OCWEN FEDERAL BANK FSB V INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN MUSIC MINISTRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
OCWEN FEDERAL BANK, FSB, a foreign
banking corporation,
UNPUBLISHED
July 8, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN MUSIC
MINISTRY, INC. d/b/a LATE NIGHT PRAISE
AND WORSHIP,
No. 249081
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003301-CH
Defendant-Appellant,
and
PERCY L. LEWIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this mortgage case, defendants International Christian Music Ministry, Inc. and Percy
Lewis appeal as of right the grant of plaintiff’s motions for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7), (C)(9), and (C)(10) and MCR 3.411 (civil action to determine interests in land).
Plaintiff is a bank that held a mortgage on a parcel of property. Defendants, who had business
dealings with the owners of the property, sued the owners and obtained a consent judgment
which the owners failed to pay. Meanwhile, the owners defaulted on their mortgage and plaintiff
foreclosed. Shortly thereafter, in another county, without plaintiff’s knowledge, defendants
obtained an order of conveyance granting them the property. Plaintiff filed this suit to determine
the interests of the parties in the property. In granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition, the trial court declared the order of conveyance null and void and vested title in
plaintiff. We reverse.
I. FACTS
In 1993, Gregory Oakwood conveyed a single-family residence located at 4050
McKinley in China Township, Michigan and appurtenant real property to “Unity Community an
Organization of the International Christian Music Ministry, Inc.” for $325,000.00. “Unity
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Community” was a Michigan non-profit corporation originally incorporated in 1987. The
president of Unity Community was Garnell H. McAfee, Sr. In 1995 and 1996, McAfee, as
president, executed a series of deeds conveying the property to himself and his wife, Marilyn
McAfee, effective July 15, 1996. The same day, the McAfees mortgaged the property for
$200,000. That mortgage was assigned to plaintiff, Ocwen Federal Bank “Ocwen.”
In November, 1996, International Christian Music Ministry, Inc. “ICMM” filed a lawsuit
against Unity Community d/b/a Unity Community Trust in Wayne Circuit Court. Their
complaint alleged that Unity Community had breached several contracts for advertising and
television commercials. ICMM sought $512,408 in damages.
During the pendency of Unity Community’s lawsuit with ICMM, the McAfees fell
behind on their mortgage payments and defaulted on their mortgage loan in 1999. Following the
publication of foreclosure notices and posting of the affidavit of publication, a sheriff’s deed on
mortgage sale was issued July 23, 1999 to Ocwen for the outstanding balance owed of
$276,783.94.
On June 24, 1999, ICMM filed a motion to convey real estate in its Wayne Circuit Court
lawsuit against Unity Community pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA),
MCL 566.31, et seq. In its brief in support of this motion, ICMM alleged that Unity Community
had breached the terms of a consent judgment by failing to pay ICMM $207,000.00 by April 1,
1999. ICMM alleged that Unity Community was in violation of UFTA because it was stripping
itself of assets by conveying the property to the McAfees.
Judge Kaye Tertzag of the Wayne Circuit Court then entered the requested order for
conveyance of real estate on September 3, 1999. The McAfees, on behalf of Unity Community,
filed a motion for reconsideration to convey real estate wherein they expressly stated that they
had a mortgage on this property (apparently throughout the trial McAfee was routinely dishonest
and that is why neither the attorneys nor Judge Tertzag gave credence to his claim that the
property was mortgaged). Nonetheless, on April 13, 2000, Judge Tertzag entered a modified
order for conveyance of real estate that conveyed the property to ICMM and Percy Lewis
(ICMM’s attorney) and declared the recorded declarations of homestead and patent on the
property to be void and of no effect. Defendants recorded their rights to the title on September 3,
1999.
Ocwen was never a party to the Wayne Circuit Court lawsuit and did not know of ICMM
and Lewis’ interests in the property until after the mortgagor’s equity of redemption period had
ended and Ocwen was attempting to recover the property. Ocwen and ICMM and Lewis
attempted to negotiate a settlement, but failed.
In December, 2001, Ocwen filed suit in St. Clair Circuit Court to determine interest in the
land. On January 23, 2002, Ocwen filed in Wayne Circuit Court a motion for relief from and to
set aside the order of conveyance of real estate and a motion to intervene. Judge Tertzag denied
both motions without prejudice, informing the parties that they should take care of the lawsuit in
St. Clair County, where the property is located.
In March, 2002, ICMM and Lewis requested a change of venue from St. Clair County to
Wayne County because Judge Tertzag in Wayne county had conveyed the real estate to ICMM
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and Lewis in 1999. St. Clair Judge Daniel Kelly denied the motion. In February, 2003, ICMM
and Lewis moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred by prior
judgment). In March, 2003, Ocwen filed its motion for summary disposition and Judge Kelly
heard oral arguments on both motions on April 14, 2003. ICMM and Lewis argued that Judge
Tertzag had already conveyed the property to them and Judge Kelly could not stay or set aside
the conveyance subject to the limitations of MCR 2.613(B). Furthermore, they argued that
because the 1993 deed conveyed the property to “Unity Community, an organization of
International Christian Music Ministry,” they had an interest in the property as co-tenants
beginning in 1993. Ocwen argued ICMM had no interest in the property because it was entirely
separate from Unity Community and that the order of Judge Tertzag was ineffective against
Ocwen.
On April 30, 2003, Judge Kelly issued an opinion granting summary disposition to
Ocwen and quieting title to the property in Ocwen. He determined that Unity Community was a
separate entity from ICMM and the 1993 deed did not create a tenancy in common. He relied on
depositions of ICMM’s president Kenneth Wilson, who testified that ICMM and Unity
Community have different officers and tax identification numbers and are entirely distinct.
