence did not establish that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was contrary to the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, supra. Once the trial court finds that at
least one of the statutory criteria has been met, the court shall order termination of the parental
rights, unless the evidence demonstrates that termination is clearly not in the child’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 353. Although there was evidence of a bond
and that respondent and her son loved each other, termination was clearly in the child’s best
interest in light of respondent’s failure to consistently address and fulfill the requirements of the
parent/agency agreement. Despite the ample time given to respondent, she still has not
addressed the problems which led to the minor child being taken into care. As noted above,
respondent has not been able to demonstrate a consistent treatment plan to maintain her own
stability. Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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