Further, all of the funds used to purchase the property were from Unity Community and the deed
to the property was returned to the address of Unity Community, not ICMM. Finally, he noted
that all property taxes on the subject property were paid by the McAfees and Unity Community.
Judge Kelly also found that at the time of the Wayne County lawsuit, Ocwen was a
necessary party in interest and its joinder in the action was compulsory under MCR 2.205. Thus,
he concluded, the order of conveyance issued by Judge Tertzag was null and void. He vested
title in fee simple absolute in Ocwen and summarily dismissed the claims of ICMM and Lewis.
This appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of whether Judge Kelly properly declared an order of Judge Tertzag to be null
and void involves a question of law, and we review questions of law de novo. Sun Communities
v Leroy Twp, 241 MichApp 665, 668; 617 NW2d 42 (2000).
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision granting summary disposition. Spiek v
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although the trial court did not
specify which court rule it relied upon in granting summary disposition, it appears the trial court
considered information outside the pleadings in its decision and concluded that there was no
genuine issue of material fact (MCR 2.116(C)(10)).
This Court must review the record in the same manner as must the trial court to determine
whether the movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Michigan Educational
Employees Mutual Ins Co v Turow, 242 Mich App 112, 114-115; 617 NW2d 725 (2000).
Review is limited to the evidence which had been presented to the trial court at the time the
motion was decided. Peña v Ingham County Road Comm, 255 Mich App 299, 313 n 4; 660
NW2d 351 (2003).
III. ANALYSIS
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Defendants argue that as a matter of law, the St. Clair Circuit Court did not have the
authority to render an order from the Wayne Circuit Court null and void contrary to MCR
2.613(B). We agree.
Judge Tertzag issued an order of conveyance granting the property to defendants and
declaring the series of conveyances resulting in the transfer of the property from Unity
Community to the McAfees to be null and void. Judge Tertzag exercised this authority pursuant
to a section of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, MCL 566.221, which states:
Every conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any estate or interest
in lands, or in goods or things in action, or of any rents or profits issuing
therefrom, and any charge upon lands, goods or things in action, or upon the rents
or profits thereof, made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or
other persons of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts or demands, and
every bond or other evidence of debt given, suit commenced, decree or judgment
suffered, with the like intent, as against the persons so hindered, delayed or
defrauded, shall be void.
As both the trial court and plaintiff noted, plaintiff should have been included in the Wayne
County lawsuit as soon as the property became an issue. Under MCR 2.205, plaintiff was a
necessary party because it had “such interests in the subject matter of an action that their
presence in the action is essential to permit the court to render complete relief” and thus was
required to be made a party. MCR 2.205. The deed to the property upon which plaintiff held a
mortgage was declared void. Nonetheless, plaintiff was never a party to the lawsuit in Wayne
County.
When plaintiff moved to intervene in the lawsuit, Judge Tertzag denied the motion and
stated that the issue should be resolved in St. Clair County. Plaintiffs did not appeal this
decision. However, Judge Kelly could not find that plaintiff had a superior interest in the
property and defendants had no interest in the property without declaring Judge Tertzag’s order
invalid. MCR 2.613(B) states, in relevant part: “[a] judgment or order may be set aside or
vacated, and a proceeding under a judgment or order may be stayed, only by the judge who
entered the judgment or order, unless the judge is absent or unable to act . . .” (emphasis added).
Dean Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice (4th Ed), § 2.613.5, p 517, interpreted this rule
as follows:
If a judgment or order is to be set aside, vacated or stayed, it should normally be
done only by the judge who made the judgment or order, since he or she is best
qualified to pass upon the matter, and since it would obviously detract from the
dignity and stability of judicial action if a dissatisfied litigant could run around
seeking to have it upset by other trial judges. This is the sense of MCR 2.613(B),
which was derived from a former statute.
Although certainly frustrating to both parties, each of whom attempted to resolve this issue in
Wayne County, the court rule is very clear that only Judge Tertzag is allowed to set aside his
order of conveyance. Thus, the trial court erred when it denied defendants’ motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) because plaintiffs claims in St. Clair County are barred by
the prior judgment of Judge Tertzag in Wayne County.
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Defendants argue that Judge Kelly had the power to set aside Judge Tertag’s order
pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(f) which allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order
or proceeding for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” We
disagree. MCR 2.612 specifically addresses acceptable reasons for setting aside a judgment or
order, whereas MCR 2.613 provides limitations on who may set aside an error. Here, the
question we are addressing is whether Judge Kelly was the appropriate judge to correct this error,
not whether relief from this order should have been granted. Interpretation of court rules is
subject to the same basic principles which govern statutory interpretation. Saint George Greek
Orthodox Church of Southgate, Michigan v Laupmanis Associates, P C 204 Mich App 278, 282;
514 NW2d 516 (1994). Statutes which may appear to conflict are to be read together and
reconciled, if at all possible. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 65; 214
NW2d 803 (1974). When two statutes are capable of a construction that avoids conflict, that
construction should control. Jackson v Community College v Dep't of Treasury, 241 Mich App
673, 681; 621 NW2d 707 (2000). Only when conflict exists between two statutes should the one
that is more specific to the subject matter prevail. In re Brown, 229 Mich App 496, 501; 582
NW2d 530 (1998). Thus, MCR 2.613 controls this issue and defendants’ argument is without
merit.
Our determination that the trial court erred in declaring the order of conveyance null and
void renders defendants’ other issues about whether the trial court made improper factual
findings moot. In sum, the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary
disposition and in declaring the order of conveyance null and void. Further, the trial court erred
in denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Bill Schuette
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